Free yourself from NSA agents. Investigation: The best employees are leaving the US NSA

In 1997, the mysterious organization NSA (National Security Academy) was created in St. Petersburg, and a chain of bloody events in the fall of 1998, which occurred shortly after Putin became director of the FSB on July 25, 1998, is connected with this organization.

Chronology of events

• September 28, 1998 killed Evgeny Agarev- an explosion of hexogen in the entrance tore off his head. This murder is related to the NSA at least in that it is technically exactly the same as the next murder, which occurred 12 days later. The murder of the defenseless Agarev is very similar to the “test of equipment” before the murder of Dmitry Filippov, surrounded by professional guards, and it was committed by the same “professional RDX specialists.”


• October 10, 1998 hexogen explosion in the entrance, the victim is the organizer and sponsor of the NSA Dmitry Fillipov. It was probably Dmitry Filippov who was the main target of the special operation, which was carried out under the pretext of the need to destroy the NSA, which Putin presented to Yeltsin as a kind of “gang of commies striving for power,” and received carte blanche to destroy it. The rest of the victims in this chain may have suffered simply for company.


• October 16, 1998 1st Vice President of the NSA Mikhail Osherov received two bullets in the head in the entrance of his house. Judging by NSA documents, he was the most active participant in this organization, and it rested on him. Since Mikhail Osherov and Dmitry Filippov were friends with Gennady Seleznev for more than 25 years (who provided all the formalities for registering the NSA and its legalization within the State Duma), the connection of events with the NSA is quite obvious; in fact, everything rested on these three: Seleznev, Filippov, Osherov.


• November 12, 1998 NSA Vice President Kurkov Anatoly Alekseevich, former head of the KGB of Leningrad, former boss of Putin, died at the age of 68 - not that old, strange. No obituaries are Googled, although Kurkov was quite pleased even after his resignation. influential person In St. Petersburg. The date of his death is suspiciously adjacent to the chain of liquidations of people associated with the NSA.


• November 17, 1998 A press conference was held by FSB officers who were dissatisfied with their use for contract killings. It was led by Alexander Litvinenko - he later suffered greatly. The fact that the FSB employees themselves showed dissatisfaction with being recruited to carry out contract killings indicates that it was at that time that such a practice took place. Otherwise, so many career FSB officers would not have exposed their heads to inevitable retribution. In the future, all participants in that conference had a hard time.


• November 17, 1998 In the newspaper “Northern Capital”, which was published by Galina Starovoitova, her article was published about the activities of Seleznev and the NSA - “New Russian Communists: the union of the sickle and the dollar.” The article, signed with pseudonyms, “exposed” the NSA - they say that the communist Seleznev is extorting money from entrepreneurs for his election campaign, hiding behind chatter about national security. Putin’s friend Cherkesov, the then head of the St. Petersburg FSB, is mentioned in this article in such a way that one can conclude that he had previously communicated with Starovoitova on this topic.


• November 20, 1998 killed in the entrance of her house Galina Starovoitova. That day, she flew to St. Petersburg on a plane with Cherkesov, who allegedly offered her his security. In the murder of Starovoitova, there is an open allusion to the “insidious intelligence service NSA,” which, desperately resisting its exposure, kills its offender in impotent anger. And, of course, one of the first versions of the murder was connected with the NSA revelations, where the “mask show” soon came.


• November 22, 1998 The NSA office, which, by a strange coincidence, was located in the same building as Galina Starovoytova’s public reception area, was raided by UBEP officers, accompanied by members of the detention group (“mask show”). They searched the NSA office and seized all the documents. Financial irregularities were found in the papers and CEO NSA Alexander Zabuty was arrested.

1. Logic and motivation for Yeltsin

Probably, it was like this: FSB director Putin came to Yeltsin and reported on Gennady Seleznev’s activity in “seizing power in the country.” There were two main points: how successfully the communists collect money for their election campaign, and about the creation of a “commie intelligence service”, which is disguised as a seemingly harmless organization called the NSA.

