11.10.2007 22:15

The defeat of a large grouping of Nazi troops near Moscow and the successful counter-offensive of the Red Army near Tikhvin created favorable conditions for inflicting new blows on the enemy. In order to liberate Leningrad from the blockade and defeat the main forces of Army Group North, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command developed a plan for the strategic operation of the Leningrad, Volkhov Fronts and the right wing of the North-Western Front. The main hostilities unfolded in January-April 1942 in the zone of the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front. Subsequently, these actions were called the Luban offensive operation.

For the first time, the action plan of the Soviet army in the upcoming Luban operation was outlined by Marshal B. Shaposhnikov at a meeting with I. Stalin on December 12, 1941. The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 17, the Volkhov Front, consisting of the 4th, 59th, 2nd shock and 52nd armies, was tasked with going on a general offensive, with the aim of defeating the German troops defending along the western bank of the Volkhov, and the main forces armies to drive to the line of Art. Luban - Art. Cholovo. In the future, advance in a northwestern direction, surround the enemy near Leningrad and, in cooperation with the troops of the Leningrad Front, surround and capture, and in case of refusal to surrender, exterminate him. On the same day, the directive of the Stavka to the Leningrad Front was instructed: by active actions of the 42nd, 55th, 8th, 54th armies and the Primorsky Operational Group, to assist the Volkhov Front in defeating the enemy defending near Leningrad, and in liberating Leningrad from the blockade .

The main drawback of this plan was its obvious adventurism. The 59th and 2nd shock armies, which were supposed to break through the strong enemy defenses just two weeks later, were on their way to the place of concentration. The troops lacked automatic weapons, transport, communications and food. In the artillery for the period of the operation, only three ammunition per gun was released. The personnel of the units arrived at the front without preparation, they did not own personal weapons well. Some units and subunits were formed from the inhabitants of the steppe regions, who found themselves in the forests for the first time. People were afraid to get lost, they were drawn to each other, they confused battle formations.

The 54th Army, although it was located throughout the blockade ring, was subordinate not to the Volkhov, but to the Leningrad Front, which led to bickering and mutual hostility between the commanders of both fronts. The troops of the Leningrad Front experienced a shortage of food, warm clothing and were exhausted by defensive battles.

The offensive was planned to be carried out in conditions of air supremacy of enemy aircraft. On top of all the actions in various areas were inconsistent in time. The troops of the 54th Army and the Volkhov Front were opposed by 16-17 divisions of the 18th Army of the German Army Group North, which created a strong defense near Kirishi and on the left bank of the Volkhva.

On January 7, the troops of the Volkhov Front, having not yet completed the necessary regroupings and not waiting for the approach of the 59th and 2nd Shock armies, whose echelons were stuck in snowdrifts, went on the offensive and tried to break through the enemy defenses on the Volkhov. The troops of the 59th and 2nd Shock armies were brought into battle as they arrived. The offensive did not bring success and on January 10 the orders of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command were suspended.

On January 13, the troops of the Volkhov Front, having created shock groups in the sectors chosen for the breakthrough, resumed the offensive. The main blow was delivered by the 2nd Shock Army to Lyuban, it was supported from the flanks by the 59th and 52nd Armies. The offensive was carried out in difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain, in off-road conditions, in deep snow. The troops were deprived of freedom of maneuver, supplies were difficult. The enemy offered stubborn resistance. Only in the direction of the main attack and on the left flank of the 59th Army, after stubborn battles, was it possible by January 25 to break through the enemy defenses south of Spasskaya Polist. The 13th Cavalry Corps was brought into the breach. Formations of the 2nd Shock Army, developing the offensive, by the end of January advanced in a narrow wedge to 70-75 km and deeply engulfed the enemy’s Luban-Chudov grouping from the southwest. To assist the Volkhov Front in completing its encirclement, at the end of February, the 54th Army struck towards the 2nd Shock Army in the general direction of Lyuban. Having suffered heavy losses, by the end of March, its troops advanced 22 km and reached the approaches to Lyuban from the northeast. However, the Soviet troops failed to develop the offensive and complete the encirclement of the enemy.

In January-March, the German command brought up reserves in the amount of 11 divisions and one brigade into the 18th Army's zone. To support their troops in the breakthrough area, the enemy deployed up to 250 bombers of the 1st Air Fleet. This dramatically changed the balance of forces in the Luban direction. Since March, the enemy began to launch counterattacks on the flanks of the 2nd Shock Army. On March 19, having concentrated fresh forces on the flanks of the 2nd Shock Army, the German troops managed to cut it off from the rest of the front.

On March 27, at the cost of heavy losses, the troops of the 52nd and 59th armies pierced a 3-5 km neck that connected the 2nd Shock Army with the front, but the position of the army remained difficult. It became even more difficult with the beginning of the spring thaw, when the roads and columned paths laid through marshy areas and forests deteriorated. Supply, communications and command and control were disrupted. The operation was practically a failure, but the Headquarters, regardless of the real situation, continued to insist on continuing the offensive.

On April 30, the offensive in the Lyuban region was stopped. Nevertheless, the 2nd Shock Army fought heavy defensive battles until the summer, holding the captured ledge, and only at the end of May received an order to begin a withdrawal. At the same time, a new commander-in-chief was appointed - Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, who distinguished himself in battles near Moscow, and in 1941 twice fought out of encirclement.

A week after the appointment of a new commander, the army was again in the ring. The Military Council of the armies decided on the night of June 24-25 to break through with all the remaining forces from the encirclement. The front command promised to deliver a counterattack, sending tanks to break through. This communication was not carried out.

On June 24, army troops, approaching the breakthrough in close formation, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Myasnoy Bor, were subjected to devastating crossfire from all types of weapons. Few managed to escape.

On the morning of June 25, the Germans finally closed the ring. According to various sources, from 6 to 16 thousand people were able to break out of the encirclement that night and in small groups in the following days. Between 14,000 and 20,000 people died or went missing during the breakthrough. General Vlasov himself was in German captivity.

Sources:
1. Lubchenkov Yu., "100 great battles of World War II", Veche, 2005
2. Dzeniskevich A.R., Kovalchuk V.M., Sobolev G.L., Tsamutali A.N., Shishkin V.A., "Unconquered Leningrad", Science, 1970
3. "History of the Great Patriotic War Soviet Union, 1941-1945", 1963

"MM. AGAPOV, retired colonel, participant of the Luban operation LUBA OPERATION (01/07/1942 - 07/10/1942) (The course of hostilities and the courage of soldiers) ... "

-- [ Page 1 ] --

History of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)

MM. AGAPOV,

retired colonel,

participant in the Luban operation

LUBA OPERATION

(7.01.1942 – 10.07.1942)

(The course of hostilities and the courage of warriors)

Part one

OFFENSIVE

(7.01.1942 – 30.04.1942)

"... Luban offensive

operation is one of

insufficiently researched

military-historical science.

("Military-historical

magazine", No. 5, 1999) Moscow Table of contents FROM THE AUTHOR

PART I. OFFENSIVE OPERATION (01/07/1942 - 04/30/1942)

CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND OF THE OPERATION

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 4. THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATION ON THE VOLKHOV

§4.1. FIRST ATTACK ATTEMPT

§4.2. RE-OFFENSIVE

§4.3. COMBAT OPERATION TO ENROUND THE MGINSKO-LADOGA GROUP

Fighting on the site of the 4th Army of the Volkhov Front

Fighting on the site of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front

CHAPTER 6. FURTHER COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE SITE OF THE 4TH ARMY.

CHAPTER 7. CONTINUATION OF COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE MAIN DIRECTION52

CHAPTER 9. OFFENSIVE ON LYUBAN

CHAPTER 10

CHAPTER 11

CHAPTER 12

§12.1. COMBAT ACTIONS OF THE 4TH ARMY OF THE VOLKHOV FRONT

§12.2. COMBAT ACTIONS OF THE 54TH ARMY OF THE LENFRONT

CHAPTER 13. CONTINUATION OF COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE MAIN DIRECTION.

§13.1. REFLECTION OF THE GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE "CORRIDOR" OF THE BREAKTHROUGH

§13.2. BATTLE AFTER REFLECTION OF THE GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

§13.3. VLASOV

CHAPTER 14

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX №1. DIRECTIVES OF THE SECURITY COMMAND TO VOLKHOVSKY AND

From the Author World War II has long been part of history. There are fewer and fewer veterans of the Great Patriotic War, direct participants in that war. You can rarely see them on the streets of Russian cities.

More often there are young people with medal bars for other wars:

Afghan, Chechen New time. New people. New Veterans.

The defense of Leningrad is now remembered only on significant dates: the breakthrough of the blockade, the complete lifting of the blockade, Victory Day.

The battle for Leningrad, which lasted 1125 days, occupies one of the most heroic and tragic pages not only in the history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, but also in the entire world history.

The enemy expected to capture Leningrad two weeks after the attack on the USSR. But the steadfastness and courage of the soldiers of the Red Army and the People's Militia thwarted the German plans. Instead of the planned two weeks, the enemy fought his way to Leningrad for 80 days. Mankind knows no other such example, when a huge city for almost 900 days was in the ring of an enemy blockade and not only lived, but also courageously fought against the enemy.

The battle for Leningrad is a set of defensive and offensive operations carried out by Soviet troops in the north-west of the country from July 10, 1941 to August 9, 1944.

These operations were carried out in order to defend Leningrad, defeat the German Army Group North and the Finnish troops between the Onega and Ladoga lakes and on the Karelian Isthmus. Among them is the Luban operation (01/07/1942 - 07/10/1942). It is divided into three operations (stages) - an offensive, defensive operation and an operation to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the encirclement.

Despite its great strategic importance, the Luban operation has been relatively little studied. There is a fairly significant number of memoirs of its participants. Some historical articles are dedicated to her, in which certain issues related to the operation are considered. However, there are no works that combine these individual issues into a holistic view that allows us to reveal with the greatest completeness the goals of the operation, its features and main results. This is noted, for example, in the Military Historical Journal, No. 5, 1999.

The author of this work collected and systematized the materials available to him on the Luban operation: a significant number of archival documents of the TsAMO RF (300 titles); works by B.I. Gavrilov Valley of Death. The Tragedy and Feat of the 2nd Shock Army” and “Through the Valley of Death”;

the work of K.K. Krupitsa “Fighting of the 2nd shock army in the Luban offensive operation”, memoirs of Ya.A. Kurochkin "We fought on the North-Western Front", articles published in the "Military History Journal", materials of the Museum of the Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts in Moscow, in particular, the memoirs of N.I. Klykov and P. Egorov, as well as memoirs of other participants in the operation, published in various collections.

The author described not only the actions of the 2nd shock and 59th armies in the area of ​​Myasny Bor, Lyuban, but also the actions of other armies of the North-Western, Volkhov and Leningrad fronts during the offensive part of the Lyuban operation. The author sought to reveal the difficulties that the participants in the operation had to face, from the commander of the front to the ordinary Red Army soldier. The presentation is accompanied by examples of true heroism and self-sacrifice of Soviet soldiers, without which the Great Victory was impossible. All examples given are documented facts.

The first part of the work presented here covers only the offensive operation. The second part of the work will be devoted to the defensive operation and the operation to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the encirclement.

The work contains the necessary diagrams and maps illustrating the course of hostilities, photographs and indexes of the materials used.

–  –  –

CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND OF THE OPERATION

While planning the main attack in the western direction towards Moscow, it paid serious attention to actions in the northwestern sector as well, i.e. towards Leningrad. The capture of the cradle of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the city of Lenin, in the opinion of the Nazi leaders, could be a major military-political defeat of the USSR.

Hitler claimed that with the capture of Leningrad, one of the symbols of the revolution would be destroyed. The fascist command also believed that successful operations in the Leningrad direction would not only ensure the safety of the left wing of Army Group Center, but also make it possible to make a roundabout maneuver to attack Moscow from the north.

The heroism and steadfastness of the soldiers of the Red Army and the People's Militia did not allow the city to be taken by storm on the move. Important evidence of the resilience of the Soviet troops in the northwestern direction was given by Tippelskirch in his “History of the Second World War”: “The enemy troops under the command of Marshal Voroshilov from the very beginning had a position in depth ... Obviously, the enemy was aware of the large concentration of German formations in East Prussia ... The destruction of large enemy forces, as planned, was not carried out ... The stubbornness of the enemy was convincing, the number of tanks participating in his counterattacks was striking. It was an enemy with a steel will, who ruthlessly, but not without knowledge of operational art, threw his troops into battle. The defense of Soviet Estonia and its capital, Tallinn, which was the main base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, then Narva and the positions of the Luga defensive region, the Kingisepp fortified area, holding the Oranienbaum bridgehead, delayed the German troops for more than two months on their way to Leningrad.

The capture of Moscow by the political leadership of Germany was made dependent on events in the north-western direction. While in Army Group Center, Hitler on August 4, 1941 stressed that the first goal was the capture of Leningrad, and that it could be achieved by the troops of Army Group North by August 20, after which all aviation forces located there and a significant part of troops of the Army Group "North" will be placed at the disposal of the Army Group "Center" for an attack on Moscow. The directive of Hitler's headquarters of August 15 indicated that only after the success of Army Group North "... it will be possible to think about resuming the offensive against Moscow" ("On the Volkhov Front", 1982, p. 10).

On August 25, 1941, having concentrated 9 (nine) divisions of the 4th Panzer Group in the Chudovo region, the Germans resumed their attack on Leningrad. The weakened troops of our 48th Army, operating in this area, could not withstand the enemy's blows and began to retreat part of the forces to Kirishi, and part of the forces to Pushkino. The direction to Tosno and Mgu turned out to be open. On August 29, the Germans reached Kolpino, where they were stopped by the 55th Army. On September 8, enemy troops, breaking through the Mga, reached Lake Ladoga and captured Shlisselburg. Thus, Leningrad was blocked from land.

At the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the command of the Leningrad Front was preparing an offensive operation in the Sinyavino direction in the second half of October.

Our troops were to strike with the forces of the 54th Army from the east, and the Neva Operational Group - from the west in order to encircle and destroy the Schlisselburg-Sinyavino group of Germans.

In the midst of the preparations for the operation on October 16, the enemy, with the forces of 8 (eight) divisions of the 39th motorized and 1st army corps, crossed the Volkhov River and went on the offensive in the Tikhvin direction. At the same time, part of the enemy launched an offensive against Malaya Vishera. Having one and a half superiority in people and more than double in tanks and artillery, on October 20 he broke through the defenses of our 52nd Army, and on October 23 captured Budogoshch and went to the rear of our 4th Army, forcing it to withdraw.

On November 8, 1941, the Germans captured Tikhvin. The fascist German command intended to encircle and destroy the troops of the 54th Army by reaching Lake Ladoga in the area of ​​Novaya Ladoga, and to link up with the Finnish troops on the river. Svir and strangle Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet with a second blockade ring. In the future, the enemy intended to advance on Vologda and Yaroslavl, with the aim of forming a new front north of Moscow (bypassing Moscow from the north).

Under these conditions, the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme Command, despite the most difficult battles near Moscow, considered it necessary to strengthen the reserves of the 4th, 52nd and 54th armies, which were defending in the Tikhvin direction. Our armies went on the counteroffensive. On November 12, the 52nd Army began its operations, on November 19, the 4th Army, and on December 3, the 54th Army. The Tikhvin offensive operation began. On November 20, Malaya Vishera was liberated, and on December 9, Tikhvin. The victory near Tikhvin was one of the first successes of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command in order to combine the efforts of the armies operating east of the river. Volkhov and again concentrated in this area, on December 11, 1941, it decided to form the Volkhov Front by December 17.

Continuing the offensive, by December 27, the troops of the Volkhov Front reached Volkhov in the Kirishi, Novgorod sector, that is, they pushed the enemy back to the same line from which he launched the offensive on October 16, and captured bridgeheads on the left bank of the Volkhov in the Lezno, Khmelishchi, north of Gruzino .

CHAPTER 2

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having assessed the situation at the front and the internal situation of the country by the beginning of 1942, as well as the deterioration of the military situation in Leningrad, the ring of blockade closed around it and the starvation of the city’s population already beginning in December 1941, made a decision and outlined a large-scale operation. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command set a big task for the troops (see.

book "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union". - M., 1961.

v.2, p.302) to defeat the main forces (16th and 18th German armies) of Army Group North

with the aim of breaking the blockade of Leningrad and liberating the entire territory of the Leningrad region south of Leningrad from the enemy (including the cities of Novgorod and Staraya Russa). This was, in essence, the plan of a new strategic operation in the entire northwestern direction. At the same time, unsuccessful attempts to break through the blockade of the city by the troops of one or two armies of the Leningrad Front were taken into account.

Therefore, the operation, which later received the name Lyubanskaya, was not developed as another front-line operation against a very strong enemy. Analyzing this operation, it must be borne in mind that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of our troops prepared it during the Tikhvin offensive of our troops (the Tikhvin strategic offensive operation 19.11 - 30.12.1941) and in the initial period of the Moscow counteroffensive of the Western and Kalinin fronts.

Here it is appropriate to recall the concept of "strategic offensive operation". During the Great Patriotic War, the front usually performed an OPERATIONAL task. To solve strategic tasks, operations were carried out by groups of fronts. (“Military Encyclopedic Dictionary”. - M., 1983., p. 787-788). "STRATEGIC OPERATION" - a set of coordinated and interconnected in terms of purpose, tasks, place and time of operations, strikes, military operations of formations and formations of various types of armed forces, carried out according to a single plan and plan to achieve STRATEGIC goals ... During the Great Patriotic War, and a new form of strategic actions was developed - the operation of a group of fronts, which included several simultaneously conducted front-line operations, united by a single plan and leadership of the Supreme High Command. The preparation of a strategic operation is carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, commanders and headquarters of the fronts. (“Military Encyclopedic Dictionary”. - M., 1983, p. 710).

According to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, three fronts were to take part in the operation: Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western. To create the possibility of carrying out this operation in the northwestern direction, the preponderance of the forces of the Red Army over the forces of the Germans in people - 1.5 times, in guns and mortars - 1.6 times, in aircraft - 1.3 times, in tanks

- 1.7 times. This operation was developed during the Tikhvin battles and already on December 11, 1941. At the meeting at Headquarters, where a decision was made to form the Volkhov Front, the corresponding tasks were set, including for the newly formed front. The tasks of the fronts were confirmed by the operational directives of the Headquarters of December 17, 1941.

for the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts and from December 18, 1941 for the North-Western Front.

Commander Volkhov - Commander Leningrad - Commander of the Severosky Front of the Western Front General K. Meretskov General M. Khozin General Y. Kurochkin At the same time, the Volkhov Front was assigned the main role in the defeat of the German Army Group North and the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad.

Therefore, the Headquarters transferred to him from the reserve two newly formed armies in the depths of the country: the 59th army, which consisted of eight rifle divisions and the 2nd shock army, which consisted of one rifle division and seven rifle brigades. Considering that a rifle brigade is not much larger than a good rifle regiment in terms of strength, then the entire army, in fact, was equal to a rifle corps.

Initially, this operation was conceived as a continuation (without a pause) by the Volkhov Front of the Tikhvin offensive operation. His troops (4th, 59th, 2nd shock and 52nd armies) were to go on a general offensive in order to defeat the enemy, who was defending on the western bank of the river. Volkhov north of Novgorod. The main forces to reach the line of Art. Luban - st. Cholovo. Later, advancing in a northwestern direction, the troops of the Volkhov Front, in cooperation with the troops of the Leningrad Front, were to encircle, capture or destroy the Lubansko-Chudovskaya group of German troops. The troops of the Leningrad Front were ordered "by active actions of the 42nd, 55th, 8th, 54th armies and the Primorsky Operational Group to assist the Volkhov Front in defeating the enemy defending near Leningrad and in liberating Leningrad from the blockade."

Let us consider the question of what inter-frontal operations were envisaged to fulfill the task set by the Headquarters?

54th Army (with ten rifle divisions: 128, 294, 286, 285, 311, 80, 115, 281, 198th Rifle Division and 3rd Guards Rifle Division, 6th Naval Brigade and 21st Tank. div.), while remaining part of the Leningrad Front, was supposed, in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Volkhov Front, to surround and destroy the enemy, who had advanced north of Mga to Lake Ladoga and blockaded Leningrad from the east and southeast. (This is one inter-front operation of the two fronts of Volkhov and Leningrad).

The troops of the left wing of the Volkhov Front (52nd Army, consisting of seven line divisions, two cavalry divisions and three artillery regiments of the RGK) were to, in cooperation with the armies of the right wing of the Northwestern Front, defeat the Novgorod group of German troops, capture Novgorod and in the future offensive in the direction of Soltsy, to contribute to the defeat of the 16th Army of the enemy and to ensure the offensive of the Volkhov Front to the northwest.

The troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front (the 11th Army, consisting of six divisions and three tank battalions), in accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of 12/18/41, were supposed to strike in the direction of Staraya Russa, Soltsy, Dno to cut the communications of the Novgorod group Germans (Novgorod-Soltsy-Dno) and, in cooperation with the left-flank army of the Volkhov Front (52nd Army), defeat this grouping, thereby contributing to the solution of the main task of wresting Leningrad from the grip of the blockade. The troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front thus contributed to the solution of the main task - to wrest Leningrad from the grip of the blockade. (“History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union”. - M., 1961, vol. 2, p. 302). (In fact, this was supposed to be the second inter-front operation of two fronts - the North-Western and Volkhov). The actions of these armies of the North-Western and Volkhov fronts were supposed to contribute to the solution of the main task of the operation outlined by the Headquarters: to wrest Leningrad from the grip of the blockade.

The defeat of the Novgorod group of German troops, the liberation of Novgorod, reaching Soltsy, Dno (in order to break communications of German troops) and a further turn to Luga would not allow the possibility of transferring additional troops to the breakthrough site to strengthen opposition or deliver a flank strike to the troops of the left wing of the Volkhov Front (2nd shock and 59th armies), performing the main task of deblocking Leningrad. By the same directive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transferred the Novgorod Operational Group of Troops of the North-Western Front to the 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front.

The tasks of the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts according to the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 17 and 18, 1941 troops of the Volkhov Front to take part in the defeat of the Lyubansko-Chudovskaya enemy grouping. The 8th, 55th, and 42nd armies ... assist the armies of the Volkhov Front in the offensive, surrounded by the enemy. (In fact, this was supposed to be the third operation of two fronts: Leningrad and Volkhov - ed.) The Primorsky Operational Group (Lenfront - ed.) Covers the base of the fleet with the defense of the occupied line, and with the release of the armies of the Volkhov Front to the Krasnoe Selo - Begunitsy line, it goes on the offensive in a southwestern direction with the task of cutting off the enemy's path to Narva ... "

(Khozin M. About one little-known operation. - Military History Journal, 1966, No. 2, pp. 35-36; USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945.

Brief chronicle. – M., 1970, p.141).

As can be seen from the above, according to the directives of the Headquarters, during this operation, at least four inter-front operations were planned and there were other conditions necessary for defining this operation as a strategic one.

Therefore, the statements of some authors that this operation was originally an independent front-line operation do not seem quite correct. In particular, in the "Military History Journal"

(No. 5, 1999) V.V. Gurkin and A.I. Krylov in the article “The Bogey of Myasny Bor. About the Lyuban offensive operation and the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd shock army from the encirclement in 1942 "indicated:" The Lyuban offensive operation of 1942 was an independent front-line operation.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, in his book The Matter of All Life, wrote about this operation that the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and right wing of the North-Western Fronts, with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet, were to defeat the main forces of Army Group North and eliminate the blockade of Leningrad (p. 136).

The former commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, General Ya.A. Kurochkin in his memoirs “We fought on the North-Western Front” writes about this period of time, confirming the thesis just expressed: “In front of the troops operating in the north-western and western directions, the Supreme Command set far

running tasks. THE TROOPS OF THE LENINGRAD, VOLKHOV, AND RIGHT WING OF THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONT HAVE TO DESTROY

GERMAN-FASCIST ARMY GROUP "NORTH" AND RELEASE

The task fell to the share of the North-Western Front to participate simultaneously in two operations carried out in two STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS - north-western and western, and it was necessary to act in divergent directions "(Kurochkin Ya.A. "We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection, M.: "Nauka", 1969, p.20).

The formulation of the tasks of the North-Western Front according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 18, 1941 Kurochkin gives the same as given in this work earlier on page 12 according to the official publication “The USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. A Brief Chronicle, M. Military Publishing House, 1970. He makes only small additions to the right wing of the front.

“The right-flank 11th Army delivered a second frontal blow to Staraya Russa with the immediate task of capturing this city, and later, advancing on the Bottom, Soltsy, in cooperation with the troops of the Volkhov Front, cut off the enemy’s retreat from Novgorod and Luga. In the center of the front, the troops of the 34th Army were to “forge the enemy in the Demyansk direction ...” (Kurochkin Ya.A. “We fought on the North-Western Front, Sbornik, M .:“ Nauka ”, 1969, p. 21).

Consequently, the right wing of the front had to advance to the west in order to participate in the defeat of the 16th Army of the enemy in cooperation with the Volkhov Front, and the left wing attacked the 9th Army of the enemy from Ostashkov to Rudnya, i.e. to the southwest and south, going deep into the rear of Army Group Center. In both cases, the front acted on the incoming flanks of our main groupings. In both cases, the most difficult tasks had to be solved: in cooperation with other fronts, isolate, cut off from the flank and rear, and defeat large enemy groups aimed at Leningrad and Moscow.

The front obviously did not have the strength to simultaneously solve two such tasks of an operational-strategic scale ...

In the old Russian direction, one weak 11th Army, which suffered losses under the command of General V.I., fought. Morozov, who, obviously, was unable to carry out a breakthrough to a depth of almost 110 km to the Soltsy south of Ilmen, without the support of the troops advancing on the right and left. (Kurochkin Ya.A. “We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection”, M .: “Nauka”, 1969, p. 21).

The decision of the commander of the North-Western Front was formulated for the 11th Army as follows: the 11th Army was to “break through the German defenses, capture Staraya Russa, General V.I. Morozov and then advance on Soltsy, Dno, where, having united with the troops of the 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front, destroy the Novgorod grouping of the enemy. In the future, the army was to turn north in the direction of Luga to the rear of the fascist German army group "North" to help break the blockade of Leningrad. The offensive was planned to a depth of up to 110 km with an average daily rate of 7-8 km. Readiness for the offensive - January 5, 1942. (Kurochkin Ya.A. “We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection, M .: “Nauka”, 1969, p. 25; TsAMO RF, f. 221, o. 1366, d. 351, l. 1).

Despite the lack of forces at the front for two strikes, as General Kurochkin wrote about, instead of the task prescribed by the Headquarters, according to its plan for the 34th Army in the center of the front, the task of only defense in order to pin down the enemy in the Demyansk direction, changed this decision. The front command set before it the task of advancing with its flanks and creating conditions for the encirclement of German troops in the Demyansk region. It obliged the 11th and 3rd shock armies to divert part of their forces from the fulfillment of the main tasks assigned to them, arising from the plan of the Headquarters, to assist the 34th army in the Demyansk region.

Kurochkin, in his memoirs, admits that the front command decided to inflict a third blow with the forces of the 34th Army. He writes: “In the center, the 34th Army, according to the plan of the Stavka, was supposed to defend itself in order to pin down the enemy in the Demyansk direction. However, having assessed the situation in detail, we decided to intensify the actions of this army as well ... and create conditions for the encirclement of the Nazi troops in the Demyansk region. After the encirclement and destruction of the Demyansk group, we planned to send the army to the Hill ... The troops of the 34th Army were to be helped by part of the forces of its neighbors - the 11th and 3rd shock armies. The offensive of the 34th Army, according to our plan, was assigned not a decisive, but an auxiliary role.

Instead of the participation of the right wing of the front in breaking the blockade of Leningrad, which was planned by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the front command put into practice the idea of ​​encircling the enemy's Demyansk grouping in the center of its front. On the pages of his memoirs (p. 26), Y. Kurochkin notes: “This is how the idea of ​​encircling the enemy's Demyansk grouping came about. But when planning the encirclement operation, we were not able to create even the minimum necessary preponderance of forces, not to mention the fact that we did not have the mobile formations that were so necessary ... ”This is an example of dispersing forces, and not concentrating them to perform the main task.

The 11th Army did not even have enough strength to complete the main task near Staraya Russa and further to Soltsy, Dno with a turn north to Luga to achieve the goal set for the right wing of the front by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command for help in deblocking Leningrad. And the Military Council of the front, by combat order No. 001 of 12.1.42, indicates: “In the center, with the efforts of the 34th Army, with the assistance of the 11th and 3rd shock armies, by 14.1.1942, encircle the Demyansk group, prevent its regrouping and departure south of the river line. Paul, Demyansk ... ". Thus, the 11th Army is already being redirected from the direction to the north - Soltsy, Dno, Luga to the south direction. “At the same time, the 11th Army, leaving the enemy garrison blockaded in Staraya Russa, turned south. She went out with her main forces to the Staraya Russa-Pola railway and began to successfully advance towards Ramushev. (Kurochkin Ya.A. “We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection, M .:“ Nauka ”, 1969, p. 30).

Practically, there was no question of rendering assistance to Leningrad. There was a goal more feasible and prestigious.

The operation conceived by the Headquarters turned into a front-line operation at the end of January 1942 due to the unsuccessful actions of the troops of the right wing of the Northwestern Front (11th, 34th armies, and in February the 1st shock army and other formations additionally allocated to the front) and 52 -th Army of the Volkhov Front to fulfill the plan and tasks assigned to them in this operation by the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to defeat the Novgorod group of Germans. A certain share of the Stavka's fault in the lack of control over the implementation of its plans is not excluded here.

The troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front in the old Russian direction, as well as the 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front north of Novgorod, were unable to complete their task, despite the fact that the beginning of the operation of the North-Western Front was successful:

"On January 7, 1942, the Staraya Russian offensive operation of the troops of the North-Western Front began against the 16th field army of the Germans (ended on 20.1.42)." “... Combat operations of the troops of the Volkhov Front resumed ...” and “On January 8, 1942, the troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front, as a result of the successful development of the offensive, having advanced more than 50 km, reached Staraya Russa by the end of the day.” (The USSR in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, a brief chronicle. - M., 1970, p. 155).

Ski units crossed the ice of the lake. Ilmen, bypassed Staraya Russa from the north, cut the road leading from Staraya Russa to Shimsk, and reached the approaches to Shimsk.

Further successful development of operations against the Novgorod group of German troops and operations to block communications used by the Germans to supply and strengthen their Leningrad-Volkhov group did not work. The Headquarters of the Supreme Command, realizing the importance of ensuring the security of the left flank of the armies of the Volkhov Front (2nd shock and 59th armies), fighting to break the blockade of Leningrad, repeatedly sets these tasks before the North-Western Front. To fulfill them, the Headquarters even strengthens this front, and precisely its right wing, transferring troops to it from the Western Front, which was successfully advancing from near Moscow. Among these troops, on the orders of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of 19.1.42, by the end of 21.1.42, the 1st shock army was withdrawn from the battle to the reserve of the Supreme High Command. "As part of the 2nd Guards. SBR, 44, 47, 50, 56, 46 and 41st SBR, 62nd and 84th Marine SBR, 123rd Tank Battalion, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20 ski battalions, 701st PAP, 1st, 3rd and 38th guards. min. divisions, army directorates with army units in the Zavidovo, Reshetnikovo, Klin, Pokrovka, Vysokovskoye areas. Army Headquarters - Klin.

The headquarters of the High Command orders:

1. By 25.1.42 fully staffed with personnel and horses and weapons according to the state and report card.

All formations and units of the 1st Shock Army withdrawn to the reserve, replenishment of the personnel should be made from units by the best most trained contingent ...

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command 19.1.42 Stalin, Vasilevsky.

(TsAMO RF, f. 301, o. 6802, d. 6, ll. 178, 179) On January 29, the army received an order to relocate to the Staraya Russa region. There, the 129th and 201st Latvian rifle divisions joined its composition. Additionally, the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Corps were transferred to the North-Western Front. At the same time, about the setting by the Headquarters of the task of helping to de-siege Leningrad in the book “The USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. A Brief Chronicle” on page 164 for 19.1.42 states: “The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a directive that set the main task for the troops of the North-Western Front

- by the actions of the 11th Army in the direction of Soltsy and further to the rear of the Novgorod enemy grouping and the General by the actions of the 1st and 2nd Guards. pages of buildings of the 34th Army V.I. Kuznetsov (commander - Lieutenant General N.E. Berzarin) and the 1st Shock Army (commander - Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov) in the Pskov direction, go to the Pskov region, cut off the main communications of the Leningrad-Volkhov enemy group.

This happened after the successful crossing of the Volkhov River and the troops of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front entering its western bank.

True, on January 17, 1942, the commander of the North-Western Front sent a memorandum to the Headquarters outlining his plan to capture Demyansk. To do this, he asked for troops to help the front. And the front received the reinforcements indicated above, but, as Kurochkin himself writes: “The Headquarters ... however, considered the main task of the front not to encircle the Demyansk group, but to strike with significant forces to the west, to the rear of the main forces of Army Group North. Such an intention stemmed from the general state of affairs on the northern sector of the Soviet-German front, and especially from the need to de-siege Leningrad ... According to the Stavka decision, the 1st shock army was concentrated east of Staraya Russa, two rifle divisions and two brigades were sent from the Stavka reserve to the same area ". (Kurochkin Ya.A. “We fought on the North-Western Front, Collection, M .:“ Science ”, 1969, p. 19-20).

Head of the Political Department of the 1st Shock Army, General F.Ya. Lisitsin writes in his book of memoirs that the command of the North-Western Front immediately set the task, together with the 11th Army on February 13, 1942, to break through the enemy’s defenses and defeat the enemy’s old Russian grouping. Further, he writes about the fulfillment of the task, but not the one that was planned by the Headquarters (Staraya Russa, Soltsy, Dno and further to Luga - the author).

“... Already in the first week, the troops of the army made significant progress.

Our frontline neighbors have also achieved some success. As a result, on February 25, the encirclement of seven infantry divisions in the Demyansk area was completed. (Lisitsin F.Ya. In those terrible days, pp. 64, 65).

On the day of the start of this offensive, “on February 13, 1942, offensive operations of the troops of the North-Western Front against the Demyansk began.

groupings of Nazi troops of the 16th Army (completed on 14.5.42). In the first offensive (completed on March 19, 1942), the troops of the 11th, 1st shock and 34th armies had the task of encircling and destroying the enemy's Demyansk grouping, capturing the cities of Demyansk and Staraya Russa and reaching the line of Art.

Veretyo, Soltsy, Bottom, Dedovichi. Subsequently, strike at Pskov and in the rear of the Novgorod grouping of the enemy. (“The USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. A Brief Chronicle”, p. 177).

The above goals repeatedly set by the Headquarters in the interests of lifting the blockade of Leningrad were never achieved by the armies of the right flank of the North-Western Front and the 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front.

The Novgorod grouping of German troops was not destroyed. The communications of the German Volkhov group of troops were not blocked. This, in particular, contributed to the further buildup of German forces and their infliction of flank attacks on the 2nd shock and 59th armies of the Volkhov Front, breaking through to Lyuban. As a result, a significant part of the troops of the 2nd shock army was surrounded. Unfortunately, most of the work of the researchers of the Luban operation ignores this point. The failure of the Luban operation is considered as a failure only of the Volkhov Front, part of the forces of the Leningrad Front and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which outlined this operation. At the same time, they forget that one of the reasons for the “tragedy of the 2nd shock army” is the unsuccessful actions of the troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front.

Defining tasks for the fronts, the Stavka proceeded from the fact that the overall balance of forces in the northwestern direction, taking into account the replenishment received, was in favor of the Soviet troops, as was already mentioned earlier. Of course, it would be desirable to ensure a greater superiority in equipment and weapons over the enemy and for a longer period of fighting, but ... Our industry from the beginning of the war until the end of 1941 could not yet fully restore the losses of troops in battles and provide for newly formed units . Naturally, there was still a shortage of a significant amount of weapons to reinforce the fronts in the winter offensive of 1941. This also applied to the troops of the North-Western, Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, aiming to defeat the German group of armies "North". The security of the troops of these fronts during the operation is shown in Table 1 below (Military History Journal, 1999, No. 5).

Table 1. The combat and numerical strength of the troops participating in the Luban offensive operation on January 7 - April 30, 1942 and in the operation to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the encirclement on May 13 - July 10, 1942 (without the North-Western Front).

–  –  –

Note 1. The table was compiled on the basis of reports on the combat and numerical strength of the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts (TsAMO RF, f.15-a, o.505, dd. 4,14,74-77).

Note 2. In the column “Number of personnel, the numerator is the total number of troops of the front and armies, the denominator is the number of combat troops and combat support units (reconnaissance, communications, engineering, etc.) Note 3. In the operation from the North-Western Front in January, the 11th Army participated, consisting of the 5th Rifle Division and the 3rd Tank Brigade; in February, the 1st shock army was additionally introduced, consisting of 2 sd, 9 sbr, 11 battalions (tank and ski), 3 divisions of guards mortars (author). It should be noted that in some works, sometimes, it is not entirely correct, according to the author, some other issues related to this operation are also covered.

In particular, it is pointed out that due to the lack of forces and means to organize an offensive in all sectors of the Soviet-German front, it was not necessary to close Leningrad in the winter of 1941-1942.

conduct a strategic operation. It was necessary to confine ourselves to private operations (they had been carried out before and all were unsuccessful). At the same time, they refer to the meeting held at Headquarters on January 5, 1942 to develop a plan for the winter campaign of 1942, at which I.V. Stalin, impressed by the recent victories of the Red Army, insisted on going over to a general strategic offensive. The leadership of the Red Army offered a different option: to concentrate the main efforts in the western direction, where the enemy did not have time to restore the combat capability of his units, to replenish our troops with reserves and equipment here and complete the defeat of the central group of Germans ... In the south and near Leningrad, the enemy managed to create a strong positional defense , to crack it, powerful artillery means are needed ... in these areas it is necessary to limit oneself to private operations ... However, Stalin was carried away by the idea of ​​​​a broad offensive along the entire front, he exaggerated the military significance of the Moscow victory and other counterattacks of the Red Army in the winter of 1941. Point of view Stalin was unconditionally supported by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. Arguing with Stalin, they say, was useless. Therefore, the meeting adopted the Stalinist plan of operations.

The opinion of the command given here did not take into account the moral side of the issue and the state besieged Leningrad and its inhabitants. In addition, decisions on this operation and directives to the fronts on its conduct by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were issued long before the above meeting.

A similar point of view about the dangers of this operation is also expressed, for example, in the article by S. Glezerov "Volkhov Cauldron", published in the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda in St. Petersburg" dated January 11, 2002. This article also uses the false statement of the German historian W. Haupt (S. Glezerov simply claims that the Germans can be trusted) that the Germans captured as trophies in the battles when the 2nd shock army left the encirclement, in particular, 171 tanks. However, these data were not verified by the author of the article. In fact, as follows from the data given above in table No. 1 (these data were published in the Military Historical Journal, No. 5 for 1999 on pages 20-21), starting from April 30, 1942 in the 2nd the shock army had only 12 tanks. Even at the height of the operation, their number did not exceed 71 pieces. It is not clear from what fronts the Germans brought to the Volkhov swamps one and a half hundred tanks that did not exist with us there, in order to confirm the statements of V. Haupt. It turns out that the Germans can be trusted, but not all.

It must also be taken into account that the Headquarters, when deciding to continue the offensive, was guided by the fact that the population of Leningrad was dying of starvation and that every day was dear to save them.

It was also taken into account that the Leningrad Front, although it had already carried out several local operations with attempts to break through the blockade, could not resolve this issue on its own.

Leningrad survived the winter of 1941-1942 hard. Communication with the mainland was maintained only along Lake Ladoga. By the time of freezing on the lake, the delivery of food to Leningraders did not exceed one third of its minimum daily consumption. On November 20, the norm for issuing bread was further reduced, the workers began to receive 250 grams of bread per day, the rest - 125 grams. Fuel reserves were depleted, the power plant stopped working, the water supply system froze, and city transport stopped.

Malnutrition has led to a catastrophic increase in mortality.

Ignoring this factor is immoral.

On December 17 and 18, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent directives to three fronts on the strategic operation plan it developed to defeat the 16th and 18th armies of the German Army Group North and liberate Leningrad from the blockade, as well as the cities of Novgorod and Staraya Russa. The plan of the operation and the directives for its conduct by the Headquarters were adopted even before the aforementioned January meeting at the Headquarters.

In the course of this operation carried out by the three indicated fronts, by the end of January - mid-February 1942, it became clear that the task of defeating the main forces of the 18th German Army on the outskirts of Leningrad and the 16th German Army with counter strikes from the fronts was practically not being fulfilled. The connection of the right wing of the North-Western Front with the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts will not happen in the future. Therefore, this operation was named Lyubanskaya for the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts and Demyanskaya for the right wing of the Northwestern Front.

It should be noted that even in February 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command reminded the North-Western Front of the need to fulfill the goals set for the front of the operation to cut off the communications of the German troops to assist the Volkhov Front.

–  –  –

CHAPTER 3. THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATION ON THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONT

Anyone who has been in those places knows these endless, majestic forests, endless swamps and swamps, large lakes, scattered and lost villages in dense thickets. There are very few roads and, in general, directions suitable for the action of large masses of troops. This fully applies both to the area south of Lake Ilmen (the region of Staraya Russa), and to the areas north of the lake and the city of Novgorod.

The winter was harsh and snowy. Blizzards covered the few paths so much that the troops had to move forward with great difficulty, laying trenches in huge snow layers. During the day they were cleared, and at night everything was covered again. The troops that got into impassability were forced to make their own way and maintain it themselves in a passable state, spending a lot of time and effort on this.

It was necessary to visit there in the memorable winter of 1941-42 in order to fully appreciate all the many difficulties that arose at every step.

Kurochkin writes in his memoirs: “The command tried to make full use of nature, the features of the terrain. What was difficult for oneself was made difficult for the enemy. Snow, blizzard, blizzard turned out to be not only an enemy, but also an ally. Sometimes a solid white haze covered the movement of our troops. Wrapped in a white shroud, they became invisible to enemy observers, and not one of his reconnaissance aircraft dared to take to the air on such days ...

“... The enemy's defense was not continuous.

The Germans occupied the villages, preparing them for all-round defense and turning them into strongholds with great engineering and tactical skill. The enemy blocked all the roads, all the ways and approaches that were more or less suitable for our offensive ... Quiet snow-covered fields in front of the villages could turn into pitch hell in an instant, as soon as we went on the offensive. Every meter of space was shot through by numerous machine guns, guns lurking in the villages...

In those conditions of the terrain, each step of the attacker is heavy in itself, even without an enemy. And here any farm, each village is a kind of small fortress...

Everything I write about here is by no means aimed at emphasizing or somehow exaggerating our hardships. Of course, the reader understands that it is more difficult to conduct an offensive in forests and swamps waist-deep in snow and without roads than in dry, flat places. But in war - as in war!

I am writing about this here only to tell, especially to our youth, about the conditions in which we sometimes have to fight. War is always difficult." (Kurochkin Ya.A., We fought on the North-Western Front. Collection “On the North-Western Front 1941-1943. - M .: Nauka, 1969. - P. 24) It should be noted that the offensive of the right wing of the North-Western Front started under favorable weather conditions. Because of the severe frosts, the swamps froze well. And where in the autumn small partisan groups made their way with great difficulty, now companies and battalions with tanks were secretly led behind enemy lines.