By shifting some accents, Putin could easily present information in such a way that Yeltsin would have a picture in his head directly associated with 1993, when in order to stay in power he had to shoot the parliament.

Having been impressed and given some thought, Yeltsin should have agreed to the measures proposed by Putin, the essence of which was “not to bring the situation to a critical point, but to get by.” little blood". That is, eliminate the ringleaders, and then, they say, this whole undertaking, most dangerous for the country, will fall apart, and rivers of blood will not be shed, as in 1993.

The ringleaders in the NSA were Dmitry Filippov and Mikhail Osherov, and of course their mutual friend, State Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev, who ensured legalization for the NSA in the State Duma. Well, of course, they didn’t dare to kill the speaker of the State Duma; that would have been too much and could have led to a lot of noise and a serious investigation. But to remove two of his friends, under the guise of gang warfare, seemed to be a simple and logical solution, so to speak, without violence.

Yeltsin had nothing to lose - by that time he already had experience in approving the shooting of parliament, approving the start of the Chechen war, and the liquidation of Dudayev. He had no moral obstacles to approving the liquidation of Filippov and Osherov. Of course, under Putin’s personal responsibility: “if you fail, I didn’t know anything, but I’ll cover you as best I can.”

2. Logical and motivated for Putin

However, it was not so easy for Putin to kill Filippov:

• firstly, Filippov was expecting an assassination attempt and hired professional security, who did not take a step away from him. Therefore, Putin’s usual options, like the murder of Igor Dubovik or Mikhail Manevich, when the killer stupidly shoots the victim, were no longer needed. Something more complex was required here, something that Filippov’s guards could not have foreseen.


• secondly, for Putin, who took the chair of director of the FSB, it was not so easy to order Filippov using old gangster connections. There was a very high risk of failure and losing everything at once. It was clearly more profitable and safer for the bandit who accepted such an order to hand over Putin to the same Filippov, rather than rack his brains over how to kill him. Or another option - having received an order, blackmail Putin himself by exposing his order.

That is why the murder of Dmitry Filippov had to be preceded by the murder by the same people of some less significant person, but according to the same scheme. Putin checked the FSB "RDX agents" on Evgeny Agarev to check the entire chain from order to murder. If there had been something wrong with the “RDX agents,” then the insignificant liquidation of Agarev would have failed, and Filippov would not have even suspected that they were targeting him.
When the same “RDX workers” blew up Filippov, and Putin did not risk anything - firstly, they were proven people, and secondly, if something goes wrong, then Yeltsin, who himself approved this liquidation, would not be at all surprised and would not twitch.

Well, the murder of Osherov, who was not guarded by anyone, was a simple matter; they sent him a “glazier” with a converted gas pistol - so that the murder would look unprofessional. It made absolutely no difference to Putin whether Osherov survived. It was necessary to shoot him only to strengthen the legend that after the sudden liquidation of the “leaders of the NSA” the insidious activities of this organization ceased. If Putin had portrayed Filippov as the “leader of the NSA” whose liquidation would completely solve the problem, then Yeltsin could have guessed that Putin actually wanted to kill Filippov, and not “liquidate the NSA” at all. To maintain the legend of a powerful secret organization, several leaders were needed.

Kurkov was very useful among the “leaders of the NSA”. Moreover, he is the only one in the entire company who even looks like a conspirator. (by the way, Kurkov was a member of the State Emergency Committee. True, during the putsch he did nothing, he sat there without twitching, but he didn’t have the opportunity to do anything then). This former head of the KGB of Leningrad, the former boss of Putin, became the deputy chairman of the board of the Viking commercial bank, and it was with this bank that scams with false advice notes were associated, the amount of thefts amounted to hundreds of millions of rubles. Evgeniy Oleinik was allegedly involved in these frauds. Whether these stories are true is a big question, and the very fact of their existence says not so much that this bank was much more criminal than others, but rather that someone needed such legends. It is a fact that KB Viking looked like an idea of ​​the old KGB men to ensure theft of funds at the interbank level (I must say, such an accusation looks plausible - at that time it was a great way to get a huge pile of money “out of nothing”). And if Putin hinted that in this way these KGB officers are getting money to finance “communist revenge,” then it would sound quite convincing, coupled with the fact that Kurkov is the vice president of the NSA. In this context, it is quite likely that Kurkov died not at all because of worries about the bank, but rather like Sobchak. At least Kurkov’s death for the legend about the “liquidation of the leaders of the NSA” was somehow very timely and opportune.

And the murder of Galina Starovoitova also worked perfectly to strengthen the legend about the “power of the NSA” - this is supposedly what a terrible organization it is, which, in retaliation for the liquidation of its leaders, killed Starovoitova. And so, they say, what a cool organization Putin defeated in a fierce battle against the commies. Although there were some losses, the “democrats won.” In addition, Starovoitova did not like the KGB officers and persistently lobbied for the lustration law, the adoption of which would have closed the public career for Putin and Cherkesov - former employees of the 5th Directorate of the KGB, which the Democrats considered the department for combating dissidents. It is completely logical that these two friends ruined her under the guise of a performance with the “liquidation of the NSA.” They simply ordered it to their bandit friends ( upd: important details of this murder - our investigation).

3. Decorative

By the way, the logic of the setup with the NSA looks similar to the State Emergency Committee. Moreover, this analogy is also interesting in the opposite direction, that is, that the State Emergency Committee of 1991, in many ways, was also a setup and a scam, an artificially created pretext for the forceful elimination of a number of people, the ban of the CPSU, and the general destruction of the USSR.

The decorative NSA was simply a horror story, at least there is no reason to suspect any of the “academics” of a real desire to weave some kind of conspiracy, with the possible exception of Kurkov. For a full-fledged conspiracy, at a minimum, like-minded people are needed who have some kind of common history, on the basis of which they could trust each other.
Let's look at the composition of NSA vice presidents:

• Advisor to the Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Osherov Mikhail Semenovich(friend of G. Seleznev)


• Major General FSB Panteleev Gennady Stepanovich, deputy Head of the FSB Directorate for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region. A very controversial character.


• Major General of Police Kramarev Arkady Grigorievich, in 1991-94 - head of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate. The same one on whom the incriminating evidence was collected and leaked to Sobchak by “Chekist Oleinik”, for which he received a bullet. The same Kramarev whom Sobchak pushed into the head of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate, and then he himself accused of rampant banditry.


• Colonel of Justice Kirilenko Viktor Petrovich. In 1966-1980 he worked as an investigator and prosecutor in military justice agencies. Deputy Chairman of the Government Committee of the Leningrad Region.


• Major General Nefedov Alexander Alexandrovich, Head of the Tax Police Department of the Leningrad Region.


• Captain 1st rank Leskov Alexander Yakovlevich, the legendary Soviet submariner, received an award for saving the Leninsky Komsomol submarine from destruction (though for some reason only in 2012).


• someone Khromovskikh Valery Georgievich, head of the financial department of the NSA


• someone Rozhkov Vladimir Dmitrievich, Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Employment of the Leningrad Population. areas.


• Major General Semchenkov Alexander Vasilievich, President of the State Security Veterans Foundation.


• Lieutenant General Kurkov Anatoly Alekseevich, who in NSA documents was recorded not as a general, but modestly as “Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of KB VIKING,” although in fact this is the former head of the entire KGB of Leningrad and the region, who headed the “office” since April 1989. to November 29, 1991, Putin's former boss.

So it turns out that the NSA is just a setup, a horror story, an excuse to shove a stack of papers under the nose, for example, of Yeltsin, where in the darkest tones it would be described about an absolutely terrible “adventure of commies striving for power.” Nothing is required here except an impression, on the basis of which you can get the go-ahead to eliminate the “leaders”...

4. Speed, complexity, scale

At least 3 groups of killers were involved ("RDX men" from the FSB, who blew up Agarev and Filippov, plus a certain "glazier" who shot Osherov, plus bandits hired, probably by Cherkesov, who shot Starovoitova). Plus, it’s unclear what happened to Kurkov.