Using the complete surprise of the attack, the troops of the 11th Army were able to break through the enemy defenses on the first day of the operation and advance up to 7 km. The strike force of the army as part of the 182nd Infantry Division of Colonel M.S. Nazarov, 84th - Major General P.I. Fomenko and the 188th - Colonel T.I. Rybakov, in a few days of fighting on virgin snow, advanced more than 50 km, bypassed the right flank of the enemy's 290th Infantry Division and started a battle on the northern and eastern outskirts of Staraya Russa. Part of the ski battalions, which crossed Lake Ilmen on the ice, cut the roads leading from Staraya Russa to Shimsk and reached the approaches to it.

Many examples of the heroism of the soldiers of the 11th Army in the offensive that had begun could be cited.

One of the regiments of the 11th Army, unexpectedly for the enemy, went through riverbeds to Staraya Russa, which at that time was tens of kilometers from the front. This regiment was led by 67-year-old Mayata village old-timer Ivan Vasilyevich Lipatov.

I.V. Lipatov brought the soldiers of the second battalion of Captain A.F. Velichko from the 595th regiment of the 188th rifle division to the village of Podborovye. As a result of a short battle, the numerous local garrison, taken by surprise, was destroyed. Wasting no time, the battalion, reinforced by part of the first battalion, moved towards the city, and the third - by senior lieutenant N.A. Gubsky - hit on Talyshno.

In night hand-to-hand combat, the Velichko battalion liberated the suburban village of Bryashnaya Gora, then broke into Kozmodemyanskaya Street (now Velichko). Again the same picture - the confused Nazis. Here are the "Arakcheev barracks". Under the barbed wire, the soldiers saw piles of dead bodies and ... traces of the recent massacre. Several corpses of enemy soldiers and even shepherd dogs testified to the courageous fight of unarmed people with the executioners.

As it turned out later, the prisoners were taken to Volotovskoye Highway and machine-gunned. The Germans also acted with the prisoners of the camp at base 104 (western outskirts).

In the early morning of January 11, the commander of the 11th Army, Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov received another order from the front commander: "Russa must be taken today and this is a matter of honor for the 11th Army." The onslaught was stepped up, not knowing that von Busch had already managed to transfer the elite SS Reich division to help the garrison. Several more villages around the city were taken. But only the 114th separate ski battalion, which had gone behind enemy lines, was able to break through into Staraya Russa (and then only late at night). At the same time, on the other side, near Bryashnaya Gora, after the death of the commander, the remnants of the Velichko battalion made their way back to their own. Only six people came out with Lieutenant Ilya Shapovalenko.

The 114th battalion, after the battle in the center, retreated to the flax mill. Part of the fighters had to be sent with the wounded, and they managed to get out. The rest were headed by political instructor S.M. Malofeevsky and Lieutenant F.V. Ivashko.

In the early morning, under the cover of armored personnel carriers, the enemy launched an attack ... The locals will forever remember the day of January 12, 1942. Thirty Soviet soldiers who survived after a fierce battle were escorted to the Gestapo. Bloody, half-dressed, they walked barefoot along the icy road with their heads held high. Along with them was a girl - a medical instructor. When the column returned, the streets were empty, the Germans, threatening to shoot them, forbade even approaching the windows.

The Red Army soldiers were led back to the flax mill...

What happened next - learned only after the liberation of the city. At that time, on January 12, 1942, the inhabitants of the nearest bunkers and dugouts heard the singing of the Internationale coming from the direction of the plant. The Red Army soldiers were walled up. And the proletarian anthem sounded until the last brick closed the hole.

Part of the forces of the 11th Army blocked the strongholds on the river. Fishing northeast and east of the city in order to cut off its garrison from the Demyansk group of Germans and from the main forces of Army Group North.

However, as General Kurochkin recalls, “Already on January 11, the first alarming symptoms of the fading pace of the offensive of the 11th Army appeared. The 84th Rifle Division lagged behind in the deep snow. Artillery units and rear moved with great difficulty. On this day in the morning, we sent the commander of the army, General V.I.

Morozov the following telegram:

“In order to resolve the issue of capturing Staraya Russa, it is imperative to speed up the actions of the 84th Rifle Division ... In addition, the regiment of the second echelon of the 188th Rifle Division can also be thrown to attack Staraya Russa and all other forces of the army at your discretion ...

Comrade just called. Stalin instructed me to tell you personally that Russa must be taken today, and this is a matter of honor for the 11th Army. Don't forget artillery and don't be shy about shells.

In the middle of the day, we sent General V.I. Another telegram to Morozov: “The directive of the Headquarters has just been received. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders the capture of the city of Staraya Russa within 11 January. To solve this problem, pull together all the artillery of the RGK, divisions of the RS, at your request, all available front-line aviation will work.

However, the fighting developed very slowly. It was not possible to take Staraya Russa on the move. The artillery of the 11th Army lagged behind in deep snow, the rifle units attacked the city without sufficient fire support.

The regrouping of the army was carried out slowly. The enemy is firmly in the city. He prepared strong strongholds. From the outskirts of the city, shots were heard literally from every house ... Our fragile, with large gaps, the encirclement ring around Staraya Russa did not provide reliable isolation of the enemy grouping.

Unfortunately, some commanders, having no experience, were sometimes too hasty with attacks, often repeating them without proper organization. The absence of a single simultaneous strike by the formations of the 11th Army against the garrison in the city could not ensure success.

The enemy offered stubborn resistance. The battles for Staraya Russa took on a protracted character. The 11th Army, leaving the enemy garrison blockaded in Staraya Russa, turned south ... and began to successfully advance towards Ramushev. (Kurochkin, ibid., pp. 28, 33).

The turn to the south by the 11th Army was carried out in pursuance of the combat order of the North-Western Front No. 001 of January 12, 1942.

CHAPTER 4. THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATION ON THE VOLKHOV AND LENINGRAD FRONTS

Having briefly covered in the previous section the initial stage of the operation of the troops of the right wing of the North-Western Front, let's move on to considering the course of the operation of the troops of the Volkhov Front.

Having received the directive of the Stavka dated 12/17/1941, the Volkhov Front Directorate, directing the military operations of the 4th and 52nd armies, launched work to prepare an offensive operation. According to the orientation of the General Staff, the arrival of the first echelons of troops of the 2nd shock and 59th armies was expected from December 22 to 25. On this basis, readiness for the offensive was planned for December 26-27, and the offensive itself for December 28.

When planning the operation, the front command proceeded from the assumption that the 4th and 52nd armies, while pursuing the retreating enemy during the Tikhvin offensive operation, would occupy bridgeheads on the western bank of the Volkhov on the move and ensure the introduction of fresh divisions of the 59th and 2nd shock armies.

As a result of a successful counteroffensive, the troops of the 4th and 52nd armies cleared the territory east of the Volkhov and reached the right bank of the river.

However, the exhausted, tired troops of these armies were unable not only to surround and destroy the retreating enemy troops, but also to overcome the Volkhov defensive line of the Germans and seize bridgeheads on the western bank of the river in size sufficient for the covert accumulation of troops and the deployment of a further offensive by our fresh armies (2nd strike and 59th). Entering them into a breakthrough from the move now fell away, because. the enemy was entrenched behind the river. It was possible to continue the operation only by breaking through the enemy defenses again. This required changes in the planning of the operation, which was originally based on the continuation of the successful Tikhvin counter-offensive with the introduction of fresh additional forces.

Such a change was also dictated by the delay in the concentration of the strike force of the troops of the Volkhov Front. The postponement required additional measures: conducting reconnaissance of the enemy and his fortifications, a more powerful artillery grouping, bringing in more ammunition to break through the defense, etc.

Despite the very difficult situation of the Leningraders and the demands of the leadership of the Leningrad Front and the city to speed up the start of the operation, at the request of the Military Council of the Volkhov Front, the Headquarters postponed the transition to the offensive to January 7, 1942 (10 days later than planned).

“Nevertheless, by the appointed time, the front was not ready for the offensive. The reason was the delay in the concentration of troops. In the 59th Army, they arrived on time and only five divisions managed to turn around, and three divisions were on the way. In the 2nd shock army, a little more than half of the formations occupied their initial position. The rest of the formations, army artillery, vehicles and some units followed the only railway. Aviation did not arrive either. (Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M., 1983, p.240).

On the right wing of the Volkhov Front, in the sector of Kirishi, Lezno, the 4th Army operated, commanded by Major General P.A. Ivanov. He distinguished himself during the Tikhvin operation, commanding an operational group of troops in the same army. A member of the Military Council was the divisional commissar I.V. Zuev. Chief of Staff - Colonel P.S. Vinogradov. It consisted of seven rifle divisions: 44, 377, 310, 4th Guards, 65, 191 and 91, one tank brigade (46th) and three tank battalions (119th, 120th and 128th). All of them were greatly weakened in previous battles and had a large shortage of people and weapons.

To the left, on the front of Zavizh, Dymno, the newly arrived 59th Army, commanded by Major General I.V. Galanin. Before this appointment, Galanin fought on the Southern Front, for some time he commanded the 12th Army there. Corps Commissar P.A. was a member of the Military Council. Dibrov. Chief of Staff - Colonel L.A. Pern. It was the most powerful army of the front. It had seven rifle divisions: 378, 372, 376, 111,374,366 and 382nd and two tank battalions (185th and 166th).

South of the 59th Army on the front of Krupichno, Russa, the newly arrived 2nd General Shock Army (commander - Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin G.G. Sokolov) took its initial position. After January 10, Lieutenant General N.K. was appointed commander. Klykov. A member of the Military Council was Brigadier Commissar A.I. Mikhailov. Chief of Staff - Major General Vizzhilin. It included one rifle division (327th), seven rifle brigades (22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 57th, 58th and 59th) and two tank battalions (160th and 162nd).

To the left of the 2nd shock army to the lake. Ilmen, the 52nd Army turned around, which was first commanded by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov. After January 10, Lieutenant General V.F. took command. Yakovlev. A member of the Military Council was the divisional commissar K.L. Pantas. Chief of Staff - Colonel B.A. Christmas. The army included five rifle divisions (267, 305, 225, 46, 259th) and one cavalry division (80th). All of them had a shortage in personnel, lacked artillery.

The arrivals of the 59th and 2nd shock armies had a lot of supply difficulties. The front did not have time to organize and arrange the rear in a short time, N.K. Klykov to accumulate the necessary supplies. The troops were in need of everything: ammunition, food, fuel, fodder. A number of staff officers did not have the experience of staff work and did not get used to their duties properly. There was no such important element in the work of headquarters as cohesion. The front also did not have the opportunity to organize combat training with them and catch up.

If we add to all this that it was winter, deep snow and forests blocked the path of our troops and fettered maneuver, then all the difficulties that arose in the path of our troops and, ultimately, influenced the development of the operation, would become clear.

The commander of the troops of the Volkhov Front decided: while conducting an offensive with all armies, the main blow should be delivered by the forces of two new armies (2nd shock and 59th).

The main efforts of the front were thus concentrated in the center - in the Lezno, Dubrovka sector (60 km), where more than half of the combined arms formations and the bulk of the artillery were deployed. Attacks were planned in three directions: Kirishi-Tosno (4th Army); along the railway to Chudovo-Lyuban (59th Army) and west of the railway (2nd Shock Army); and the third direction to Novgorod (52nd Army).

For a number of reasons, the 2nd shock army was at the center of the events of the offensive that had begun. She had the task of breaking through the enemy defenses along the western bank of the river. Volkhov and go out with the main forces (by the end of January 19, 1942) on the river. Kerest. In the future, advance in the direction of Finev Lug, Chasha station, Nizovsky junction. With access to the Leningrad-Dno railway, it was intended to make a turn to strike at Luga.

(TsAMO RF, f.204, op.97, d.8, ll.72-78). (See the scheme of tasks for fronts on p.13).

Despite the fact that the 2nd shock army failed to complete this task in full, nevertheless it left the greatest mark on the Luban operation. For almost half a year, by attracting and grinding enemy reserves, the army diverted the attention of the enemy command from Leningrad and thereby ensured the overall survivability of its defense.

§4.1. THE FIRST ATTEMPT OF THE OFFENSIVE On January 7, 1942, the front moved into the Volkhov table offensive. But only two battalions of the 1002nd succeeded in crossing the Volkhov and gaining a foothold. Rarely, friends, we have to meet the rifle regiment of the 305th rifle division, the 52nd army, the soldiers of the 376th and 378th riflemen. divisions of the 59th Army. Warriors of the 376th division Let's remember what happened (commander Lieutenant Colonel D.N. Ugorich) and we'll drink, as usual, As it was customary in Rus'.

How many days did they hold on to Volkhov to the north of vil. Pertechno, they destroyed about a regiment of guitars. In the frozen dugouts lay, The battalion of the 1256th Infantry Regiment Fought on Ladoga, the 378th Division captured the first German fought on the Volkhov, a trench, but the enemy quickly came to his senses, Did not retreat a single step.

pressed the attackers to the ground with machine-gun fire, counterattacked. The division commander half- Let's drink for those who commanded the companies, kovnik I.P. Dorofeev brought into action the second Who was dying in the snow, echelons of regiments, but the fire superiority of Who in Leningrad forced the enemy in the evening, under cover, to make his way through the swamps, with snowfall to return to their original positions, breaking the throat of the enemy!

On January 8, the 378th division undertook P.N. Shubin made a new attempt to advance after a short artillery preparation. One battalion of the 1256th Rifle Regiment and a company of the 164th Separate Tank Battalion crossed the Volkhov again and captured the enemy's stronghold east of vil. Useful. The Germans repeatedly counterattacked, but the battalion Art. Lieutenant N.N. Sokolov held firm and did not give up his positions.

Some of the successes noted here have taken place in separate sections and secondary directions. However, the offensive of the units of the 59th Army ended in failure.

Let us turn to the beginning of the actions of the 2nd shock army. On January 1, 1942, the army commander ordered the formation commanders to personally reconnoiter and study the theater of upcoming military operations on January 2 (involving commanders up to platoon commanders to participate in it). These areas are indicated in the table below, compiled according to the documents available in the archive. For comparison, the last column of the table indicates the areas in which then, by order of the commander No. 01 of January 6, 1942, these formations, in fact, began offensive battles.

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As can be seen from the table, the 24th brigade was supposed to reconnoiter the area where, according to order No. 01, the 23rd brigade was actually advancing; and the 23rd brigade was to reconnoiter the area, which was then attacked by the 327th division and the 58th brigade.

The offensive of the 2nd shock army, in accordance with the order of the commander No. 01 of January 6, 1942, was to begin on January 7 at 10 am. The army had to break through the first line of German defense at the junction of the 126th and right flank of the 215th German infantry divisions, and then defeat the 25th Wehrmacht infantry division at the second line of defense of the Germans.

The order provided that the 25th separate rifle brigade would break through the German front at the Dymno-Vysokoye line (7.5 km) and, in a further offensive, cover the right flank of the army; The 57th separate rifle brigade destroys the Germans at the Vysokoye - Novye Buregi line (7.5 km), then breaks through to the Novgorod-Chudovo railway west of the village of Kolyazhka; The 327th Rifle Division advances at the Novye Buregi - Gorodok line (5 km) with the aim of breaking through to the railway in the Mostki - Spasskaya Polist section; The 58th separate rifle brigade breaks through the German defenses in the Gorodok-Gorelovo sector (1.5 km) and then captures the Myasnoy Bor-Lyubino Pole railway section; The 23rd separate rifle brigade breaks through the German defenses in the Gorelovo Zmeysko sector (3 km) and then breaks through to the railway between Myasny Bor and Gorodishche 2; The 24th separate rifle brigade breaks through the German defenses in the Zmeysko-Russa sector (4 km) and then goes to the railway between the villages of Lyubtsy and Krutik: and in the further offensive it covers the left flank of the army.

Unfortunately, due to poorly established communications, the order of the army commander, sent with messengers, arrived at the headquarters of divisions and brigades with a great delay. Therefore, for example, the 25th separate rifle brigade launched an offensive at 11.00 in the morning, and units of the 327th rifle division at that time were just reaching their starting position and replacing the units that had defended there before the 52nd army.

The headquarters of the 2nd shock army reported this to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front with operational report No. 13 / op at 16.00 on 07.01.42: “2. The combat order No. 01 / op of the army for the offensive on 7.1.42 arrived at the headquarters of brigades and divisions with a great delay. 3. 25th brigade launched the offensive at 11.00; 327 sd parts went to their original position and replaced parts of 52 A; The 58th Rifle Regiment began the offensive at 13.00, advancing to the line of Shevelevo, Vylegy, were met by strong enemy mortar fire from the direction of Yamno. four.

The position of the remaining parts is not specified due to the lack of communication. Measures have been taken to establish communication. (TsAMO, f.309, f.4073, d.2, l.42).

These days the frost exceeded 30 degrees. For example, on January 3rd, a thermometer in the area above the river. Volkhov showed 32 degrees. The snow cover was up to 1.5 meters deep. It was necessary to move through the forests without roads, since those roads that were available were covered with deep snow. Very coldy and the difficult conditions of the path during the advancement of units to their original positions on the front line exhausted people. From the very beginning, the author took part in this operation as part of the 23rd separate rifle brigade as a machine gunner. Our brigade went on the offensive a day later than the time set by order of the army commander.

A significant number of units of the brigade could not reach their original positions on time. One rifle and mortar (50-82 mm) battalion, as well as a mortar battalion of 120-mm mortars with an auto company of delivery, arrived at the Malaya Vishera unloading station only on the evening of January 6.

The brigade began the fight for the German defense unit, organized at the Red Shock Worker state farm, located on the western bank of the river. Volkhov.

To break through to the state farm, it was necessary to cross the frozen Volkhov. The starting positions for the offensive of our battalion were in the trenches of the part of the 52nd Army that we replaced, located not on the river bank, but at a distance of more than 500 meters from the river. Volkhov to the right of the village of Gorelovo. When going on the offensive, we had to overcome this open space to the river. There was deep snow along the way. The matter was aggravated by the fact that we did not have camouflage suits and skis (except for the mouths of submachine gunners and reconnaissance).

There was no artillery preparation on our sector. From the beginning of our movement (the Germans seemed to be waiting for this moment), machine-gun and mortar shelling began. From heavy losses along the way to the western bank of the river and then to the enemy positions, which seemed very long to us, only deep snow and the fact that we were moving in it by crawling could save. The fire was so strong that it was impossible to raise their heads or kneel - only crawling in the snow. By 15 o'clock we managed with great difficulty to reach the middle of the river. Having advanced to the western coast, we came under even stronger shelling. The tanks assigned to the brigade did not accompany us. They could not cross the river. The ice was not explored, and there were no crossings for tanks.

After a day of heavy fighting, on the orders of the brigade commander, our battalions retreated to their original positions. In our brigade, 50 people were killed and 302 wounded. The offensive of other rifle brigades of the army developed just as slowly and unsuccessfully.

The only strong unit of the army was the 327th Rifle Division. She acted to the right of the 23rd and 58th separate rifle brigades. Army Combat Order No. 01 dated 01/06/1942 only for her and for the 58th division. page of the brigade was provided for the support of army artillery.

However, in the offensive launched by the army on order No. 01, this most powerful formation of the army did not take any practical part. Its units did not have time to concentrate and reach the starting line in time (this is stated in the above operational summary of the headquarters of the 2nd shock army No. 13 / OP).

Commander of the 327th Rifle Division, Major General I.M. Antyufeev, in his memoirs on this occasion, only pointed out that the offensive was not successful and that the artillery not only could not suppress enemy fire weapons, but did not even have time to properly zero in.

The army artillery, even at 8 pm on January 7, was not yet firing at the enemy, but was only withdrawing materiel to the designated areas. (TsAMO RF, f.309, o.4073, d.2, l.43; Agapov M.M. 23rd separate rifle brigade in the battle for Leningrad, 1999, p.10-11).

The offensive on the Krupichno, Russa sector was also unsuccessful.

The troops of the front in fierce battles tried to break through the enemy defenses, but to no avail. All day on January 8, the formations of the 2nd shock army fought heavy battles.

Therefore, the command of the front, with the permission of the Headquarters, stopped the offensive. In the operational summary of the headquarters of the 2nd shock army No. 16 / op on

At 20:00 hours on January 8, it was indicated that, according to the order of the front commander, the further offensive was suspended. When it got dark, the troops retreated. (TsAMO RF, f.309, o.4073, d.2, l.47).

However, the onslaught of the Volkhovites was strong. A German officer who fought at the Tigoda station against the 310th Infantry Division of the 4th Army wrote in his diary on January 10, 1942: “The Russians give us a lot of work. The question is whether or not to be the northern front. The German high command also understood this threat. General F. Halder wrote in his Diary: “An enemy attack was repulsed on the Volkhov sector. Here and in the region of Lake Ladoga, a major enemy offensive is approaching. From this we can conclude that the enemy mistook our poorly organized offensive for nothing more than reconnaissance in force.

Colonel of the Wehrmacht H. Polman in his book “Volkhov. 900 days fighting for Leningrad. 1941-1944 ”directly writes:“ The battle began near Volkhov in the zone of the 38th Army Corps on the adjacent flanks of the 126th and 215th Infantry Divisions on January 13, after several reconnaissance attempts.

“The fighting showed,” writes in his memoirs “In the Service of the People”, the former commander of the Volkhov Front, K.A. Meretskov, - unsatisfactory training of troops and staffs. The commanders and staffs failed to manage the units and organize interaction between them.

To eliminate the identified shortcomings, the Military Council of the front asked the Headquarters to postpone the operation for another three days ... The start of the offensive ... was postponed to January 13, 1942.

Corresponding organizational conclusions were drawn from the failed offensive: on the proposal of the Military General Council of the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was convinced of prof. V.F. Yakovlev of the unsuitability of the army commander of the 2nd shock Sokolov, and on January 10 he was recalled to Moscow, appointing Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov, who was replaced in his former post of commander of the 52nd Army by Lieutenant General V.F. Yakovlev.