Such a serious operation could not have taken place without a strong cover story. The number of people involved in the fact that the NSA was being liquidated should have numbered in the dozens (and someday this will definitely come to light, someone will spill the beans).

5. Information background

Events related to the NSA were covered in the media in such a way as to shift the emphasis from the political background - to “the bandits did not divide the money.”

In relation to the NSA, some powerful force was clearly playing along with the creation of a criminal-gangster information background, and therefore the criminal image of this organization is simply off the charts. After the NSA was decapitated, it generally turned into a “den of bandits” - after the removal of Mikhail Osherov, a certain Oleg Taran, convicted of fraud, was put in his place at the NSA. He was shot by a sniper on September 21, 2001, and his place was taken by Vladimir Kulibaba, the right hand of crime boss Konstantin Yakovlev (the same “Kostya Mogila”). I wonder why a well-known crime boss suddenly needed to get into the NSA, as if we were talking about some kind of extremely profitable enterprise? Usually shadow tycoons strive for the shadows, but here, on the contrary, for some reason they decided to go to where everyone is killed, imprisoned, and constantly investigating something. Strange.

In general, after a chain of bloody events, it would be logical to simply close the Academy of National Security - what kind of national security is there when the “academicians” could not even ensure the safety of their organizers, and some clowns, supposedly from the “Shutov’s gang,” are doing this to them got separated easily. It is unclear who needed the continuation of the existence of this “Academy” with such a sad history. By the way, for some reason it still exists, there is even a website http://anb-rf.narod.ru/

6. About the acronym NSA

The name and abbreviation NSA is almost a copy of the mysterious American intelligence agency called the National Security Agency (NSA or NSA). Simply the word Agency has been replaced with Academy.

According to Wikipedia, this is “the most secretive American intelligence service, solves problems of obtaining information through technical means, and is responsible for all types of electronic intelligence, data protection and cryptography tasks. Due to its special secrecy, the NSA acronym was sometimes jokingly deciphered as “No Such Agency” (“an agency that does not exist”) or “Never Say Anything” (“never say anything”).”

However, despite the secrecy of the NSA, Yeltsin should have known about this organization in connection with the history of the liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Numerous attempts to kill Dudayev during the first Chechen war failed, not without the help of the US CIA, which actually provided “cover” for the militants. And so, if you believe the Chechens who investigated this case, when the cost of eliminating Dudayev reached sky-high heights, the American NSA got involved in this case, which provided the necessary information to eliminate the leader of the Chechen separatists. The homing missile found its target on April 21, 1996, 2 months before Yeltsin’s next presidential election, which took place on June 16, 1996. The successful elimination of Dudayev significantly increased Yeltsin's rating before the elections, and this service from the Americans seemed very useful.
The NSA even published a snapshot from a video coming directly from the rocket:

Thus, even the very abbreviation NSA in 1998 could have already evoked in Yeltsin associations with some powerful secret intelligence service, and the efforts of the “unfinished commies” to create the NSA under the roof of the State Duma all the more seemed not to be the creation of some harmless academy, but with a pretension to create a secret organization, well disguised.

7. Attribution of murders to the “Shutov gang”

The fact that the “RDX” murders of Agarev and Filippov were attributed to the “Shutov gang” clearly indicates that Putin knows who actually ordered these murders, and is deliberately pointing the finger at a person who is obviously not involved in them, so that the real killers - "RDX agents" from the FSB - were not found.

The Shutov case is a bomb for the regime

The fact that the “Shutov case” is a complete fake is clear from the huge number of inconsistencies, of which the most obvious is that Shutov, as a result of the activities of his “gang,” did not become a millionaire, unlike traditional gangster leaders who acquire wealth and spheres of influence. His bandits, according to the case materials, received about $100 a month. In general, the financial side of this “business” is complete absurdity (as, indeed, are all other sides).

Shutov allegedly began creating a gang in 1997, and recruited performers from antisocial elements sitting in IZ-45/1 - it was from there that Lagutkin, Rogozhnikov and some other “gang members” came. All of them did not know Shutov, but testified that after leaving prison, through a chain of intermediaries they began to receive tasks from him and carry them out unquestioningly. True, at the trial they refused their testimony, and even told in detail how and who forced them to lie, but they were simply removed from the courtroom; for the accused, the trial was held in absentia.

Apparently, these guys from “Shutov’s gang” are ordinary drug-addicted criminals who were selected in advance to falsify the case against Shutov, and then released for a walk in order to soon put everyone back and force them to sign the testimony necessary for the fabricators - about how they were commanded by Shutov. The task of attributing the murders of Dubovik, Agarev and Filippov to them was most likely given to the falsifiers later.

What the criminal guys were like can be imagined from one more or less plausible episode:
“On the night of December 8–9, 1998, in apartment 194 of building 46 on the street. Malaya Balkanskaya in St. Petersburg, gang members Nikolaev, Rogozhnikov, Minakov and Lagutkin drank alcohol with Kharenkina. While drinking alcohol, Nikolaev, Rogozhnikov and Lagutkin attacked Kharenkina with the aim of stealing her property. Nikolaev struck the victim’s head and body several times with his fists. Next, Nikolaev suggested that Rogozhnikov wash the blood from Kharenkina’s face, tie her up, and take away her jewelry. Realizing the single intent to seize the victim’s property, Rogozhnikov struck her once in the face with his fist and tried to forcibly remove the gold ring from the victim’s hand. Suppressing Kharenkina’s resistance, Rogozhnikov grabbed a kitchen knife from the table and, using it as a weapon, struck at least one blow to the victim’s hand, after which, threatening violence dangerous to life and health and demonstrating the knife, he forcibly removed two gold rings: one of them - a wedding ring - worth at least 500 rubles, the second ring - with cubic zirconia, worth at least 400 rubles, which Nikolaev, he and Lagutkin took possession of. Rogozhnikov tied Kharenkina in the bathtub with a rope. After that, Rogozhnikov, Nikolaev and Lagutkin stole property belonging to her from the victim’s apartment: a Panasonic telephone worth at least 700 rubles, a telephone set worth at least 120 rubles. In total, property worth at least 1,720 rubles was stolen from Kharenkina. Then Rogozhnikov untied Kharenkin and the gang members fled from the scene with the stolen property. As a result of the joint violent actions of Nikolaev and Rogozhnikov, Kharenkina suffered beatings and a cut wound on the dorsum of her left hand.”
That is, this is two months after another brilliantly executed murder by them (the victim was a powerful shadow politician Dmitry Fillipov, surrounded by professional guards who could not help him in any way). These professional killers, who have already committed a series of daring political liquidations, have put the whole of St. Petersburg, the entire police and the FSB on their ears. You probably thought that they hitchhiked out of St. Petersburg, or “lay low” with a suitcase of money earned from the murder? No, the boys shook off traces of RDX from their hands and went to rob Kharenkina. These guys are so harsh that they carelessly drink and rob a drinking companion, and take possession of a telephone worth at least 120 rubles.

It would seem, why don’t the fabricators remove this episode from the case so as not to undermine the movie image of the gang of killers? But how to seize it if there is a victim - Kharenkina, and what to do with her? While removing the rings from Kharenkina, criminal drug addicts Lagutkin and Rogozhnikov did not even suspect that very soon almost all the high-profile murders of 1998 would be pinned on them.

There are so many absurdities and inconsistencies in the “Shutov case” that it is generally incomprehensible how such an important matter, on which the country’s top leadership directly depends, could be so mediocrely and clumsily falsified.

The series of murders in 1998 are, of course, far from the worst crimes of Putin’s gang of killer lawyers who deprived Russia of justice as such. Just a few old murders, such a small thing compared to everything else. But with these murders everything was done so crudely that by seizing on the “Shutov case”, on whom these murders were pinned, one can legally prove not only Shutov’s innocence (which, in general, few people are interested in), but Putin’s guilt - first of all, in falsifying the case , and then further along the chain to the organization of the murders themselves.