On the same day, January 10, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, signed by Stalin and Vasilevsky, sent Directive No. 03 to Meretskov and the fronts demanding the use of the basics of military leadership. She demanded that the commanders of units and formations "learn to interact." The directive reminded of the need to concentrate forces during the offensive, in connection with which followed a strict order "to prohibit the deployment of individual divisions in a chain" and prescribed "to create shock groups of 3-4 divisions" and emphasized that "only the combined actions of shock groups ... can ensure the success of the offensive. (USSR in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, p. 156; TsAMO RF, F. 408., o. 9991., d. 24, ll. 12-14).

It was no longer sudden. Enemy reconnaissance discovered not only the preparation of the front for the offensive, but quite accurately established the direction of concentration of the main efforts. In the combat log of Army Group North for January 1942, we find an entry: “Reconnaissance shows a clear creation of the direction of the enemy’s main attack in front of the front of the 126th Infantry Division and in front of the right flank of the 215th Infantry Division. In addition, major preparations for the offensive are being made against the bridgeheads of Gruzino and Kirishi, as well as in the northeastern section of the army on both sides of Pogost. Having received such information about our intentions, the fascist German command took a number of appropriate measures. It regrouped, replacing the battered in the battles near Tikhvin with full-blooded formations. The heavily weakened tank and motorized divisions of the 39th motorized corps, withdrawn to the Lyuban region, were hastily put in order, replenished with people and equipment. With the help of troops, prisoners of war and the local population, the depth of defense was created: trenches were dug, settlements were fortified, winter roads were laid, etc. (Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. 1983. - P. 242-243).

The enemy met the offensive of our troops at well-prepared positions, equipped with a system of resistance nodes and strong points, with a large number of bunkers and machine-gun platforms. The leading edge of the German defense, basically, passed along the western bank of the river. Volkhov. The mirror of the river was shot through with dense oblique and flank fire. The second defensive line passed along the embankment of the railway line and the Kirishi Novgorod highway. It was a line of fortified strongholds in populated areas and at heights with well-organized fire communications between them. The entire space between the Volkhov River and the railway line was densely covered with engineering barriers: barbed wire fences, forest blockages, minefields and land mines. The steep western bank of the river was splashed in places with water, and its icy surface was a formidable obstacle for infantry without special equipment.

The strongholds were saturated with machine guns and mortars. The operational depth of defense was a system of nodes, equipped mainly in settlements. The defense was supported by powerful artillery and fairly strong aircraft.

To hold the Volkhov line, the Germans used parts of the 1st and 38th army corps consisting of eight (11, 21, 254, 291, 61, 215, 216) German infantry divisions and the 250th Spanish division. The 39th motorized corps was in the operational reserve. The 285th security division was located in the depths. In total, there were 13 enemy divisions in front of the front. Almost all of them were fully equipped, well trained and provided with sufficient weapons and ammunition.

Our troops were technically inferior to the enemy due to objective factors. Compared to ours, German formations and units had more automatic weapons, vehicles, mechanization and construction of defensive structures and roads. Were better provided with means of communication. All the armies of the front were purely infantry in our country. Troops moved exclusively on foot. The mobility of the troops was extremely low. We did not have the necessary number of tanks and aircraft to support the infantry on the battlefield. It was a time when the technique of the enemy dominated on the ground and in the air.

For a number of reasons, the industry of the USSR, for the second half of 1941, produced such a quantity of military products that made up for the losses of the active army in small arms by only 30 percent, in artillery - by 57, in tanks - by 27 and in combat aircraft - by 55 percent. .

In other words, by the beginning of 1942, the combat capability of the troops of the active army had not yet been fully restored and, naturally, there were not enough weapons to equip the deployable formations, which were intended to strengthen the fronts and make a decisive contribution to the winter offensive of the Soviet troops. (“Military History Journal”, 1990, No. 3, p. 16).

The deliveries of military equipment to the Soviet Union by the Allies under the Lend-Lease agreement began only in October 1941. They were significantly lower than the quantities agreed by the parties. In 1941, 204 aircraft were delivered instead of the 699 provided for by the protocol, tanks - 182, instead of the agreed 750. These quantities could not contribute a significant velad to the Red Army in the winter offensive of 1941-1942.

In the 2nd shock army, four separate rifle brigades (22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th) were an exception in this respect. They began to form in October-November 1941 in the Kharkov Military District as shock cadet brigades. Their core was made up of cadets from various military educational institutions, as well as fighters who arrived after being treated in hospitals. These units were fully staffed with artillery and small arms and had a fairly high saturation of automatic weapons for that time: each brigade had 529 SVT automatic rifles and 19 PPD assault rifles. They were not provided only with radio stations relying on the state. (MM.

Agapov. 23rd separate rifle brigade in the battle for Leningrad, 1999, pp.5-6).

At the beginning of the operation, there were no rear and support units and institutions on the Volkhov Front in the 2nd shock and 59th armies. Therefore, the fighters had to temporarily experience great difficulties in supply. Often the cargoes went to the old addresses of the connections to completely different areas. The armies that previously existed here from their bases could give very little. The formations and units of the newly arrived armies did not accumulate combat experience. A number of staff officers had no staff experience. But the situation developed in such a way that the front also did not have the opportunity to organize combat training with them and catch up. The personnel of some formations did not live in the forests and had no experience of fighting in a wooded and swampy area.

The troops of the newly created front were not provided with sufficient ammunition.

The Volkhov Front effectively used the additional time (January 9-13) provided by the Stavka to the front to better prepare the offensive. This can be seen from the actions of the 23rd Separate Rifle Brigade described below according to the documents that the author has.

By the beginning of the first offensive, the engineer company of the brigade did not have time to conduct engineering reconnaissance and engineering training in the offensive zone. The units of the brigade did not carry out reconnaissance actions.

In connection with the above, the headquarters of the 2nd shock army on January 9, by combat order No. 02, ordered the commander of the 23rd separate rifle brigade to organize engineering reconnaissance of the crossing of tanks (up to 60 tons) across the river. Volkhov and start harvesting timber for the construction of the crossing. In accordance with the order of the army headquarters, the sapper company of the brigade conducted reconnaissance of the thickness of the ice on the river, the steepness of the banks, the availability of timber to reinforce the ice and the construction of a crossing for tanks. In addition, she prepared timber for the crossing, conducted reconnaissance and cleared eight minefields in the area of ​​​​the battalion offensive. Inconspicuous obstacles were removed, advance paths were cleared, roads were cleared, etc. (TsAMO RF, f.309, f.4073, d.8, l.10; f.1812, f.1, d.4, l.6, 11;

The reconnaissance units of the brigade conducted night searches in order to capture prisoners and identify enemy fire weapons in the offensive area.

Exploration was carried out in the area with. Plotishno and the Red Shock Worker state farm with one group on the night of January 11 and two platoons on the night of January 13, 1942. They failed to capture prisoners. One platoon under the command of ml. Lieutenant Svidovsky Ivan Sergeevich was tasked with identifying enemy firepower at the Red Shock Worker state farm. The platoon, under heavy machine-gun fire in deep snow, advanced across the river and came close to the village of the state farm. The platoon took the blow and completed the task. The necessary data was transferred to the gunners. Svidovsky was awarded a government award with the medal "For Courage". (Agapov M.M. 23rd separate rifle brigade in the battle for Leningrad. 1999, pp. 12-13). The additional period of preparation for the offensive (from January 9 to 13) was effectively used by other formations of the army.

In the operational reports and memoirs of the participants in the operation, one can read that in most sectors of the offensive of our troops, the morning of January 13, 1942 turned out to be sunny. Towards the end of the artillery preparation, the wind picked up and swirled the wind. Shooting chains moved to the attack. Before the enemy trenches, it was necessary to overcome 800-1000 meters of open space with a frost of over 30 degrees and a snow depth of up to 1.5 m. Not everyone managed to cross the flat surface of the Volkhov River.

Let's start the review of hostilities from the right flank of the front, where the 4th Army was advancing. It was here that the operation envisaged by the Supreme Command Headquarters (directive of December 17, 1941) began to encircle the Mginsko-Ladoga group of German troops by the 4th army of the Volkhov and 54th army of the Leningrad fronts.

§4.3. COMBAT OPERATION TO ENROUND THE MGINSKOLADOZH GROUP OF GERMAN TROOPS

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The 4th Army fought in the Kirishi area. Kirishi is a settlement, whose name was given to the enemy bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river. Volkhov, held by the Nazi troops during the retreat from Tikhvin in December 1941. The bridgehead included the village of Dobrovolny, the Kirishi railway station, Plavnitsy, Novinki, vil. Kirishi and, in fact, the village of Kirishi, where the industrial buildings of the chemical and woodworking plants have been preserved. The Nazis adapted these buildings and the railway track for defense, having managed to dig deep into the ground and create a fairly dense, branched fire system.

From the very beginning, the bridgehead attracted significant forces of our 4th Army and fettered its maneuver in solving the main task of the offensive operation of the front. The 4th Army, as indicated in the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 17, 1941, was supposed to: “... advance in the general direction of Kirishi, Tosno and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, encircle and destroy the enemy who advanced north of Mga to Lake Ladoga ". (TsAMO RF, f. 204, o.89, d.50, ll.135-137).

As a first step in fulfilling this task, the army had to clear the eastern bank of the river from the enemy. Volkhov and seize bridgeheads on the opposite bank of the river, capacious enough for the further development of the offensive.

The army troops began to carry out this task as soon as they reached the river. Volkhov. In the last days of December 1941, they managed to capture in the area of ​​​​st. Tigoda and north of Vodose are two small bridgeheads. To expand them, the formations of the army regrouped and began to attack the enemy. However, repeated attacks were unsuccessful. They claimed many lives, weakening the already weakened parts more and more. By the time the front troops went over to the general offensive, the divisions that were part of the 4th Army each had no more than 3,500 people. Lacked artillery, mortars, automatic weapons.

The enemy felt this and, pulling fresh forces here, began to show activity. On January 13, 1942, on the day the front troops went over to the general offensive, the Nazis themselves attacked units of the 4th Army, which had reached the left bank of the river. Volkhov, trying to throw them off the bridgeheads. Having beaten off the enemy attack, the troops of the 4th Army struck back. But it turned out to be weak and did not bring tangible results.

The fighting in the Kirishi area, now flaring up, then fading, continued until October 1943. This bridgehead was in a very sensitive direction. From here there were the shortest routes to the east - to Tikhvin and to the north-west to Leningrad. The fascist German command considered it a springboard from which they hoped, under favorable conditions, to again strike at Tikhvin and unite with the Finns.

In addition, the bridgehead, located on the left flank of the Chudovolubansky enemy grouping, was a kind of shield covering this grouping from the blows of our troops, ensuring the stability of its positions. That is why personnel divisions with high combat capability, formed in East Prussia, were involved in the defense of the Kirishi bridgehead. On the bridgehead, units of the first 11th and 21st infantry divisions consistently defended. Later, the 217th, followed by the 61st Infantry Division, defended here. By the time the bridgehead fell, units of the 132nd Infantry Division were defending it. For the stubborn defense of the bridgehead, the Nazi command assigned the name "grenadier" to the most distinguished divisions and regiments.

The Kirishi bridgehead of the enemy not only diverted the forces of our troops from solving the main tasks, but most importantly, it fettered the maneuver of the army troops, tying them hand and foot. Therefore, the liquidation of the Kirishi bridgehead would be of positive significance not only for the army, but for the entire front. To throw the German troops from the Kirishi bridgehead, the 4th Army carried out several private operations.

Fighting on the site of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front

To the right of the 4th Army of the Volkhov Front, the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front operated.

The 54th Army, pursuing the defeated enemy troops near Voybokalo and Volkhov during the Tikhvin offensive operation, reached the Voronovo, Pogostye, Nov. line at the end of December 1941 with its left wing. Kirishi (see cards on pages 7, 8). Here, among the icy swamps, in some places covered with forest and shrubs sunk in the snow, there was a railway, which the retreating German troops grabbed. In the embankment of the canvas, which towered 1.5 - 2.5 meters above the snowy plain, they equipped machine-gun nests and artillery positions for anti-tank guns, dug out cells for machine gunners, built dugouts, cracks and other shelters.

The army was faced with the task of going on the offensive simultaneously with the troops of the Volkhov Front so that, in cooperation with the 4th Army, which was striking in the direction of Tosno, to encircle and destroy the enemy troops that had advanced to Lake Ladoga.

Commander of the 54th Army, Major General I.I. Fedyuninsky (12/30/41) demanded that the formations that had by this time reached the line of Lodva, Larionov Ostrov, break through the enemy defenses by rail and capture the line of Caps, Pogostye, Konduya, Zenino. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, l.71).

For several days, units of the army attacked the enemy's defensive positions, but the progeneral could not tear them apart. The most successful was 80I.I. Fedyuninsky Rifle Division of Colonel P.F. Brygin. Her 77th regiment, under the command of Colonel S.A. Sherstov, having overcome the railway embankment southeast of the Zharok junction and having gone deep into the rear of the enemy defense by almost 8 km, occupied the village of Konduya. Another, 153rd regiment of the same division, under the command of Major A.P. Zhigulova, moved even further and drove the enemy out of the village of Zenino. However, these regiments could not gain a foothold on the achieved lines. They did not have artillery, anti-tank mines and other means that could be countered by enemy tanks and armored vehicles. Cut off from the supply bases and not feeling the support of the main forces of the army, both regiments, having stayed behind enemy lines for 9 days, crossed the railway in the opposite direction and joined their division.

I.I. Fedyuninsky in the book "Raised by alarm" (M., 1961, p. 92) writes about the reasons for the failure: "... Sufficient superiority over the enemy in forces and means was not created."

Is it so? The 54th Army consisted of ten rifle divisions, a rifle brigade, a marine brigade, two tank brigades and a number of reinforcement units. In the direction of active operations by the beginning of January 1942, there were seven rifle divisions and one tank brigade, which were opposed by units of the enemy's 11th and 96th infantry divisions. If there was no necessary superiority on the entire 30-kilometer offensive front, then in certain directions the forces and means of the army made it possible to have it. In addition, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, given the importance of the task that the 54th Army was solving, allocated two rifle divisions to reinforce it - the 11th and 177th.

Without waiting for the approach of these two divisions, the army commander, taking advantage of the fact that the enemy’s defense was not continuous, but was built according to a system of separate nodes of resistance, sent the 311th rifle division of Colonel S.D. Biyakov to the rear of the enemy. According to the commander, attacking the headquarters of formations, preventing the concentration of reserves and the supply of ammunition, disrupting communications and control, the division should have contributed to the success of our formations advancing from the front.

The actions of the division at first caused alarm in the enemy.

The enemy was forced to send carts under cover of tanks and reinforced patrols. However, the actions of the division did not bring any special results influencing the general course of the army's offensive. In addition, she herself was hourly under enemy air and artillery attacks and was forced to change her position and hide from his reconnaissance. Difficult to the extreme, sometimes almost insoluble, remained the supply of ammunition, food, fodder and the problem of evacuating the wounded and sick. All this, as well as the lack of support from our aviation, hampered the division's maneuver, limiting its combat operations to a small area. The division stayed behind enemy lines until February 1, 1942. Having crossed the front line in the opposite direction, it concentrated in the Pogostye area. After a 10-day rest of the fighters and commanders, on February 11, the division was again brought into battle.

Simultaneously with the deployment of the 311th division behind enemy lines, on January 5, the army commander specified the task of the troops operating in the direction of the main attack, directing their efforts to the section of st. Guesthouse, Zharok junction. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, l.78).

On the night of January 6, army troops again attacked enemy positions. Parts of the three divisions 285, 80 and 198 managed to crack the enemy defenses in narrow areas and intercept the embankment of the railway line east of Shala in a small space. However, there was not enough strength to expand the breakthrough. The enemy took advantage of this. With fire and counterattacks, he began to put pressure on the wedged units of our troops, trying to throw them off the railway embankment. During the reflection of the enemy counterattack, the commander of the 80th division, Colonel P.F., was seriously wounded. Brygin. Colonel N.V. took command of the division. Simonov.

The time was approaching for a transition to a general offensive with the troops of the Volkhov Front. The troops of the 54th Army used the remaining days for preparation. Having made the transition on the ice of Lake Ladoga, the 11th Infantry Division of Major General V.I. joined the army. Shcherbakov, significantly increasing the striking force of the army. The commander decided to deliver the main blow in the direction of Pogostye, Shapki, Tosno, going towards the troops of the 55th Army of the Lenfront. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, l.82).

This decision was in line with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of 12/17/1941, but, putting it into practice, the 54th Army turned its back on the Volkhov Front, which played the main role in the beginning operation.

In two months, the Headquarters will correct this decision and order a strike towards the 2nd shock army. But, as we shall see, it will be too late.

The enemy, having revealed the plans of our troops, along the German communications not cut by the 1st shock, 11th armies of the North-Western Front and the 52nd army of the Volkhov Front, will pull up fresh forces to the Lyuban region and take other countermeasures.

In accordance with the decision taken, at the beginning of the operation, the commander of the 54th Army directed the main efforts of the army troops towards Lodva, Shapka, Vinyagolovo, Konduy, Zenino. Korodynya, trying to pave the way to Tosno.

On January 13, 1942, on the day the troops of the Volkhov Front went over to the "repeated" offensive, divisions of the 54th Army on a 20-kilometer front, from Lodva to the Zharok junction, attacked the opposing enemy.

The artillery preparation that preceded the attack was weak.

The enemy's firepower was not suppressed, and the attack was not developed. Only some units of the 285th and 281st rifle divisions managed to overcome the railway embankment, but they were driven back to their original position by the ensuing enemy counterattacks. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, ll.84.86).

In the Army Combat Action Journal for that day, it is written, “The general offensive of the army, launched at 10.30 on 13.1.1942, was not successful due to the following reasons:

- the lack of a clear, well-thought-out plan of operation, striking along diverging lines and on a fairly wide front with a small number of divisions;

- the absence of permanent military intelligence, especially flank intelligence;

- the lack of a well-established interaction between artillery and infantry.

Further, the weak work of our aviation and the highly developed enemy fire system were pointed out. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, l.87). Speaking about the failures of the offensive, General Fedyuninsky also refers to the same reasons in his memoirs. (Fedyuninsky I.I. Alerted.

– M., 1961, p.97).

On January 16, the army commander again moved the divisions on the offensive, concentrated on the breakthrough sector. However, again, failure. An entry is made in the Army Combat Log:

“The operation plan was not developed, the reconnaissance did not illuminate the area enough, reconnaissance was not carried out, due to the short time allotted for the preparation of the operation. The order was signed at 20.45 on January 15, launched at 22.00, received at 23-24.00. There was no light time at the disposal of the commanders of divisions and regiments. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10122, d.61, l.88).

Ordinary fighters, junior and middle commanders knew nothing of this. It never occurred to them that there, at the army headquarters, they could not develop an operation plan and agree on the time and location of the infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation, and the haste shown in organizing the offensive would turn out to be a failure. They believed in their weapons, they knew the task - to destroy the enemy who had taken refuge behind the railway embankment and went forward.

The soldiers of the 11th Infantry Division, advancing on Pogostya, decided to outwit the Nazis. In the dead of January, two groups of sappers, with bags filled with tol, bogged down in the snow to the waist, moved to the front line of the enemy’s defense. Here is the edge of the forest. It was followed by an open snow-covered field. The harassing light of rockets fired from the other side of the field every now and then forced the fighters to burrow into the snow. By 5 o'clock in the morning, the sappers reached the embankment of the railway and began to lay the roof almost under the very nose of the Nazis. The squad leader of the 28th separate engineer battalion, Sergeant B.D. Bukhteev, connected the wires and, holding the cable with his hand, was the last to crawl to the rear.

At dawn there was an explosion. In the place where the chimney of the observation post had just been seen, a huge funnel formed, deeply cutting through the thickness of the embankment. Immediately after the explosion, machine gunners rushed forward. They occupied the gap formed in the embankment. Under their cover, rifle units began to move up. The battle for Pogostye, for the umpteenth time, began to flare up again.

By the evening of January 20, the 177th Rifle Division approached, and in the morning of the next day it went on the attack.

The soldiers of the division met the order to advance with great enthusiasm. Having advanced the guns of the regimental and divisional artillery to direct fire, the artillerymen destroyed the enemy fortifications in the embankment, and the 486th rifle regiment under the command of Major V.I. Nikonov captured the railway, separate units leaked over the road, south into the forest. Despite the first success, this division failed to develop it. (P.

Egorov. "Through forests and swamps", funds of the Museum of military glory of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts).

At the end of January, organizational changes took place in the army.

The entire Sinyavino Group of Forces withdrew from the army and entered on January 27, 1942 under the command of the 8th Army. In the second half of January, the field administration of this army, on the orders of the Leningrad Front, transferred its troops to the newly restored Neva Operational Group, and itself began redeployment, together with army units, from the Nevsky bridgehead across Lake Ladoga beyond the blockade ring to the Volkhov sector. Here she received from the 54th Army part of her sector of the front, adjacent to Lake Ladoga.

February has come. This month in the central part of Russia has always been famous for heavy snowfalls, but in the winter of 1941-1942. there was a lot of snow. He covered swamps with a thick layer, filled forest thickets and clearings.

It was terribly difficult to wade through such virgin snow, especially in the forest, and it was even more difficult to conduct offensive operations. And yet, the soldiers of the 54th Army, attacking the enemy in the Pogost area, did not stop fighting. Sometimes they managed to advance 200-300 meters, occupy a trench or several dugouts, at other times they managed to withstand an enemy counterattack. But regardless of anything, active hostilities did not die out for a single day.

These fights were not even mentioned in the reports of the Information Bureau. But they gave birth to hundreds of heroes: infantrymen, artillerymen, mortarmen, sappers, signalmen, orderlies.

The personnel of the regimental battery of the 502nd regiment of the 177th rifle division, Lieutenant Vasily Petrov, acted fearlessly and with high skill. Having installed the guns on the embankment and under the railway bridge, the artillerymen, firing at close range, from the flank, smashed the firing points and manpower of the enemy. The Nazis, angry with well-aimed shots from Petrov's battery, decided to capture it. Under cover of the morning mist, they attacked. But our observers reported it in time. Having allowed the Nazis to 200 meters, the guns hit with buckshot.

In a few minutes it was all over. The enemy chains seemed to have been blown away by the wind. Only black dots were left lying on the snow, the dead and wounded. (TsAMO RF, f. 410, op. 10139, d. 10, l. 19).

The famous artilleryman, master of direct fire, ml. Lieutenant V.G. Bondarenko. Komsomolets Volodya Bondarenko commanded an artillery platoon from the first days of the war. Started the war as a sergeant. For military successes, he was awarded the military rank of junior lieutenant.

After receiving the order to attack, Bondarenko studied the location of the enemy's firing points, rolled out his guns to the front line and, as soon as the command followed, opened a destructive fire. On this day, his platoon broke 11 bunkers and 5 dugouts, burying about 60 Nazis in them. (TsAMO RF, f.410, op.10175, d.1, l.74).

On February 13, having crossed the ice of Lake Ladoga and made an almost 100-kilometer march along snow-covered roads to the Pogost area, the 124th tank brigade under the command of A.G. approached. Motherland.

The brigade had already met with the enemy more than once, in its ranks there were fearless and experienced tankers. Having taken to waiting positions and received an order to attack, together with the 198th Infantry Division, Colonel N.M. Martynchuk, the command staff immediately began to study the approaches to the front line of the enemy's defense, and the personnel - to check the condition of the combat vehicles and eliminate shortcomings after a hard march.

In everything - in working out the task, and in checking weapons, and in adjusting running gears - there was an upsurge. Only the day before the fight, 47 applications were submitted to the primary party organizations. Soldiers and officers wanted to go into battle as communists. (P. Egorov. "Through forests and swamps." Funds of the museum of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, l.64).

On the morning of February 16, when the night shadows disappeared, the tanks roared forward. They were faced with the task of capturing Pogost together with units of the 198th Infantry Division and developing an offensive in the direction of Vinyagolovo.

This task, as it turned out, was not an easy one. First of all, because it has already been deployed to other formations more than once, and the offensive actions of our troops have already attracted attention and attracted enemy reserves. And secondly, the Nazis attached exceptional importance to this point in the system of their defense, covering the way to Leningrad. Here they created heavily fortified positions. In the embankment itself there were dugouts, bunkers, firing nests, rifle cells. Behind the embankment are the firing positions of mortars and artillery.

At 0900, the 1st tank battalion, consisting of 19 KV tanks under the command of Major N.M. Rybakov, reached the front line of the enemy's defense. Having ironed the dugouts and shelters, the tankers overcame the first position on the move, and then, having made a 1.5 km throw, broke into the second one.

At the same time, the 2nd tank battalion under the command of Major Paikin destroyed the enemy defenses west of Pogost.

By February 17, units of the 124th Tank Brigade approached Vinyagolov. But they could not master this point on the move. Having broken away from the infantry and not feeling the support of the artillery, the tankers were forced to stop. At the same time, the enemy forces continued to grow. By the end of the day, his tanks appeared. Artillery began to hit much harder.

Enemy bombers hovered over the battlefield. On February 18, the Nazis, feeling superior in strength, struck back.

Finding themselves without infantry and strong supply and communication lines, the tankers of the brigade were forced to withdraw.

February 23 was followed by a command to stop the attack. They didn't bring any success anyway. Parts of the 198th Rifle Division, pinned down by continuous enemy air raids, could not get off the ground, and the tanks of the 124th Tank Brigade, although they broke forward, were forced to return without infantry support.

In the area of ​​the Zharok junction, the battle continued. Having received replenishment, the 285th Infantry Division attacked the positions of the Germans with renewed vigor. The enemy resisted fiercely. In brutal martial arts these days, the combat glory of the machine gunner of the 1015th Infantry Regiment Pyotr Alekseevich Safonov, the first holder of the Order of Lenin in the division, was born.

Small in stature, a thin guy, in his company he was the son of many fighters. Elderly warriors took care of him. When hot moments came, they sent him either for cartridges or for food.

Safonov was eager for the real thing. He became friends with the machine gunners, stubbornly studied the machine gun and waited for an opportunity to try his skills in battle. And such an opportunity presented itself. In one battle, a machine-gun crew was killed by a mine that exploded nearby. Then Safonov lay down behind the machine gun.

The Nazis, who went on the counterattack, were almost there. But then a machine gun hit and forced them to roll back. The commander noted Safonov's resourcefulness and courage, and appointed the young soldier as a machine gunner.

CHAPTER 5. BATTLE ON THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN STRIKE

Success was outlined only in the 15-kilometer offensive zone of the 52nd and 2nd shock armies. In the 52nd Army, the 305th Rifle Division again distinguished itself. By the end of the day on January 13, the soldiers of the division crossed the Volkhov and started fighting with the 250th Spanish division of the enemy, slowly advancing in the direction of the villages of Gorka and Lelyavino. To the north, following the 305th, the 46th and 267th Rifle Divisions of the 52nd Army crossed over and entered the battle on the west bank.

267th Rifle Division, brigade commander Ya.D. Zelenkova, formed in the Chernihiv region, advanced on the village of Gorka, which stood on the banks of the Volkhov. Along the steep bank, the Germans built bunkers, full profile trenches, barbed wire, minefields. On the morning of January 13, during artillery preparation, artillerymen blew up an ammunition depot in the village.

The 844th Infantry Regiment of the division attacked Hill 130.0 between Gorka and the Oneg pioneer camp. The regiment crossed the Volkhov, but on the right bank lay down under heavy enemy fire. The soldiers could not raise their heads. When it got dark, the Germans set fire to ten houses in Gorka to illuminate the approaches to the village. This crime of the enemy shocked our fighters. The commander of the battery of 76-mm guns, Lieutenant Krutikov, together with the calculation, rolled out one gun for direct fire and smashed the nearest two bunkers with several shells, from where heavy machine guns fired. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy ceased fire, the regiment commander launched the 3rd battalion of senior lieutenant Z.A. Gagueva. To the right, the 1st battalion of senior lieutenant Ilyashevich rushed forward from the neighboring 848th rifle regiment. From two sides they burst into the village and engaged in hand-to-hand combat. The enemy fled, suffering heavy losses. Then the 846th Rifle Regiment drove the Germans out of the village of Nagornoye, and the 848th Regiment captured the pioneer camp and the villages of Starye and Novye Bystritsy north of Gorka with the second and third battalions. The bridgehead was captured. Trophies were captured by the regiments: 4 mortars, 2 anti-tank guns, 14 heavy and light machine guns, rifles, a car, as well as an ammunition depot, where there were 1,500 shells, about 800 mortar mines, 150 thousand rifle cartridges, 300 grenades, lighting rockets. (Izmailov L.G. 267th Infantry Division in the battles on the Volkhov Front, LNO, pp. 213-214).

Scheme of the initial position for the offensive in the breakthrough sector of the 2nd shock army on 13.1.42

In the offensive zone of the 2nd shock army, luck accompanied the 327th rifle division of Colonel I.M. Antyufeev, formed in the Voronezh region. She was given the 44th separate ski battalion and the 839th howitzer regiment of the RGK. The 1098th Rifle Regiment, advancing from the eastern shore from the village of Gorodok, crossed the Volkhov at Krasnoye Poselok by 14:00 on January 13. By the evening of the 13th and on the night of January 14, the 1102nd Infantry Regiment, advancing from the eastern shore from the village of Dubovitsy, started a battle for the village of Kostylevo. The 1100th regiment occupied the heights on the western bank near the village of Bor, but could not occupy the village. Thus, the Voronezh troops penetrated the defenses of the German 126th Infantry Division in this sector. Losses killed in the 327th division were small, but there were quite a lot of wounded - up to a thousand people. Among the dead was the commander of the 1098th regiment, Colonel P.Ya. Komarov. Russian Soviet poet P.N. Shubin, who at that time was a war correspondent for the Frontovaya Pravda newspaper, described his death in the poem "On the Northern River."

To the left of the Voronezh residents, the 58th separate rifle brigade of Colonel F.M. stubbornly tried to force the Volkhov. Zhiltsova with the 561st Artillery Regiment of the RGC attached to her. The offensive of the brigade developed with great difficulty. On the first day of the offensive, it was not possible to force the Volkhov.

The second rifle battalion of the brigade when moving to the eastern bank of the river. Volkhov was met with fire by unsuppressed firing points of the enemy in vil. Gorelovo. They stopped the advance of the battalion. The soldiers lay down. Together with the shooters, the crew of an anti-tank 45-mm gun moved.

The gunner, Red Army soldier Smyk Akim Alekseevich, began to fire at these firing points. One, which especially interfered with the advance of our infantry, he liquidated with his gun from the first shot. In addition, he himself destroyed several fascists. The suppression of this firing point made it possible for our infantry to advance further to the banks of the Volkhov. For this battle, the Red Army soldier Smyk A.A. was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. (TsAMO RF, f.33, o.682524, d.588, l.72).

After the advance of the main forces of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the brigade to the eastern bank of the Volkhov River, the enemy opened machine-gun and mortar fire. The movement stopped, the infantry lay down. The Germans in some places blew up the ice near the western bank of the river. Polynyas appeared. On the first day of the second offensive, the 23rd brigade failed to cross the Volkhov.

But on the left flank of the 2nd shock army, the 24th separate rifle brigade of Colonel M.V. was successful. Romanovsky. By 5 p.m. on January 13, her 1st battalion reached the western coast and began fighting to expand the bridgehead at Novaya Bystrica. (Agapov M.M. 23rd separate rifle brigade in the battle for Leningrad, 1999, pp. 13-14; TsAMO RF. f. 309, o. 4073, d. 2, ll. 75.78, d. 8. , l.8-9; f.1812. o.1, d.3, ll. 86-87).

On the morning of January 13, in accordance with the plan of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front under the command of Major General I.I. launched an offensive on Pogostye and Tosno. Fedyuninsky. With stubborn battles, she went towards the Volkhovites. She managed to advance 20 kilometers.

The neighbor on the left is the 11th Army of the North-Western Front under the command of Lieutenant General V.I. Morozova was already conducting offensive operations, as mentioned earlier, creating a threat on the southern flank of the Novgorod grouping of the enemy. At that time, the 11th Army approached Staraya Russa. Unfortunately, here she stopped, unable to take possession of the city. (Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - 1983, p. 249).

The next day, January 14, the 2nd shock army expanded the captured bridgeheads. Rifle brigades, which had seized small bridgeheads the day before, transferred their second echelons there. Finally, the 23rd and 58th rifle brigades managed to cross the Volkhov. 58th brigade at 4 o'clock. 30 minutes. on the morning of January 14, she reached the western bank of the Volkhov in the direction of the village. Yamno. In the 23rd brigade, a company of machine gunners and part of the forces of the 3rd rifle battalion crossed the Volkhov by 13 o'clock. They successfully advanced to vil. Plotishno. Behind them, other units of the brigade moved to the bridgehead. But at this time, the 23rd brigade received a personal order from the commander of the 2nd shock brigade to withdraw from the battle in its sector two separate rifle battalions with support units, artillery and mortars.

Under the command of the brigade commander and the military commissar, they were to head to the site of the 58th rifle brigade. They were given the task of helping build on the success of the 58th brigade and, together with it, capture the village and the German resistance center of Yamno. By 19 o'clock, parts of the brigade (1st and 3rd det.

rifle battalions, a company of anti-tank rifles, a separate communications battalion without one platoon, two reconnaissance platoons, a platoon of submachine gunners, six 76mm cannons, a mortar battalion and a sapper company) were withdrawn from the battle in their area and took up positions near vil. Yamno next to the 58th Infantry Brigade. They prepared to attack in the morning. The oral instruction of the commander was confirmed by combat order No. 03 of the army headquarters with a specification of the task: after the liberation of Yamno, capture the village. Borisovo, cut the road Myasnoy Bor - the state farm "Red Drummer" and destroy the enemy in the state farm. (TsAMO RF, f.309, o.4073, d.8, l.23).

Meanwhile, the 24th separate rifle brigade, operating at the junction with the 52nd army, fought off enemy counterattacks in the Gorelovo-Russ area during January 15th. On the main line of the 2nd shock army on the night of January 15, the 1st and 3rd divisions. The battalions of the 23rd Infantry Brigade, overcoming the enemy's stubborn fire resistance, entered the village of Yamno. Suffering significant losses, by 12.00 o'clock they advanced to its western outskirts (report of staff-23 to the headquarters of the 2nd shock army No. 7).

reported to the head of the political department of the Volkhov Front that:

"15. Red Army soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Separate Rifle Brigade TT.

Bychkov and Merkulov were the first to break into the village of Yamno, occupied the dugout and at night, crawling from one dugout to another, knocked out the Germans from the dugouts with grenades, killed the officer, while seizing the officer's bag with documents, a pistol and other trophies. The Germans, taken by surprise, ran out of the dugouts without even having time to put on their greatcoats. (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.125, d.17, l.37-40; Agapov M.M. Ibid., p.14).

The headquarters of the 2nd shock army for the development of the offensive decided to enter the second echelon and ordered the commanders of the 58th and 23rd divisions. page of brigades to pass through their battle formations the reserve 53rd division. page brigade (commander - Major General V.S. Rakovsky), who received the task of capturing the Myasnoy Bor station.

At 12 noon on January 15, the 2nd division. p. battalion of the 53rd det. The brigades moved through the battle formations of the brigades that had already captured Yamno. But by this time the Germans had brought up to 500 submachine gunners and new weapons to the Yamno area. The Germans opened heavy fire on the advancing units. After that, the arrived machine gunners of the Nazis launched a counterattack. Entering the battle through the battle formations of the 23rd brigade, the 2nd battalion of the 53rd brigade could not withstand the sudden blow and ran back. At the same time, he carried away the fighters of the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 23rd brigade. The panic that arose in the 53rd brigade and spread to the battalions of the 23rd brigade led to the loss of the village. After that, Yamno had to be taken a second time.

The decisive actions of the senior instructor of the political department of the 23rd brigade of the battalion commissar A.D. Gerashchenko, who was in battle formations, helped our fighters "hook" on the outskirts of Yamno. He stopped some of the fighters, organized a group of them and led her into battle. They recaptured dugouts on the outskirts of Yamno. By order of the front commander No. 01 / n dated February 1, 1942 A.D. Gerashchenko was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for this feat. In the Gerashchenko group, the Red Army soldier M.T. Yakovlev. Under heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, he threw grenades at the German bunker, killing 12 Germans, and captured the firing point. Then he participated in the cleansing of another bunker from the Germans. This made it possible to keep the outskirts of the village. M.T. Yakovlev was awarded the medal "For Courage" on April 21, 1942 for this battle. Red Army soldier E.E. Galagan, gunner of the 76-mm gun of the 23rd brigade. He put forward his gun for direct fire and with accurate shooting knocked out the Germans from the bunkers, destroyed other firing points and manpower. By this he contributed to the retention of Yamno. The commander of the front, he was also awarded the medal "For Military Merit". (TsAMO RF, f.33, o.682524, d.588, l.42,178; f.408, o.10020, d.22, l.162).

Stubborn battles on January 15-16 were fought by the 327th Infantry Division. On the night of January 16, she liberated the villages of Bor, Kostylevo, Arefino, Krasny Poselok. There has been some success in breaking through the German defenses in the sector of the 58th division of the brigade with the assistance of the 23rd division of the brigade in the Yamno area. At the same time, the Germans put up stubborn resistance in the areas of rifle brigades located to the south, in the area of ​​Plotishno, Borisovo, the Krasny Udarnik state farm.

The commander of the 2nd shock army, by his order No. 056 of January 16, united Colonel F.M. Zhiltsov separate rifle brigades (23rd, 58th and 53rd) and ordered to destroy the enemy who had broken through into Yamno. To do this, two rifle companies of the 53rd division arrived in Yamno at night. brigade page. By this order, the "Southern Operational Group" of troops was created, which existed until the end of January (with the replacement of the 53rd brigade in it by the 24th). This was the first case of the practical organization of an operational group of troops as part of the 2nd shock army in order to more effectively lead the troops and improve the organization of the battle. Most likely, the “hint” of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command by Directive No. 03 of January 10, 1942 played a role.

(Agapov M.M. 23rd separate page brigade in the battle for Leningrad. 1999, p. 15).

The commander of the 2nd shock army decides to reinforce the troops in the area of ​​Yamno, Plotishno, which is promising for completing the breakthrough of the enemy's first line of defense. For this, the army headquarters planned the participation of the main force of the army - the 327th rifle division. On the evening of January 16, the headquarters of the 2nd shock army gave the following order (combat order No. 03) to the commanders of the 327th division and the 58th, 23rd and 24th divisions of the brigades: “The enemy, putting up stubborn resistance in sector 23 and 24 sbr, holds the western bank of the river. Volkhov. On the Yamno sector, exclusively Kolomno, the enemy front was broken through. The 327th Rifle Regiment with one rifle regiment with a company of tanks T firmly fettering and covering Bor, Kostylevo, Arefino, ... with two rifle regiments with reinforcement units striking at the eastern edge of the forest west of the settlements along the river. Volkhov to the south and south-west, together with the 23rd, 24th and 58th rifle brigades, surround and destroy the enemy in the areas of the Krasny Udarnik state farm, Russa, followed by access to Myasnoy Bor, Lyubtsy. 23, 24 and 58 rifle brigades with access to the Lyubtsy line to form the second echelon of the army ... Actions begin at 7.00, 17.01.42. (TsAMO RF, f.309, o.4073, d.8, l.24).

While the battles for Yamno were going on, the sapper company of the 23rd brigade built winter crossings across the Volkhov in the YamnoShevelevo area in three days - on January 15. At 2 pm on January 17, a company of T-60 tanks (10 vehicles) crossed the river along these crossings and reached the eastern outskirts of Yamno. (TsAMO RF, f.1812, o.1, d.32, l.2; f.309, o.4073, d.14, l.38).

Although deep snow and fires in the village severely limited the action of light tanks, their arrival strengthened the morale of the fighters.

Reporting to General A.M. Vasilevsky about the results of the first two days of the offensive operations of the troops of the front, K.A. Meretskov noted with bitterness that our aviation had not yet fully assembled and that shells were being brought in with great interruptions. (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.89, d.21, ll.137-138). After that, our aviation rendered great assistance to the advancing troops, having made more than 1,500 sorties in a few days with the aim of striking at the enemy’s battle formations.

A few words about the air forces of the front. The units and formations included in them had good training and combat experience. In the battles for Tikhvin, our pilots shot down 134 enemy aircraft and destroyed 164 on the ground. Their main disadvantage was their small number.

By the beginning of the Luban operation, the front aviation consisted of only 118 aircraft, of which:

fighters - 71, attack aircraft - 19, dive bombers - 6, reconnaissance aircraft - 4 and U-2 - 18. (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.89, d.

It should be noted that in the first days of the operation, the aircraft fleet of the front was replenished with almost a hundred aircraft and increased to 211 units. But, unfortunately, almost exclusively by U-2 aircraft. These workers day and night supplied the troops with food and ammunition, took out the wounded, bombed enemy positions after dark. But, of course, they were not capable of solving the main tasks of defeating enemy troops.

“If the 2nd shock army was successful, then the offensive failed in the 4th and 59th armies. Their attacks became weaker and weaker over time, and then completely stopped. The neighbor of the Volkhov Front, the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, having used up ammunition, on January 17 also stopped offensive operations. She stopped at the turn of Mount Cannon, Lodva, st. Molux, Art. Pogost'e, Posadnikov Island, New Kirishi settlement.

In this situation, attacks on the right flank of the front meant a waste of strength. After my report, the Headquarters allowed to transfer all efforts in the direction of Spasskaya Polist and Lyuban. This direction then remained the main one for almost another half a year. That is why the whole operation began to be called Luban. (Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M .: Nauka. 1983. - P. 250).

In accordance with this decision, the 4th Army, which had suspended the offensive, expanded its operational sector at the expense of the 59th Army, and the latter moved even further south, almost to the rear of the 2nd Shock Army.

CHAPTER 6

The section of the Zavizha front transferred to the 4th Army, Vyya increased the front of the army's combat operations by 10 km. Together with the site, two divisions (288th and 376th) and three ski battalions (47th, 48th and 50th) were transferred. In addition, the army with this site received another enemy foothold held by the enemy in the Gruzino region. This bridgehead, like the Kirishi one, was located in a sensitive area of ​​​​our defense and therefore immediately became a subject of special concern to the army command. At the end of January 1942, the army faced the task as a primary goal: to drop German troops not only from the Kirishi, but also from the Gruzinsky bridgeheads. General Lyapin (the new commander of the 4th Army) decided first to throw the Germans off the Georgian bridgehead. He brought the 65th Infantry Division of Colonel P.K. to the reserve. Koshevoy, replenished it with people and weapons, and then aimed at Gruzino to reinforce the positions of the 1218th Infantry Regiment of the 366th Infantry Division, which occupied there, to begin active operations against the bridgehead. The 1218th Rifle Regiment under the command of Major Zarub remained in the 4th Army at the place where the 366th Division fought, until it was transferred to the 2nd Shock Army. In Gruzino there were old Arakcheevsky barracks with deep cellars and even underground passages. The 65th Rifle Division and the 1218th Rifle Regiment were given the task, interacting with each other, to capture the Bolshevik state farm 4 km east of Gruzino and then advance on Gruzino.

Having organized reconnaissance, the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 1218th rifle regiment, Lieutenant Komkov, led his battalion around this German fortified point. This battalion, bypassing the state farm from the rear, captured the villages of Lyudnya, Khotilovo, Motylye, which created a threat for the enemy to intercept the approach to the state farm. Komkov's battalion came close to Gruzino.