The last (in my memory) attempt to sue Putin is tribunal Victor Ilyukhin. It all ended quite logically - immediately after this tribunal Ilyukhin died suddenly. It is clear that the legal provability of his crimes in itself is not enough when justice has been abolished in the country, and the court has been turned into an instrument of slander and reprisals.

Nevertheless, this strongly protruding “skeleton in the closet” with the vile murder of Dmitry Filippov and attributing it to Shutov is an excellent point of effort for those who want to rid Russia of Putin’s gang of thieves and traitors. We need to rub our noses into the “Shutov case” of all the “zaputinites” who believe that the accusations against Putin are unsubstantiated. Here there are not only weighty suspicions, there is a specific murder of Dmitry Filippov, which Putin hid in the fake “Shutov case.” The reluctance to have an honest investigation into this case indicates that the lack of a verdict against Putin is not at all due to a lack of evidence of his guilt, but because of the destruction of justice in Russia.

Officially, the NSA is responsible for all types of computer, electronic and any other intelligence using modern technical means. And it has long been no secret that the sponsors of the development of most software created in the United States are local intelligence agencies. It is to their servers that your computer, connected to the Internet, constantly sends information for its subsequent processing by NSA analytical centers. The awareness of agency employees can be judged by information published by defector Edward Snowden.

The NSA is located in 50 buildings at Fort Meade (near Laurel, Maryland). Each of them is protected by special security systems, windows that reflect electromagnetic waves, and many others technical means, making the territory of the object inaccessible to outsiders. And there is something to hide. According to Edward Snowden, he personally, being a small cog in the NSA colossus, sitting at a computer, could listen to almost any person on Earth who logged onto the Internet. Thanks to the modern proliferation of systems mobile communications The NSA, Snowden claims, can listen to almost anyone. This raises a question. If the NSA is such a knowledgeable organization, why are terrorist attacks and other crimes still happening in the world? It remains to be concluded that they are carried out, at a minimum, with the tacit consent of the NSA.

The recent USENIX Enigma conference got me thinking about a couple of things. Especially here this guy, who stood up and ranted about TAO's work. This one and Another one, who, on the other hand, couldn't care less whether people knew he worked for TAO. I worked at TAO. I was an operative at the Remote Operations Center for a year and a half. But before you think, "Oh shit, he's going to be the next Snowden," screw it. I don't really like the idea of ​​suddenly driving off in a black government jeep to an unknown destination, so don't expect any top-secret material to be revealed here. I immediately apologize for possible disappointed expectations. I'll start with a few words about the USENIX talk and go through my own experience working at the NSA.

In fact, I don’t want to say anything very bad about Rob Joyce’s report. If more people followed his advice, life would be a little easier. The only thing I would like to note is that the entire report sounds quite familiar. Where could I have heard all this before? Rob doesn't tell us anything we don't already know or haven't done. I generally got the impression that if it weren’t for the NSA representative who started such a hurdy-gurdy, the report would have been taken down faster than you could say the word “update.” And if you don't have the patience to watch the speech itself, here are a couple of my conclusions based on the report:

• the top 20 critical security measures are what he is forced to talk about throughout the entire speech (privilege reduction, segmentation, whitelists, patch management, etc.);
• the EMET toolkit should be installed as quickly as possible;
• NSM is incredibly powerful. What I predicted long before working at the NSA and is still relevant today;
• IAD (Information Assurance Directorate) - guys who are not strictly tied to hacking your personal information, issue good notes on strengthening system protection. It's worth listening to them.

I also thought the impromptu commentary on zeroes at minute 12 sounded quite funny. I remember the noise in in social networks about some statistics saying that the NSA reports about 90% of the vulnerabilities they find. More like a white lie, it seems to me.

Let me paint you a completely hypothetical scenario. Let's say you have a fuzz farm (a set of stations that run programs aimed at creating software crashes). Your task is to collect several zerodeans based on these crashes. Of course, you are especially interested in vulnerabilities with RCE, but among other things, privilege escalation vulnerabilities will do.