At the same time, when Komkov's battalion and units of the 65th Infantry Division were bypassing the state farm from different sides, our mortars opened heavy frontal fire on the state farm. By this they misled the enemy, who considered him for artillery preparation and expected an attack from the front.

The battalion commander of the 1218th Infantry Regiment agreed on issues of interaction with units of the 65th Infantry Division. On the night of February 3, they simultaneously stormed the state farm. The Germans did not expect such an attack and began to retreat in disorder. At the same time, our troops captured trophies: one serviceable tank, two guns, other weapons and a lot of ammunition.

The state farm "Bolshevik", being on the dominant heights, occupied an advantageous position in relation to the Georgian bridgehead. The enemy fortifications were clearly visible from it and it was a convenient starting position for the development of the offensive. The Nazis understood this well.

Therefore, having gathered their strength, they again captured the state farm with a retaliatory attack. The command of the 4th Army, which did not expect such a quick loss of the newly conquered positions, demanded from the commander of the 65th Infantry Division, Colonel P.K. Koshevoy, return the state farm. The division was already preparing for this. Units of the 38th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Major I.E. Abramenko, in the evening of the same day, with a swift attack, the Nazis were driven out of the state farm. The enemy left up to 150 corpses on the battlefield.

On the morning of February 4, the battle broke out along the entire front of the Georgian bridgehead. The Nazis desperately resisted, but they could not hold back the pressure of our soldiers. By the morning of February 5, Gruzino was cleared of enemy troops. (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.89, d.98, l.17).

Only the former Arakcheev estate, located on a small island of the river, remained in the hands of the enemy. Volkhov, formed by an artificial channel. The palace and the buildings adjacent to it, built in the style of medieval architecture, with thick stone walls and narrow windows, were skillfully adapted by the Germans for defense. This estate, which received the name "Arakcheevsky nest", subsequently cost our troops considerable sacrifices. Then, during the battles for Gruzino, the command of the 4th Army and the headquarters of the front apparently did not attach much importance to this estate and did not immediately take measures to capture it, but, on the contrary, immediately after the capture of Gruzino, i.e. On February 5, the front headquarters decided to withdraw the 65th rifle division from the battle and send it to the area of ​​\u200b\u200boperation of the front strike force. By the time they figured it out, it was already too late. The enemy took cover behind massive stone walls, threw up reserves and organized a fire system. Subsequently, General Lyapin wrote that "... the Arakcheev nest, the existence of which few of us even then knew, located on the island, remained uncleaned." (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.89, d.170, l.9).

It should be noted that the 4th Army during the Luban operation was a kind of source of reserves. So, on January 23, 191, 377 and 92 rifle divisions left its composition, a few days later the 4th Guards left, and on February 5 the 65th rifle division.

After the departure of the 65th division, remaining in the Gruzino area, the 288th division and the 1218th regiment tried for several more days to seize the "Arakcheevsky nest", but to no avail. They only managed to explore and study this estate. There was simply not enough strength to solve the problem. A few days later, the Nazis, having brought up fresh reserves, launched a furious counterattack through the area of ​​the Georgian park on the positions occupied by the 1218th regiment. Despite the fact that the regiment suffered heavy losses, it managed to repel a counterattack. Junior Lieutenant Burlak especially distinguished himself. He placed mortars in the houses on the outskirts of Gruzino and through the window openings the mortars began to fire at the attackers. Calculations failed. Burlak noticed that in the sector of fire from the mortar that fell silent to his right, the Nazis rushed to the attack. The junior lieutenant rushed to this mortar and began to work alone for the entire crew. By firing, he destroyed the attackers. 40 killed fascist soldiers - the result of the actions of junior lieutenant Burlak. The Nazi attack was repulsed.

The 1218th Rifle Regiment was withdrawn from the battle in Gruzino and sent to its 366th Rifle Division in the 2nd Shock Army only on February 23, 1942.

Attacks of the troops of the 4th Army in the Kirishi area and on the left bank of the river. Volkhov did not receive development. The loss of the Georgian bridgehead forced the enemy to pay special attention to holding the Kirishi bridgehead.

The value of the Kirishi bridgehead has now increased even more. In a hurry, the Germans reinforced the garrison, increased the number of gun and machine-gun emplacements. A significant amount of artillery was redirected by them from the left bank of the river. Volkhov to support the Kirishi garrison.

The offensive capabilities of the 4th Army were continuously decreasing.

To draw the attention of the front commander to this fact, General Lyapin, on February 13, 1942, reported: the total number of the army is 17009 people, of which only 5950 people are fighting, 89 field and 14 anti-tank guns, 9 mortars, 55 heavy machine guns. (TsAMO RF, f.294, o.97, d.20, l.54).

Given that the army held an 80-kilometer front, an offensive with a decisive goal was out of the question. At best, she could conduct an active defense on the occupied lines. It was to this conclusion that both the army commander and the front commander came. Meretskov knew what forces were transferred to other armies and what was left on this sector of the front. The commander of the front, on the report of the commander-4, imposed a resolution allowing him to confine himself to private operations and active intelligence. (P. Egorov. Through forests and swamps, pp. 36-43, funds of the Museum of the Volkhov Front.; TsAMO RF, f. 204, f. 97, d. 20, f. 54).

CHAPTER 7. CONTINUATION OF COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE MAIN DIRECTION

Further describing the fighting on the central sector of the Volkhov Front, it should be noted that after the decision to transfer all efforts to the direction of Spasskaya Polist and Lyuban, it was here that “a grouping of troops from three armies was created. In the center, on a 15-kilometer section of the front, the 2nd shock army advanced, to the right of it - the 59th army, having a strike group on its left flank, to the left of the 2nd shock army - the main forces of the 52nd army .. Thus, by the course of events, an amendment was made to the plan of operation. The main blow was directed to bypass the fortified positions of the enemy, and Lyuban remained the closest target of the advancing troops of the front. (Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M .: Nauka.

– 1983, p. 250).

With the emerging success in the sector of the 2nd shock army of the commander, he ordered the commander N.K. Klykov, on the morning of January 15, to bring into battle the second echelon of the army (two rifle brigades 53 and 59) and by the end of the day reach the line of the Chudovo-Novgorod railway. (TsAMO RF, f.204, o.89, d.108, ll.254-255).

The actions of the 53rd brigade, brought into battle from the second echelon in the Yamno region, showed that these forces were too weak and could not provide a turning point in our favor.

To intensify the strike, by order of the front commander, the 59th separate rifle brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Chernik was brought into battle in the sector of the 327th division. Of interest is the formation of the brigade, which began at the end of October 1941 in the PriVO with a formation center in the village of Dergachi, the regional center of the Saratov region. Conditions for formation were far from the best.

In addition to the school building, adapted to accommodate the headquarters of the brigade, there were no other buildings to accommodate the emerging units and subunits. The personnel were quartered in peasant houses with. Dergachi and surrounding villages. This had a negative effect on the preparation and cohesion of units. The formation of the brigade was led by senior battalion commissar I.Kh. Venets, brigade commissar. The brigade commander and chief of staff arrived at the brigade only on the 20th of December - a day or two before the first echelon was sent to the active army. During the formation of the brigade, they were able to conduct the only exercise on the topic “March and Encounter Battle”. At the same time, a suddenly rising snowstorm and a snow blizzard, in a completely open steppe, prevented its successful completion, because. frostbite began. Poorly during the formation received weapons and materiel. The brigade received guns and mortars, part of rifles and machine guns only in Yaroslavl at the station. Vspole. Warm underwear, padded jackets and quilted trousers were also received here. All this affected the quality of the first combat operations of the brigade.

According to the commissar of the Wentz brigade, the privates and sergeants were excellent. 500 people of communists and Komsomol members were received, unarmored and sent to the brigade as ordinary political fighters. They cemented party and Komsomol organizations units and divisions. The commanding staff, including commanders of units and subdivisions, as well as political workers, were called up from the reserve and had no combat experience.

The first echelon arrived at its final destination, the Nebolchi station on December 31, 1941. Further, following on foot, with deep snow drifts, clearing the way for transport and military equipment, the units moved along the Msta River to Malaya Vishera. By January 11, the brigade approached the destination. She received the task of entering the gap at the turn of the villages of Bor, Kostylevo and, acting on the rear of the Germans, move to the second line of defense of the Germans in order to cut the Novgorod-Chudovo railway in the section Myasnoy Bor - Spasskaya Polist and take Spasskaya Polist on the move. Already when crossing the Volkhov, the enemy fired at the brigade with shrapnel and inflicted heavy losses. On the west coast, German aircraft bombed her marching columns. On the morning of January 15, the brigade went on the offensive, but there was no sudden strike, because. it was discovered by the Germans the day before. In addition, the Germans threw into the rear of the brigade a group of submachine gunners who managed to cause some panic in the brigade. The commander and staff officers went to the battalions and eliminated the panic. After that, with great difficulty, the brigade was still able to push the enemy, however, the combat mission was not completed. The brigade commander for the loss of control of the battle by the Military Council of the 2nd shock army was removed from his post and replaced by Colonel V.F. Glazunov. The brigade was withdrawn again to the second echelon for replenishment (Venets I.Kh. On the battles of the 59th division of the brigade in the Luban operation. Manuscripts of reports and messages at the military-historical conference.

Leningrad, ss. 98-130).

The 2nd shock army, being weak in its initial composition, felt the need for reinforcement from the first steps. To strengthen it, on January 15, the front commander reassigned to it the rifle divisions that were previously part of the 59th Army: the 382nd Colonel G.I. Sokurov and 366th Colonel S.N. Bulanova. The latter was transferred without one of its rifle regiments (1218). This regiment was involved in the battles for the Georgian bridgehead and therefore temporarily remained part of the 4th Army. Section of the front with the Georgian bridgehead by decision of com.

front was transferred from the 59th Army to the 4th. From that moment on, the 2nd Shock Army began to include three rifle divisions.

The offensive operation of the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts in the Great Patriotic War, carried out on January 7 - April 30; an integral part of the combat operations of the Soviet troops, undertaken in the winter of 1942 with the aim of defeating Army Group North and releasing Leningrad. The idea of ​​the operation was to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping in the area of ​​Lyuban, Chudovo, and subsequently go to the rear of the fascist German troops blockading Leningrad from the south.
By the beginning of January 1942, the troops of the Volkhov Front (commanded by General of the Army K.A. Meretskov), as a result of the defeat of the enemy near Tikhvin, reached the Volkhov River and fought to expand the bridgeheads captured on the left bank of the river. The 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Volkhov River, fought with its main forces in the region of Posadnikov Island. The troops of the 54th Army and the Volkhov Front (4th, 59th, 2nd shock, 52nd armies) in the zone between lakes Ladoga and Ilmen were opposed by 16-17 divisions of the 18th German army. The fascist German troops were able to organize a solid defense on the left bank of the Volkhov and near Kirishi. The troops of the Volkhov front outnumbered the enemy in men by 2.2, tanks - by 3.2, artillery - by 1.5 times. In the offensive zone (30 kilometers), the 54th Army had only a slight superiority over the enemy in people and artillery, the enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops in aviation. In preparing and conducting the operation, the troops carried out a lot of party-political work aimed at fulfilling the responsible task of deblocking Leningrad. Particular attention was paid to the creation of a high offensive impulse in the troops. The significance of the victory of the Soviet troops near Moscow was explained to the personnel.
On January 7, the troops of the Volkhov Front, having not yet completed the necessary regroupings and concentration of forces, went on the offensive and tried to break through the enemy defenses on the Volkhov River with the forces of the 2nd shock and 59th armies. The offensive did not bring success and on January 10, by order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, it was suspended. The attacks of the 54th Army in the region of Posadnikov Island were also unsuccessful. On January 13, the troops of the Volkhov Front, having created shock groups in the sectors chosen for the breakthrough, resumed the offensive. The main blow was delivered by the 2nd shock army to Lyuban, from the flanks it was supported by the 59th and 52nd armies. The offensive took place in difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain. Off-road and deep snow made it difficult to maneuver and supply troops. There was not enough ammunition, food, fodder. Only in the direction of the main attack and on the left flank of the 59th Army, after stubborn battles, was it possible by January 25 to break through the enemy defenses south of Spasskaya Polist. The 13th Cavalry Corps was introduced into the gap. Formations of the 2nd shock army, developing the offensive, by the end of January advanced in a narrow wedge to 70-75 kilometers and deeply engulfed the Lubansko-Chudovskaya enemy grouping from the southwest. To assist the Volkhov Front in completing its encirclement, at the end of February, the 54th Army struck towards the 2nd shock army in the general direction of Lyuban. Having broken through the enemy defenses west of Kirishi, by the end of March, its troops advanced 22 kilometers and reached the approaches to Lyuban from the northeast. However, the Soviet troops failed to develop the offensive and complete the encirclement of the enemy due to increased resistance. In January-March, the fascist German command transferred 7 divisions and 1 brigade from the 16th Army, as well as from Germany, France and Yugoslavia, to reinforce the 18th Army. In addition, up to 4 divisions from near Leningrad were regrouped in the offensive zone of the Volkhov Front. To support his troops in the breakthrough area, the enemy attracted up to 250 bombers of the 1st Air Fleet. This dramatically changed the balance of forces in the Luban direction. Since March, the enemy began to inflict strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 2nd Shock Army. On March 19, the fascist German troops managed to intercept important communications of the army at the base of its breakthrough. On March 27, the troops of the 52nd and 59th armies broke through the 3-5-kilometer neck that connected the 2nd shock army with the front, but the position of the army remained difficult. It became even more difficult with the beginning of the spring thaw, when the roads and columned paths laid through marshy areas and forests deteriorated. Supply, communications and command and control of troops were disrupted. On April 30, the offensive in the Lyuban region was stopped. The formations of the 2nd shock army fought heavy defensive battles until the summer, holding the captured ledge. At the end of June 1942, its troops were withdrawn to the line Spasskaya Polnet, Myasnoy Bor.
Luban operation has not been fully completed. However, in the course of it, the Soviet troops seized the initiative and forced the enemy's 18th army to conduct defensive battles. The troops of the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army attracted the main forces not only of the 18th Army, but of the entire Army Group North.
Literature: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945. T.2. M., 1963, pp. 332-336; Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944. M., 1964, pp. 133-145; Unconquered Leningrad. L., 1974. pp. 251-279.
V.M. Ivanov

Luban offensive operation (January 7, 1942 - April 30, 1942) - an offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War.

On January 7, 1942, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army broke through the enemy defenses in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Myasnoy Bor (on the left bank of the Volkhov River) and deeply wedged into its location (in the direction of Lyuban). But not having the strength to continue the offensive, the army was in a difficult position. The enemy cut her communications several times, creating a threat of encirclement. By March 26, the enemy managed to unite his Chudovskaya and Novgorod groupings, create an external front along the Polist River and an internal front along the Glushitsa River. Thus, the communications of the 2nd shock army and several formations of the 59th army were interrupted.

The commander of the Volkhov operational group, Lieutenant General M. S. Khozin, did not comply with the directive of the Headquarters (mid-May) on the withdrawal of army troops. As a result, she was surrounded. The measures taken by the command of the Volkhov Front managed to create a small corridor through which disparate groups of exhausted and demoralized soldiers and commanders came out. On June 25, the enemy liquidated the corridor. On July 12, the commander of the 2nd shock army, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov, surrendered.

The 54th Army under the command of General I. I. Fedyuninsky did not fulfill its task. Its units, having suffered heavy losses in the Pogost area, broke through twenty kilometers ahead and did not reach Lyuban a little. In total, during four months of fierce fighting, the 54th Army, again having lost almost all of its composition, it got stuck in local forests and swamps for a long time. In his memoirs, I. I. Fedyuninsky rather self-critically assesses his actions as commander of the army, admits that part of the responsibility for failures lies with him. In particular, he, as the commander of the army, did not organize a clear interaction between the army units, there were delays in issuing orders, which led to unnecessary casualties without tangible results in terms of the position of the units.

The operation of the 2nd shock, 52nd and 59th armies provided significant support to the defenders of Leningrad, who could not withstand the new assault, pulled over more than 15 enemy divisions (including 6 divisions and one brigade were transferred from Western Europe ), allowed the Soviet troops near Leningrad to seize the initiative. The command of the 18th German Army noted that "if this breakthrough had been combined with a frontal attack on the Leningrad Front, then a significant part of the 18th Army would have been lost, and its remnants would have been thrown back to the west." However, the Leningrad Front could not then deliver a counterattack.

K. A. Meretskov Marshal of the Soviet Union in the book “In the Service of the People” wrote that 16 thousand people left the encirclement from the troops of the 2nd shock army. In the battles of the 2nd shock army, 6 thousand people were killed, and 8 thousand were missing.

According to the study “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century”, the irretrievable losses of the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Lenfront during the Luban operation from January 7 to April 30, 1942 - 95064 people. In the operation to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the encirclement from May 13 - July 10, 1942 (2nd shock, 52nd and 59th armies of the Volkhov Front) - 54774 people. In total - 149,838. If we take into account the figure announced by the Germans - 32,759 prisoners, 649 guns, 171 tanks, 2904 machine guns, many launchers and other weapons - and information about those who made their way from the encirclement. A. Isaev in the book “A short course in the history of the Second World War. The offensive of Marshal Shaposhnikov ”writes that 9462 people left the encirclement by June 29, including 5494 people who were wounded and sick. By July 10 - 146 people. Individual soldiers and commanders went not to the west, but to the south. Approximately, you can bring the total number of those killed and those who died from wounds - up to 107,471 people (Volkhov Front, 54th Army of the Leningrad Front), minus those who made their way to their own and prisoners.

Comments:

A. S. TURGAEV, N. YU. SPIRINA

LUBA OPERATION: PREPARATION FOR THE OFFENSIVE

Keywords:

Luban offensive operation, blockade of Leningrad, Army Group "North"

The article is devoted to the history of the Volkhov Front, the main goals of its creation - the defeat of the Army Group "North" and the subsequent lifting of the blockade of Leningrad.

On the basis of archival documents and memoirs of contemporaries, the authors describe the balance of forces, the course of hostilities and the reasons for the failures of the Luban operation.

In December 1941, Soviet troops stopped the advance of the German armies along the entire length of the Soviet-German front. As a result of the counteroffensive near Moscow and Tikhvin, the enemy suffered its first major defeat and was forced to go on the defensive. This created a favorable environment for changing the situation near Leningrad, completely lifting the blockade and defeating Army Group North.

At the final stage of the Tikhvin-Volkhov offensive operation, the Headquarters of the Civil Code developed a plan for eliminating the enemy near Leningrad. On December 12, 1941, a meeting was held in Moscow at which

Luban offensive operation, Siege of Leningrad, group of armies “North”

The article is dedicated to the history of the Volkhov front, main objectives of its creation - to defeat of group of armies “North” and the subsequent lifting of Siege of Leningrad.

On the basis of a considerable quantity of archival documents and memoirs of contemporaries the authors describe a parity of forces, the purposes and the reasons of failures of Luban operation.

present were Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin, Chief of the General Staff Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, and Commander of the Leningrad Front M. S. Khozin. commander of the 4th Army K. A. Meretskov. Together with them, the secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU (b) A. A. Zhdanov, the chief of staff of the 4th Army brigade commander G. D. Stelmakh, as well as the commanders of the 26th and 59th the armies that were to fight on the Volkhov were Lieutenant General G. G. Sokolov and Major General I. V. Galanin. Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov spoke at the meeting, who reported

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

shield about the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to form the Volkhov Front in order to defeat the enemy grouping, which keeps Leningrad in a blockade.

The line of the new front was to pass along the Volkhov River, starting north of the village of Kirishi and ending at Lake Ilmen. The southern flank of the front bordered the 11th Army and the Novgorod Army Group of the North-Western Front, while the northern flank bordered the 54th Army, which remained part of the Leningrad Front. K. A. Meretskov proposed to transfer the 54th Army to the Volkhov Front, since it is fighting on the outer ring of the blockade along with the 4th and 52nd armies and has no direct contact with the Leningrad Front. However, Khozin and Zhdanov were against such a decision, motivating their opinion by the fact that the 54th Army would help break the blockade, coordinating their actions with the troops of the Leningrad Front. At the same time, difficulties in supplying and managing the army from besieged Leningrad were not taken into account. After listening to all the arguments of Zhdanov and Khozin, Stalin found it possible to satisfy their request, believing, as K. A. Meretskov writes, that "if it is better for Leningrad, so be it."

The Luban offensive operation (see Fig. 1) was conceived by the Soviet command in the form of a deep breakthrough of the front against

nickname with the simultaneous encirclement and defeat of the army group "North", which kept Leningrad in the blockade ring. Before the offensive in January 1942, the Soviet command mistakenly believed that the enemy was broken after the defeats near Moscow and Tikhvin, and counted on success. After the victory at Tikhvin and Volkhov in December 1941, the troops of the newly formed Volkhov, as well as the Leningrad and Northwestern fronts, were tasked with defeating the enemy grouping near Leningrad and removing the enemy blockade from the city, taking into account the experience of two unsuccessful Sinyavinsky offensive operations in 1941.

The haste with which the Luban offensive operation of 1942 was being prepared was caused not only by military necessity, the desire to quickly defeat and drive the enemy out of the territory of the USSR. The blockade of Leningrad, which was deprived of land communications with the country, caused severe famine and high mortality among the civilian population, since it was impossible to supply food to the besieged city in sufficient quantities. The lack of fuel supplies and the interruption of the supply of electricity further complicated the situation of the Leningraders. In such a situation, the deblockade of Leningrad, along with the defeat of the grouping of German troops in the western direction,

Rice. 1. Luban operation.

The location of the troops before the offensive of the Red Army

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

acquired exceptional importance. It was a military, political and economic task at the same time, on the urgent solution of which the situation on the Soviet-German front and the prestige of the country in the international arena largely depended.

The blockade of the "cradle of the revolution", the inability to change the situation near Leningrad in their favor, exerted a certain moral pressure on the country's leadership. Therefore, demands from the commanders of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were constantly heard from Moscow to launch an offensive faster, defeat the German group, and lift the blockade. All the human and material resources available to the troops in the battle for Leningrad were subordinated to this goal.