So, your farm finds several vulnerabilities, among which there is no RCE or privilege escalation capability, but it crashes the system and/or denial of service (DOS). Zerodeans with DOS are not of particular interest to state-level APT (quite the contrary). That's why you report these vulnerabilities. Why? It’s very simple - if you don’t tell about them, there is always the possibility that they will be used against you (hacktivists, intelligence services of other states). In this case, they will not be able to be the first to succeed, and your own operations will be significantly safer due to the fact that the problem will be patched. In any case, this is a situation of direct benefit for you and your reports. Not to mention the very opportunity to show positive statistics on how you report the majority of vulnerabilities found. It turns out neatly, doesn’t it?

My personal reasons for leaving the NSA are due to insufficient pay compared to the private sector, absolutely asinine attitudes among people (with a few exceptions) and in 2013. These are the main things that I will be happy to discuss further. But in order to somehow interest you, while you are still reading this, I will also talk about other not very clean things inside TAO, even if they have nothing to do with classified information. If this helps even one inexperienced, inquisitive mind reconsider their decision to work for TAO, I will consider my job done.

Let's talk about obtaining clearance - the SF86 procedure. So SF86 is a lot of incredible hell. It is necessary to enter your entire previous life over the past five years into a multi-page document. Places you lived in, people you knew while you lived there, where you went on vacation, and so on. Then comes the turn of private investigators visiting you, your current employer, your friends, your family, and so on. Then, a set of psychological tests. Further more - lie detectors appear on the scene. Yes Yes. We hand over the final decision to the power of pseudoscientific nonsense, the results of which are easily disputed and will not stand up for even a second in a court case where you will have to prove your trustworthiness. As a result, this whole procedure took me more than six months, after which I finally received a job offer. And this is not to mention the fact that all this information ended up being compromised.

Finally - getting a job offer (funny enough - at Defcon 20, an event that Jack Moss, a fed himself, advised other feds to stay away from). For me personally, the irony is that this was my first participation in Defcon. I was told that I would be sent to training. How long will it last? About six months. Once again I have to omit details, again due to the risk of driving a black jeep. Suffice it to say that everything was very strict. However, to give at least some idea and set you up for the right mood, I will tell you about one remarkable meeting during my training.

One day we were introduced to the operatives already working for TAO in a short question and answer session. A sort of NSA version of “I’m an operative, ask me whatever you want.” There were several questions on a variety of topics, most of which I conveniently forgot. But there was one that was very memorable: “What is the staff turnover among operatives?” To this one of them replied with a straight face: “About a year and a half. Some are being translated. Some leave the agency. There are hospitalizations due to stress. We have had several suicides.” The only thing that appeared in my head at that moment was a large inscription burning in red letters: “EEE... Seriously? Are you sure that this is exactly what they want you to tell us??” In general, for me this was the first signal that I needed to reel in my fishing rods.

I've been advised an incredible amount of times that while I'm here and want to participate in conferences or whatever, I need to write a bunch of requests, proof of need and requests for refunds, down to the last cent. And I wrote. It seemed to me, damn it, that all security conferences were directly related to our, ahem, direct activities. All my requests were refused. The official resolution always read: “Due to lack of funding.” What wasn't reported: "funding cuts because the intelligence agencies and GSA are doing stupid things." Despite this, of course, we had the means to send General Alexander Keith to Defcon and Black Hat, but not mere mortals. Although it would seem that this was directly related to our work. It all ended with me paying my own way to Vegas that year, which, in turn, did not save me from participating in the terribly boring and wildly mandatory training about OPSEC and DEFCON (like, don’t fall for the “free hugs for the feds” sign) and not to participate in the game of “spot the fed by his gait”, that is, super banal bullshit that boils down to a simple thought - don’t attract attention to yourself).