The leading edge of the German defense in front of Meretskov's front mainly ran along the western bank of the Volkhov. The mirror of the river was shot through with dense aimed flank fire. The second defensive line passed along the embankments of the railway and the Kirishi-Novgorod highway. It consisted of intermittent lines of fortifications in settlements and at heights with well-organized fire communications between them. From the water's edge of the Volkhov River to the railway embankment, the area was equipped with engineering barriers and

barbed wire pine forests with minefields, forest debris and land mines. The icy surface of the steep western bank of the river was a difficult obstacle for infantry without special equipment. German strongholds were saturated with machine guns and mortars. The defending enemy troops were supported by strong artillery and rather powerful aviation formations. Such a defense was to be overcome by the troops of the Volkhov Front in the Lyuban offensive operation.

The troops of the Volkhov Front, which included the 4th and 52nd armies, were reinforced by the composition of two armies. The 59th Army of Major General I.V. Galanin was formed in the Siberian Military District on the directive of the Headquarters of November 2, 1941. It included 6 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions. The total number of troops of the 59th Army on January 1, 1941 was 65,452 people. (the average staffing of a rifle division is 10,910 fighters and commanders), 381 guns, including 143 guns of 76.2 mm and above. There were no tank formations in the army.

Weaker in terms of quality was the 26th army, renamed the 2nd shock army. It was formed in the Volga Military District in the autumn of 1941 and almost half

consisted of rifle brigades. In its initial composition, there was one division (327th), and 8 brigades. All of them were formed in September-December and had no combat experience. On January 1, 1942, when the 2nd Shock Army was transferred to the Volkhov Front, it consisted of 43,970 people, 71 tanks in two tank battalions, 462 guns (113 of them with a caliber of 76.2 mm and above). The compounds were generally well stocked. For example, in the 327th rifle division there were 11,832 people, and in the 23rd rifle brigade - 4524 soldiers. The commanding staff of the army was formed mainly from people of middle military age who had been in the reserve for a long period.

On December 17, 1941, General of the Army K. A. Meretskov, Commander of the Volkhov Front, was given directive No. 005826 from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the transition to a general offensive. It said: “The troops of the front, consisting of the 4th, 59th, 2nd shock and 52nd armies, defeat the enemy defending along the western bank of the Volkhov River, and with the main forces of the armies go to the Lyuban front, Cholovo station.” Subsequently, it was ordered, advancing in a northwestern direction, to surround the enemy defending near Leningrad, and in cooperation with the troops

mi of the Leningrad Front to capture him, and in case of refusal to surrender, to exterminate him.

Specific instructions were given to each army: the 4th - to advance in the general direction of Kirishi-Tosno and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, encircle and destroy the enemy who had advanced north of Mga to Lake Ladoga. In the future, advancing in the direction of Krasno-gvardeisk (Gatchina) and Ropsha, assist the armies of the Leningrad Front in destroying the enemy holding these points. The 59th Army was to advance in the direction of Gruzino (where German troops retained a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Volkhov), Siverskaya, Solsovo.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the 2nd Shock Army to advance in the direction of the Chascha and Nizovsky stations with a further attack on Luga.

In front of the 52nd Army in the composition

5 rifle divisions (46, 288, 259, 267 and 111th), subordinate to the Novgorod operational group, were tasked with capturing Novgorod and advancing in the direction of Solets, ensuring the offensive of the Volkhov Front to the northwest.

The 54th Army of the Leningrad Front received the task formulated in the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. divisions, 6th sea.

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

brigades, 21 TD, 81 and 882 Gap go on the offensive simultaneously with the troops of the Volkhov Front with the task: in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Volkhov Front, advancing in the direction of Tosno, to surround and destroy the enemy who has advanced to Lake Ladoga and blocking Leningrad from the east and southeast".

Setting the armies the task of an offensive, the Headquarters expected that after the successful Tikhvin-Volkhov offensive operation in December 1941, the enemy suffered heavy losses and would not have time to fully restore the combat capability of his units on this sector of the front in a short time. In Moscow, it was believed that after the defeats near Moscow and Tikhvin, the morale of the German soldiers was undermined, the enemy troops were disorganized in harsh winter conditions and would not be able to offer serious resistance. Therefore, the Luban operation to defeat Army Group North was planned as part of a large general offensive of Soviet troops in 1942 from the Barents to the Black Sea, which was supposed to lead to the defeat and expulsion of Nazi troops from the occupied territory of the USSR. “The Germans are at a loss from the defeat near Moscow, they are poorly prepared for the winter. Now is the best time to move to the general

stepping down, ”considered I.V. Stalin.

The general offensive of the active army in the main strategic directions was supposed to deprive the enemy troops of the respite necessary to put them in order and replenish.

On January 5, a meeting of the Headquarters took place in Moscow, which decided on a general offensive from the Barents to the Black Seas. G.K. Zhukov and N.A. Voznesensky spoke out against this plan. But their arguments that the army did not yet have sufficient material resources for such large-scale actions were not taken into account. After the meeting, the Chief of the General Staff, B. M. Shaposhnikov, told Zhukov: “You argued in vain: this issue was decided in advance by the Supreme.”

G.K. Zhukov expressed his opinion at this meeting regarding the situation near Leningrad: “As for the offensive of our troops near Leningrad and in the south-western direction, our troops are facing serious enemy defenses there. Without the presence of powerful artillery weapons, they will not be able to break through the defenses, they themselves will be exhausted and suffer heavy, unjustified losses. I am in favor of reinforcing the fronts of the western direction and conducting a more powerful offensive here.

In the book of X. Polman “Volkhov: 900 days of fighting for Leningrad. 19411944” this decision is assessed in this way: “The fact that the German front on the Volkhov attracted very significant forces, of course, significantly facilitated the position of the German central group of forces, which was leading heavy battles and repeatedly broken through. The forces that the Soviet command put into use during the offensive on the Volkhov could have a significant impact on the outcome of the operation of the German Army Group Center. Stalin made the same mistake as Hitler - he wanted to attack everywhere and therefore did not achieve a decisive victory anywhere.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to launch an offensive on the entire Soviet-German front by troops of nine fronts from the Baltic to the Black Seas. The troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov fronts, the right wing of the North-Western Front and the Baltic Fleet were tasked with defeating Army Group North. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 17

1941 to the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts on the offensive in the Luban direction remained in force.

In preparation for the operation, the command of the Volkhov Front decided to reinforce the armies in the directions of the main attack. In addition to the 9th Army with the formula

the 111th and 288th rifle divisions, the 163rd and 166th tank battalions were "temporarily" transferred. The 259th Rifle Division was transferred to the 2nd Shock Army with the same wording "temporarily". After breaking through the front, the units and formations withdrawn from the 52nd Army were to be returned back so that the army could advance in the direction indicated to it.

The directive of the Stavka before the troops of the North-Western Front was tasked with the right wing to strike in the direction of Staraya Russa, Soltsy, Dno, cutting off the communications of the Novgorod enemy group, and in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Volkhov Front to defeat it, thereby contributing to the solution of the main task: the removal blockade of Leningrad.

The Leningrad Front was to "assist the Volkhov Front in defeating the enemy defending near Leningrad and in liberating Leningrad from the blockade." Defining tasks, the Headquarters proceeded from the fact that the overall balance of forces in the northwestern direction, taking into account the incoming reinforcements, was in favor of the Soviet troops. On

On January 1, 1942, Army Group North had 665,000 men, 6,000 guns and mortars, and 160 medium and light tanks. On the front south

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

Lake Ladoga operated 13 enemy divisions. However, the number of German troops indicated in Soviet sources does not agree with the data of the headquarters of Army Group North, which included in its ranks, together with the attracted forces of the reserve of the main command and air cover, no more than 450 thousand people. The armies of the Volkhov Front were opposed by an enemy grouping of 167,000 men1.

The composition of the German troops on January 1, 1942 was as follows: the 16th Army of the Army Group North (connections north of Novgorod) included the 38th Army Corps as part of the 250th Fighter Regiment, the 126th and 215th Infantry divisions, the 39th motorized corps as part of the 61st infantry,

20th Motorized and 8th Panzer Divisions.

The dividing line with the 18th Army ran along the mouth of the Ti-Goda River. In the right-flank formations of the 18th Army, which opposed the Volkhov Front, the defense lines on the right (eastern) flank of the army were occupied by the 1st Army Corps, consisting of four infantry divisions: 291st, 21st, 11th and 254th. After the defeat at Tikhvin, these divisions consisted of a large number of

by German divisions and attached units.

a set of personnel and a decrease in firepower due to the loss of artillery and mortars in battles. However, the command of the Army Group "North" took vigorous steps to increase the combat effectiveness of these divisions through marching reinforcements, the transfer of guns and military equipment from other sectors of the front. Therefore, by the beginning of the battle, the enemy grouping on the Volkhov lines had increased and continued to build up during the fighting by attracting new divisions from other sectors of the front and from Western Europe.

The troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts on the same date had 725 thousand people, 9 thousand guns and mortars, 230 heavy and medium tanks. However, directly on the site of the upcoming breakthrough, there were 325,672 people in the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front. . The distribution of personnel by armies and units of front-line subordination is presented in Table. 1.

With the advent of two new armies and units of the Novgorod operational group, the Volkhov Front had a 1.5-fold superiority over the enemy in manpower, 1.6 times in guns and mortars, and 1.3 times in aircraft. On January 1, 1942, the Volkhov Front united: 23 rifle divisions,

Table 1

The composition of the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in January 1942

Name of formations Number of divisions Number of brigades Number of separate battalions (tank, ski, airsled) Number of personnel Number of tanks Number of guns and mortars

54th Army of the Leningrad Front 11 2 2 83 549/ 69 363 18 1156

Volkhov front, including armies: 25 9 25 242 123/ 222 490 220 2048

4th 9 1 9 69 503/ 62 473 146 920

59th 8 - 8 70 566/ 70 566 - 384

2nd shock 1 8 8 47 422/ 47 422 71 470

52nd 6 - - 51 533/ 38 971 - 254

Front-line units 6 - - 51 533/ 38 971 - 254

Total in operation 36 11 27 325 672/ 291 853 328 3204

Note: the table was compiled on the basis of reports on the combat and numerical strength of the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts for January 1942.

The column "Number of personnel" shows: in the numerator - the total number of troops of the front and armies, in the denominator - the number of combat troops and combat support units (intelligence, communications, engineering, etc.)2.

By the beginning of the Luban operation, the total strength of the 2nd shock and 59th armies and the quantitative composition of the combat troops and combat support units were the same, since the armies did not have service and rear units and institutions. It should also be noted that on the eve of the offensive on January 7, 1942, the size of the armies increased somewhat due to the inclusion of some units in them.

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

8 rifle brigades, one grenadier brigade (due to the lack of small arms, it was armed with grenades), 18 separate ski battalions, 4 cavalry divisions, 1 tank division, 8 separate tank brigades, 5 separate artillery regiments, 2 howitzer regiments of high power, a separate artillery regiment anti-tank defense, 4 guards mortar artillery regiments of rocket artillery, anti-aircraft artillery

division, separate bomber and separate short-range bomber regiments,

3 separate assault and 7 separate fighter regiments and 1 reconnaissance squadron.

The Soviet troops slightly outnumbered the enemy in manpower, which was clearly not enough to conduct a large-scale offensive operation, as well as in terms of the number of guns, mortars and tanks. But there was very little ammunition. By the beginning of the operation, the front had a quarter of ammunition. In the 4th and 52nd armies, for unknown reasons, there were no sights for guns, there was not enough telephone wire and radio stations, which made it difficult to control the troops. The units lacked warm clothing.

In the first days of January 1942, air units armed with Po-2 aircraft arrived to reinforce the Air Force of the front. Superiority in quantity

The honor and quality of aviation equipment was on the side of the enemy. This was convincingly shown by the fighting that soon unfolded on the front in the Volkhov River basin from the southern shore of Lake Ladoga to Ilmen.

When planning operations for the beginning of 1942, the Headquarters, as it turned out later, erroneously assumed that a successful counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow would not allow the Nazi command to reinforce Army Group North with reserves or formations taken from other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

Moscow also believed that the available forces at the Volkhov, Leningrad and North-Western fronts were sufficient to defeat the enemy near Leningrad and lift the blockade from the besieged city. Therefore, the Headquarters did not envisage the use of strategic reserves on this sector of the front, except for those armies that were designated for the offensive at the beginning of the operation.

For the winter period, the main task that was set for the German troops was to create a strong defense along the entire length of the Soviet-German front. In the order of February 12, 1942 on the conduct of hostilities on the Eastern Front with the beginning of spring, the main command of the ground

German troops and the General Staff in the section “for Army Group North” indicated: “Army Group North, having fortified in the areas of Kholm and Staraya Russa, hold the current positions of the 2nd and 10th Army Corps south of Lake Ilmen . During the offensive of Army Group Center in the direction of Ostashkov, ensure a junction with Army Group Center in the Ostashkovo area. Considering the significance of the blockade of Leningrad, at all costs hold the front of the army group north of Lake Ilmen. By order ... the capture of the islands in the Gulf of Finland is planned. After the submission of the necessary reports, the army group will receive an order for further actions on the siege of Leningrad. It is necessary to prepare for the capture of a section of the coast opposite Kronstadt.

It follows from this document that at the beginning of 1942, having not yet recovered from the bloody winter battles and a major defeat near Moscow, the German high command did not set the task of capturing and destroying Leningrad. It was subsequently formulated in the second half of the year, when the army of E. von Manstein captured Sevastopol. Part of its divisions, together with the field marshal, will be sent near Leningrad to finally determine the fate of the city. The solution of narrowly tactical tasks in the Lenin-

The hail was supposed to create the prerequisites for subsequent actions against the besieged city. The capture of the coast opposite Kronstadt, as subsequent events showed, was part of this plan. By the end of April, by the same order, it was planned to replenish units and formations of Army Group North in the amount of 100 thousand people. This could significantly strengthen the grouping of German troops near Leningrad.

The troops of the Volkhov Front began preparations for an offensive operation. But there was practically no time left for this, especially since stubborn battles continued throughout the front and the troops suffered losses. The plans for the Lyuban offensive operations of the 4th Army of the Volkhov Front set the task of encircling and destroying the enemy, who had advanced north of Mga to Lake Ladoga. The directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters also determined the combat composition of the army, which included 7 rifle divisions (4th Guards, 191, 44, 65, 377, 92 and 310), 27, 80th cavalry divisions, 60th tank division, 46th I tank brigade, 119th, 120th, 128th separate tank battalions, as well as artillery and mortar support units. During the defeat of the Tikhvin-Volkhov grouping of the enemy of the 4th Army, commanded by General P. A. Iva-

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

new, pursuing the retreating German divisions, they reached the enemy's defensive positions prepared in advance near Kirishi.

Here, on the eastern bank of the Volkhov River, German troops created bridgeheads - two lines of powerful defensive fortifications in the region of Kirishi and Gruzino. After the retreat near Tikhvin and Volkhov, the command of the Army Group "North" decided to hold these bridgeheads in the hope that from here, after the regrouping of troops and their replenishment from reserves, a strike would be struck again in order to connect with the Finnish troops on the Svir, capture communications and finally solve the problem of capturing Leningrad.

The Kirishi bridgehead of the Germans on the eastern bank of the Volkhov River had a front length of 4 km and a depth of

2 km. The 44th division of Colonel P. A. Artyushenko, having crossed to the western bank of the Volkhov north of Kirishi, together with units of the 54th Army, launched an attack on Larionov Ostrov. The 146th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major N. L. Manzhurin, with a surprise night attack, managed to break through the enemy defenses in a narrow area and intercept the Mga-Kirishi railway. Interception of this road, along which the enemy was going

to communicate with the group holding the Kirishi bridgehead, forced him to launch counterattacks against the Soviet units.

For five days, one attack followed another. But the soldiers of the 44th division, mostly Leningrad militias, invariably pushed the enemy back. On the morning of December 26, units of the 92nd Rifle Division crossed to the left bank of the Volkhov south of Kirishi in the Lezno-Vodosye sector, and the 65th Colonel P.K. Koshevoy, the 310th General N.M. Zamirovsky and the 4th Guards General A. I. Andreev's divisions crossed the Volkhov on the ice in the area near the Tigoda railway station and reached the Chudovo-Volkhovstroy railway. The defensive positions of the enemy, directly covering the village of Kirishi from the east, were attacked by units of the 377th Infantry Division of Colonel K.A. Tsalikov and the 80th Cavalry Division of Colonel L.A. Slanov. But they weren't successful. The enemy strove at all costs to hold the foothold on the eastern bank of the Volkhov, which he called the "champagne cork" for the configuration of the front. He reinforced the troops defending there with units of the 285th security and 21st infantry divisions and successfully repulsed the attacks. Prolonged, stubborn battles began in the area of ​​the Kirishi bridgehead and on the territory of the entire Kirishi defensive region.

No less bloody battles took place in the area of ​​​​the German bridgehead in Gruzino. Soviet

the troops could not manage to overcome the enemy's defensive zone in this sector of the front. Repeated attempts to throw the enemy into the Volkhov did not lead to anything.

The Kirishi bridgehead of the enemy on the eastern bank of the Volkhov seriously disturbed the command of the Volkhov Front. Its elimination would create favorable conditions for maneuver. Preparations began for another offensive operation to eliminate the bridgehead. The 4th Army spent the main human and material resources on these tasks and was practically unprepared for the planned large-scale offensive.

The headquarters of the All-Russian Supreme Command expected that during the general offensive of January 1942, Soviet troops would occupy Kirishi and continue the offensive on Tosno. The directive of the commander of the Volkhov Front No. 004 of December 21, 1941 set the deadline for the transfer to Kiri-shi of the headquarters of the 4th Army - by the end

December 24, 1941 . However, units of the 4th Army met fierce resistance from the enemy and could not complete the task, in the first place - to eliminate the bridgeheads on the right, eastern, bank of the Volkhov River near Kirishi and Gruzino. In the second half of December, bloody battles unfolded for the bridgeheads, which cost both sides great

losses. All this did not contribute to the preparation and launch of the Luban offensive operation, diverting large forces to solve a narrowly tactical task, the failure of which jeopardized the whole plan.

On December 26, 1941, the commander of Army Group North, von Leeb, made an entry in his diary: “The situation on the right flank of the 1st Corps remains tense. The enemy attacks here in the direction of Kirishi. The troops suffer greatly from extremely severe frosts. General Beckman, commander of the 11th Infantry Division, reports on her complete exhaustion.

In the directive of the Stavki V GK dated

On December 24, 1941, the 4th and 52nd armies were tasked with completing the defeat of the enemy on the eastern bank of the Volkhov, seizing the bridges and capturing bridgeheads on the western bank in order to ensure the deployment of the 2nd shock and 59th armies.

On the same day, the 4th company of Lieutenant G. Pecherkin from the 60th regiment of the 65th rifle division of the 4th army, pursuing the enemy, immediately crossed the river. Behind it, the 2nd battalion of the 311th rifle regiment of the same division was entrenched on the west coast.

On December 25, advanced units of the 52nd Army captured small bridgeheads south and north of the village of Gruzino near the villages of Zelentsy, Lezno and Vo-dossier. But to move forward with the Soviet

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

you parts failed. The enemy completed the withdrawal of troops to a new defensive line, pulled up reserves and launched strong counterattacks. Moreover, the enemy managed to hold bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Volkhov in the area of ​​Kirishi, Gruzino and Dubtsy, which posed a threat of flank attacks to the Soviet troops during the forthcoming offensive.

The struggle for bridgeheads on both sides continued throughout the entire Lyuban operation, which practically excluded the main forces of the 4th Army from carrying out the combat mission of breaking through to Tosno.

The intensity of the fighting during this period was also noted by German sources: “The Russians did not remain inactive in front of the front. From the first days of our occupation of new positions, they daily tried to establish contact with the units behind the front line, ”the memoirs of the 215th Infantry Division write.

In the diary of the commander of the 380th regiment of the 215th division on December 29, an entry was made: “To date, the regiment has lost 830 people since the start of hostilities on the Eastern Front. December 30: today again 11 killed, 37 wounded. Among those killed were Lieutenant Gresser, officer candidates Vittel and Blenert. January 4, 1942: today is the first day since the fighting in the East when I did not have a single

th killed and wounded ". On this day, January 4, Soviet troops stopped their attacks along the entire front in order to lull the enemy's vigilance and prepare for the offensive.

On the night of December 31, in pursuance of the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to seize bridgeheads on the western coast of the 52nd unit, together with the arrived 376th rifle division of the 59th army, they were to defeat the enemy’s Chudov group and take the city of Chudovo. That is, even before the start of the main offensive of the Volkhov Front, individual parts of the armies included in it waged continuous offensive battles, losing people and consuming an already insignificant reserve of ammunition. As a result of a fierce battle, the regiments of the 376th division crossed the Volkhov. For several hours there was a battle for the village of Rybachy Domik. By noon on December 31, the 2nd battalion of the 1248th regiment broke into the village of Pekhovo, but could not advance further and almost all died. In the 3rd battalion of the regiment, 25 people remained in the ranks. As a result of stubborn bloody battles, it was possible to create small bridgeheads from the villages of Pekhovo and Pertechno. Expending their strength, the Siberians of the 376th division continuously attacked the enemy until January 6th. Only on this day they made seven attacks on enemy positions, but the enemy did not retreat a single step, suppressing the offensive impulse of the Soviet troops with a powerful

artillery and mortar fire.

The soldiers of the 267th division of the 59th army also tried to capture a bridgehead on the western bank of the river. On the night of January 1, 1942, the 844th regiment broke through the first line of defense, but by the end of the day it was surrounded and with difficulty made its way to the main forces of the division. The losses in the regiment were heavy. It became clear to the front command that time had been lost. It is impossible to overcome the enemy's lines on the move, without preparation, without an operational pause, especially if the arriving troops are brought in directly from the march. The Volkhov Front was not ready for the offensive.

During the period of preparation for the offensive operation, I. V. Stalin sent a letter to the commander of the Volkhov Front. It said: “The work that has been entrusted to you is a historic work. The liberation of Leningrad, you understand, is a great thing. I would like the forthcoming offensive of the Volkhov Front not to be exchanged for small skirmishes, but to result in a single powerful blow to the enemy. I have no doubt that you will try to turn this offensive precisely into a single and general blow against the enemy, upsetting all the calculations of the German invaders. I shake your hand and wish you success. I. Stalin. 29.12.41" .

The burden of responsibility placed by the Headquarters on the commander

Volkhov Front, prevented him from making the right decision - not to rush into an offensive operation until the troops were ready for it. The situation was complicated by the fact that the divisions of the Volkhov Front did not have time to reach the area of ​​concentration to deliver the main blow. The commanders were not able to study the enemy defenses in detail, to develop detailed action plans for a particular sector of the front. The troops lacked food and ammunition.

As early as December 23, 1941, on the eve of the proposed offensive, K. A. Meretskov sent a report to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, which stated: “On December 22, a representative of the Red Army formations management reported to me that the divisions of the 59th Army were arriving without the required weapons. So, for the entire 378 rifle division there are only 379 rifles,

3 heavy and 15 light machine guns,

4 mortars. The 374th Rifle Division has 344 rifles and 3 mortars for the entire division. The 376th division, which has finished unloading, has only 8 sets of harness for 36 guns, the division has no means of communication and vehicles. 372 rifle division, which has finished unloading, has 533 rifles for the entire division, 7 light machine guns,

6 mortars, 8 divisional and 12 regimental guns without a single set of harness. No means

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

The division has no communications. In order not to waste time on re-equipping, I decided to send the divisions in the condition as they arrive to the concentration area, since I believe that armament for the divisions will be supplied, and we will carry out rearmament in the concentration area. Given the withdrawal of the enemy, this does not cause a big risk if the supply of weapons is not delayed. Divisions were sent to the front line practically unarmed, in the expectation that the enemy would not take offensive action.

In a direct conversation

A. M. Vasilevsky Meretskov again raised this issue: “Comrade Vasilevsky, please note that with regard to weapons ... work is going on day and night, and yet due to the fact that there is no motor vehicle, and also that the Galanin units (59 -I Army of Major General I.V. Galanin. - Auth.) arrived unarmed, they had to be armed during unloading and on the campaign. All this delayed readiness, and today, Galanin in particular, began work with about half of the combat kit. And the fuel hasn't come up for the tanks yet."

On the morning of January 6, the commander of the Volkhov Front, General of the Army K. A. Meretskov, signed an order to go on the offensive,

which said: “On January 7, 1942, the troops of the Volkhov Front should go on a decisive offensive against the enemy with all their might, break through his fortified positions, defeat his manpower, relentlessly pursue the remnants of the defeated units, surround and capture them.” The order determined the direction of the main attack of the front - Siverskaya-Volosovo, as well as the immediate task: to break through the enemy's defensive lines on the Volkhov, Tigoda, Ravan rivers and reach the Lyuban-Dubovik-Cholovo front.

By this time, the rear of the front had not created a system of bases with stocks of food, material resources, ammunition, communications, had not deployed medical facilities, and had not formed road maintenance and road construction services. The front and army rears were not provided in the required quantity with either motor vehicles or horse-drawn vehicles.

In such conditions, the offensive began. The fighters going on the attack were promised that in the near future they would be delivered ammunition, food, and automatic small arms. Four armies were preparing for an offensive on the Volkhov front, but only one of them - the 2nd shock army - was given special attention by researchers of the war. It should be noted that in many respects the tragic outcome of Volkhovsky

The battle was predetermined by the fact that all the armies, due to various objective and subjective reasons, did not fulfill the tasks assigned to them.

The 2nd shock army was commanded by the former deputy people's commissar of internal affairs, General G. G. Sokolov, who had no experience in staff and combat work. Having accepted the 2nd shock army, he began to issue "Suvorov" orders: "Walking, like the crawling of flies in the fall, I cancel and order to continue to walk in the army like this: a military step is a arshin, they should walk. Accelerated - one and a half, and press.

Food is out of order. In the midst of the battle, they dine and the march is interrupted for breakfast. In war, the order is this: breakfast is dark, before dawn, and dinner is dark, in the evening. During the day you will be able to chew bread or crackers with tea - good, but not - and thanks for that, since the day is not particularly long.

Remember to everyone - both the chiefs, and the privates, and the old and the young, that during the day it is impossible to walk in columns more than a company, but in general in a war for a campaign it is night, then march.

Don't be afraid of the cold, don't dress up as Ryazan women, be good and don't succumb to the cold. Rub your ears and hands with snow” (Order No. 14 of November 19).

The soldiers of the 2nd shock marched to the front line on foot, trampling down the snow,

reaching to the waist. Former fighter of the 2nd shock army P. Gerasimov, 22 years after the Victory, recalled: “We went only at night, during the day we took refuge in the forest. The path was not easy. In order to break through the road in deep snow, it was necessary to build columns of fifteen people in a row.

The first rows walked, trampling down the snow, which in places reached the waist. Ten minutes later, the leading row moved aside and was attached to the tail of the column. The difficulty of the movement was aggravated by the fact that on the way there were unfrozen swampy places and streams with ice on the surface. Shoes got wet and frozen. It was impossible to dry it, since it was not allowed to make fires in the parking lots. The convoy horses were exhausted. The fuel ran out and the cars stopped. Stocks of ammunition, equipment, food had to be carried on ourselves. Even before the start of the fighting, the tired and hungry army turned out to be practically without equipment and with a small amount of ammunition. She occupied the starting line in order to go into the last and decisive battle for the liberation of Leningrad.

The commander of the Volkhov Front, K. A. Meretskov, to whom I. V. Stalin entrusted the historical task of liberating Leningrad from the blockade, knowing full well the tough temper of the Supreme Commander-

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

moreover, he was not morally ready to take on the burden of such responsibility. Hence the haste and inconsistency in his actions in preparing armies for the offensive, underestimation of the enemy, slowness and inconsistency in decision-making. This was noted by many commanders in the headquarters on the Volkhov front. The 59th and 52nd armies were assigned first some tasks, then others. They changed their deployment, divisions were transferred from one army to another. This confusion on the eve of the operation created nervousness among the commanders, a lack of understanding of what was happening, apathy, when people did only what they ordered.

K. A. Meretskov decided to strike the main blow with the forces of the 2nd shock and 59th armies, break through the defenses in the Spasskaya Polist area, reach the Lyuban-Dubovik-Cholovo line and destroy the Luban-Chudov grouping in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front enemy. It was planned, after defeating the enemy in this sector, to advance in a northwestern direction and, with the assistance of the forces of the Leningrad Front, to break through the blockade of Leningrad.

In a combat report signed on January 7, 1942 at 00:20, Meretskov informed the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: “Despite

to the fact that the concentration is not completed, the 2nd shock army will move

January 7 on the offensive. The main difficulties: the army artillery of the 2nd shock army did not arrive, its guard divisions did not arrive, aviation did not concentrate, vehicles did not arrive, ammunition stocks were not accumulated, the tense situation with food and fuel has not yet been straightened out.

Preparations for the offensive did not go unnoticed by the enemy. He makes vigorous attacks on the positions of the 59th and 4th armies. In the same report, K. A. Meretskov informed I. V. Stalin: “Simultaneously with the counteroffensive on the front of the 59th Army, the enemy also launched a counteroffensive on the left flank of the 4th Army, although the counteroffensive was repulsed there, the enemy suffered heavy losses, but The 65th and 4th Rifle Divisions were driven back 2-3 km. Before the offensive, the units of the Red Army had to retreat under the onslaught of the enemy. This did not cause alarm at the headquarters of K. A. Meretskov. Large enemy forces were concentrated on the flanks of the proposed breakthrough, which later managed to hold their positions and predetermine the outcome, as the Germans called it, of the Volkhov battle.

On the morning of January 7, 1942, without waiting for the concentration of all formations, the 4th and 52nd armies of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive. Then the arriving troops of the 59th

and 2nd shock armies. The offensive was carried out in the direction of Lyuban and Tosno. For three days, the troops of the front tried to break through the enemy defenses, but to no avail. How this happened was described in his memoirs by war veteran I. S. Katyshkin, who served at the headquarters of the 59th Army: “On the morning of January 7, 1942, the troops of our first echelons, after a short artillery preparation, went on the offensive. Under heavy enemy fire, they crossed the Volkhov River across the ice, reached its western bank, and even captured several small bridgeheads there. But the enemy, pulling up his reserves, immediately launched a series of strong counterattacks and threw our units back. A whole series of attacks and, of course, counterattacks followed. Our regiments and battalions either clung to the opposite bank of the river, or, under the pressure of fascist tanks and submachine gunners, again rolled back to their original positions. This went on for several days. Finally, on January 10, the commander of the 59th Army, having reported the situation to the headquarters of the front, asked permission to temporarily stop the offensive, give the tired troops the opportunity to put themselves in order, and provide everything necessary for the continuation of the operation. And such a respite was granted.

Commander of the 327th Infantry Division of the 2nd Shock Army I. M. An-

Tyufeev recalled: “On the evening of December 31, 1941, the commander of the 2nd shock army, Lieutenant General G. G. Sokolov, ordered me to change units of the 52nd Army on the eastern bank of the Volkhov in the Selishchenskiye barracks - Gorodok sector by dawn on January 3 and on January 6 to be ready to attack. The task of the division is to break through the enemy defenses on the left bank of the Volkhov and, bypassing the strongholds of his defense, to capture the Lyuban station, located 80 km from the breakthrough site. My attempts to prove that the division would not be ready to attack by the specified date, since there was no ambulance transport, ammunition and weapons were not fully received by the state, there was no food and fodder, were not taken into account. The general raised his finger, making it clear that this command comes from there and is not subject to discussion. At dawn on January 7, an offensive began along the entire strip of the Selishchensky barracks - Kolomno (length

4 km), the 59th Army was advancing to the right of us. The offensive was not successful due to the fact that the artillery could not support the infantry with its fire. “The artillery preparation was insufficient,” wrote P. P. Dmitriev, the former commander of the control platoon of the 327th Infantry Division, in his memoirs. - For each howitzer, we had only 20 shells. Having shot them, we found ourselves unarmed and could not

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

crush enemy firing points. The infantry, defenseless against the hurricane fire of German artillery, beating from the high western coast, fell on the Volkhov ice with black dots: the shooters were not supposed to wear camouflage suits.

In the memoirs of the 215th Infantry Division, the battles of early January are described in a very emotional way. Positions in the Dymno area were subjected to repeated attacks on 2 and 3 January. In the following days they did not stop. “On the evening of January 7, 1842, the commander of the 6th company of the 380th regiment, sergeant major Schlafen, during a control round, discovered that a strong Russian detachment, crawling through the snow, silently penetrated between two machine-gunner posts and, using the bushes near Volkhov, broke into Dymno. A dubious hand-to-hand fight began. For several hours, the battle went on for every fence, every ruin of the house. Before help from the regiment arrived, the height of Dymno was again in our hands. The Russians used elite troops here - Siberian Komsomol members, well-armed and trained, of which not one surrendered.

Describing the battle that began by the evening of January 7 along the entire front of the 215th Infantry Division from Yamno to Dymno, the German authors of the memoirs emphasized the bitterness with which the struggle was fought for every meter of the coast, for every position: “Attack,

ended in failure, the Russians repeated at midnight. In the morning they made their way to Kolomno and Zvanka. The battalions fought fiercely for their skins. The foot soldiers, crooked from the cold, lay in their snowy trenches, the gunners stood by their guns. Hour after hour passed in the highest degree of readiness. Then with a shout of “Hurrah!” a new wave of attackers came through the wide Volkhov. MGs (machine guns) threshed the attackers, artillery and mortars shot them with barrage fire, the attackers lay down. But the commissars raised the survivors with shouts, they again got up and fled to the western bank of the river. The fire fell on them again. Hand-to-hand fighting broke out in different places.

Having crossed the Volkhov River in some sections, the army troops suffered heavy losses in the battles for coastal settlements, having no strength to advance in depth. Without artillery and tank support, the 2nd shock army in the first half hour of the offensive lost about

3 thousand people.

Thus began the Luban offensive operation. For three days, the troops of the front tried to break through the enemy defenses, but to no avail.

decided to temporarily stop the offensive, regroup troops, pull up artillery, bring in the necessary material and technical means, and resume offensive military operations from January 13.

Moscow also knew about the failure of the first days of the offensive. So, a telephone conversation between K. A. Meretskov and Headquarters took place: “January 10. At the apparatus, Stalin, Vasilevsky.

According to all reports, you are not ready to attack by the 11th. If this is true, it should be postponed for a day or two. In order to advance and break through the enemy defenses, each army must have a strike group of at least three divisions and, in addition, concentrate 5,060 guns in the area of ​​the strike group of each army to support the strike group ... If you remember, I suggested that you postpone the offensive if Sokolov's shock army is not ready, and now you are reaping the fruits of your haste.

Later, in his memoirs, the commander of the Volkhov Front, K. A. Meretskov, wrote: “To really prepare an offensive, it took at least another 15-20 days. But such terms were out of the question. Therefore, we gladly seized on the postponement of the offensive by two days proposed by the Stavka. During the negotiations, they begged for another day. Start

The offensive was thus postponed to January 13. At the same time, movements began in the command staff of the armies. The front command believed that the commander of the 2nd shock army, Lieutenant General G. G. Sokolov, could not lead the troops entrusted to him. By order of the Headquarters, he was replaced by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov, who at that time commanded the 52nd Army. His place was taken by Lieutenant General V. F. Yakovlev. The change of high-ranking commanders on the eve of the offensive also had a bad effect on the overall course of the operation.

“On the night of January 10,” General N.K. Klykov recalled his appointment, “I was called to Paporotino, where the headquarters of the 2nd shock army was located. Meretskov, Zaporozhets and a representative of the Headquarters Mekhlis were already here. After listening to my arrival report, Meretskov announced: “Here is your new commander. General Sokolov was removed from his post. General Klykov, take over the army and continue the operation.” The order was completely unexpected for me. How to continue? With whom? I asked the chief of artillery, who was present here:

Are there shells?

No. Spent, - followed by the answer.

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

because of each projectile, until he promised the army 3 rounds of ammunition. According to the staffing table, to break through the enemy’s defenses, 5 rounds of ammunition were required and another

2 ammunition relied on each subsequent day of the offensive.

The first battles on the Volkhov showed that not only the troops were not ready for the offensive. The logistics services were not working clearly, there was no normal communication, the headquarters of divisions and brigades could not quickly assess the situation due to the lack of reliable information about the situation in the regiments and battalions. “The troops are already in battle, and the two armies do not have a single field hospital,” recalled A. A. Vishnevsky, chief surgeon of the Volkhov Front.

The German command attached great importance to the Volkhov sector of the front. So, on January 5, 1942, the commander of the 422nd regiment of the 126th infantry division, Lieutenant Colonel Baron von der Goltz, announced in an order: “Mr. Commanding General told me yesterday that if we do not hold the Volkhov, we will lose the war, if we hold it, we will win the war . It's worth a life."

In German sources, there is a discrepancy regarding the start of the Luban offensive operation. So, on January 3, 1942, the 291st Infantry Division and Battalion

we of the SS regiment "Dead Head" with difficulty managed to eliminate the breakthrough of the Soviet troops at the mouth of the Tigoda River. In these battles on January 4, the commander of the regiment, Colonel Lomeyer, died. “But the attack that was repulsed at the mouth of the Tigoda was not the expected full-scale attack of the Soviet troops. In the first days after the New Year, fierce battles of local importance were fought everywhere between Kirishi and Novgorod, ”wrote P. Karel.

“The continuous attacks of the Soviet troops in the area of ​​​​the Kirishi bridgehead exhausted the rank and file and officers of the 21st Infantry Division. The Russians sought to push back parts of the division from their positions, to capture the western bank of the Volkhov. This daily struggle cost them great sacrifices. But there were losses on our part, too,” the story says.

21st Infantry Division.

An attempt at a large-scale offensive of the Volkhov Front

January 7, the Germans perceived as a reconnaissance in force. “Enemy reconnaissance and strike detachments have been probing the front since January 7,” W. Haupt noted in his work.

In the description of the fighting of the 4th SS police division, the battles from January 7 to 10 are not mentioned at all. They were perceived not as a major offensive of the Volkhov Front, but as ordinary front-line skirmishes for improvement

positions of the opposing sides. In the history of the 126th Infantry Division, the battles of early January were also assessed not as a new offensive, but as a continuation of the Tikhvin operation.

Stubborn battles were also going on at the mouth of the Tigoda River. “A quickly formed battle group from the 505th Regiment (291st Infantry Division) and a battalion of the 9th SS Infantry Regiment attacked the enemy in piercing cold weather and forced him to stop. Colonel Lomeyer, commander of the battle group, which bore the name “Lions of Libava”, fell in this battle, ”W. Haupt wrote. But even in this case, the hostilities of the Soviet troops were perceived by the enemy as a private operation to improve their positions.

Colonel H. Polman also believed that the battle began on January 13th. Only on January 15, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, F. Halder, makes an entry in his diary: “The enemy is being wedged on the Volkhov front. There is a lull in the rest of the front of Army Group North.

An analysis of archival documents, memoirs of participants in the events, German sources allow us to conclude that, firstly, the Luban offensive operation

1942 was not a surprise for the enemy. The Germans expected the offensive of the Soviet troops and to him

prepared. “Reconnaissance accurately established the creation of an enemy strike force in front of the front of the 126th and in front of the right wing of the 215th infantry divisions. It was also established that the enemy was preparing attacks on the Gruzino and Kirishi bridgeheads, as well as on the northeastern front of the army on both sides of the Pogo-Stie, ”German documents reported. The only question that remained open was where the main blow would be delivered. This standby mode made it possible to create minimal reserves at the headquarters of Army Group North, which were planned to be sent to the crisis sector of the front, including from near Leningrad.

Secondly, it seemed obvious that the direction of the main attack of the Soviet troops by the command of the Volkhov Front was extremely unsuccessfully chosen. “I still wonder: what did the command count on, driving horses into an impenetrable forest, where there are no roads, no paths, and snow up to the belly of the horses? After all, it was enough to look at the topographic map of the Novgorod region to understand: these places beyond the Volkhov are the real land of Mazai - swamps and swamps, ”wrote veteran of the 2nd shock army artilleryman I. I. Kalabin in his memoirs. When planning a breakthrough through forests and swamps, the front commander K. A. Meretskov did not take into account that

Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the offensive

To the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory

equipped in the German rear good roads where reinforcements can be moved quickly, there are fortified settlements. The enemy could maneuver equipment and uninterruptedly carry out the supply of ammunition and food. All this was deprived of Meretskov's troops, driven into forests and swamps. Under these conditions, the soldiers themselves had to carry guns and ammunition.

Thirdly, the troops of the Volkhov Front, due to objective and subjective reasons, were not ready for the offensive. The divisions did not finish concentrating on their starting positions, ammunition and food were not brought up, aviation was only pulling up to the front, the tanks did not have enough fuel.

Fourthly, the fatigue of the troops, which, before the start of the offensive, spent three months in continuous battles, affected. Those divisions and brigades that arrived at the front as part of fresh armies did not have combat experience, were not united, most of the fighters and commanders fought in the forest zone for the first time and therefore felt extremely insecure.

There were more compelling reasons throughout the country that objectively influenced the state of affairs in the Red Army and affected the course of battles in the first year of the war. M. S. Khozin wrote about the reasons for the failures of this period: “One of

The main ones, of course, were the general grave state in which our country and the Armed Forces found themselves as a result of the defeats that befell us in the summer-autumn campaign. The enemy approached Moscow, occupied Ukraine, Crimea and Donbass. Military production was sharply reduced, there were very few tanks and aircraft at the front, there was not enough ammunition, fuel, and even small arms. The difficult situation forced us to put into action reserve formations and units insufficiently trained and knocked together.

By the end of 1941, the active fronts suffered significant losses in people, weapons and military equipment. And if the availability of mobilization human resources in the country made it possible to compensate for the damage, to ensure the creation of new formations, then it was not possible to equip the deployed formations and units with weapons and military equipment to the standard strength. Industry at the end

1941 produced such a quantity of military products that made up for the losses of the active army in small arms by only 30%, in artillery - by 57%, in tanks - by 27%, in combat aircraft - by 55%.

By the beginning of the Luban offensive operation, the combat readiness of the troops had not yet been fully restored;

equipping deployable formations that were intended to reinforce the newly created Volkhov Front. The two armies that joined its composition from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters - the 2nd shock and 59th combined arms - had no combat experience, they were 70-90% manned and equipped with artillery. They did not have tank units and artillery units of the RGK, as well as aviation. In these armies at the beginning of the operation there were no rear and support units and institutions at all. This affected the supply in the very first days of the offensive. In battle, the soldiers of the Soviet army lacked the most necessary - weapons, ammunition, food. They could only oppose the technical equipment of the German army with a bayonet and their courage.

V. V. Gurkin and A. I. Kruglikov, “directives of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command of Lenin-

city ​​and Volkhov fronts, as well as others in December

1942 were given without taking into account an objective assessment of the combat capabilities of the troops of the active army and the quality of the deployed reserve formations.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was distrustful of the ability of the commanding staff of the Red Army to lead combat operations. Moscow carried out petty tutelage of the actions not only of the commanders of the fronts, but also of the armies, and direct instructions were often given to the commanders of divisions. Such actions fettered the initiative of the commanders, any adjustments to the plan of operation that the situation required had to be coordinated with the General Staff of the Red Army, and often personally with I.V. Stalin. All this in the conditions of the battle affected the speed of decision-making, adversely reflected in the overall picture of the offensive operation and led to tragic consequences.

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