Well, now about the main, so to speak, elephant in the room. About salary. Here is a link to this year’s calculation grid, which, according to my recollections, has not changed much. I was hired at the GS 11 level, which meant a salary of approximately $70,000. This is if you have experience as a system administrator and several years of personal experience working with NSM. Plus a premium for industry certifications, plus a small premium for belonging to a certain state, and so on. Take a look at this. You will see that the average salary is 73,000. But the data presented is statistically incorrect, since the general list includes titles that are not directly related to cybersecurity. A bit of statistical analysis on my part. But keep in mind that I am not a mathematician or a data scientist. And the fact that this salary ranking from indeed.com for security analysts in the Maryland region also does not claim to be absolutely true. First, let's look at a few items that are not related to cybersecurity:

• SAP business analyst – $135,000;
• students from Baltimore (I have no idea what this is about) - $51,000;
• Baltimore Social Services Analyst – $64,000;
• government analyst – $51,000;
• program analyst – $78,000.

Let's remove these positions. With the exception of “Baltimore Security Analyst $22,000,” all other titles suggest $80,000 or more in income. So, the government is already underpaying me by about 10,000, based on this data for the non-senior analyst position.

Now let's look at the data with new averages (for fun, without even removing the position at 22,000). The average for a Security Analyst/Senior Security Analyst is already at 99,000. A difference of almost 29,000. A little debunking of the myth that the government's local adjusted income scale is based on the average for a given region, isn't it? And this is only if you compare wages operative in relation to the security analyst. You can also look at the salaries of pentesters and security engineers... You will see a much larger gap. Moral of the story: The government continues to wonder why it can't attract and retain cybersecurity talent. And it's quite simple - it seriously underpays the talent it's trying to retain. It's no secret that some information security firms actively hunt TAO employees.

As shown above, agency pay is quite meager. This predictably makes people greedy and mean-spirited when it comes to writing reports and submitting indicators (and you are required to write reports on the work done and your own indicators twice a year. I definitely won’t miss this). Simply because you may stand between them and the next step up the career ladder. Simply put, public servants were completely unethical towards each other. Unceremonious and immoral. They always had something more important than helping you achieve your goals. I found that getting support for even one of the tasks was an absolute matter of chance. Several times, sticking my head out and lending a helping hand to people myself resulted in me being rather unceremoniously besieged. On top of all this, nepotism is quite common within TAO. A high percentage of candidates are recruited from colleges. These guys always strived to work within their own circle and, undoubtedly, could show a tendency to play favorites among their friends and peers. The bosses don't give a damn about this as long as the assigned tasks are completed.

At the same time, when workers were not squabbling among themselves, they concentrated all their efforts on the “green labels.” “Green employees” are contract workers for the agency. As you may have guessed, a contract soldier could be identified by his green badge. The implication was that in all cases, contractors were paid more than federal employees. This made the feds jump out of their pants to muddle them, regardless of the nature of the problem and/or whether the contractor had a direct connection to it. I've heard stories of bus drivers being literally eaten alive for being 2-3 minutes late.

And if it's not enough that your own colleagues are trying to drag you down, on the other side there has always been an absolutely clueless management team. Since I started working in the development program, I have had several bosses. Not one of them could clearly explain to me what exactly I do every day, or at least how this day goes. There was so much office space that it was almost physically painful.

In general, I usually have no problems finding a common language with others and do not deviate from my principles in order to be an asshole in the real world (I usually let off steam on Twitter). Therefore, I still managed to find a few friends at the agency, which is why I didn’t feel completely up to my neck. cesspool(most of these people now work elsewhere). In addition, it is worth adding that the experience of working with people who were representatives not of the feds, but of military units, was amazing. Excellent team play, coupled with the “just do it” approach and a dose of five-point black humor reconciled with the work in due measure.

Now let's move on to my last complaint - the government shutdown (most likely referring to the sixteen-day government shutdown in October 2013 - approx. trans.). Congress, in its endless idiocy, refused to agree to the government's proposed budget. When stories like this happen, all government services are left in limbo until the moment the budget is approved. Yes, it affected us too. We were ordered to leave without severance pay, indefinite time, no compensation. In short, “continue to have fun yourself as best you can.” Around the same time, my wife and I became the proud owners of real estate. In addition to the mortgage, I had other bills to pay. Well, really, Congress, doesn’t the question of the lives of several thousand people stop them from starting an idiotic squabble? Fortunately, the government shutdown was not as long as it could have been or as many expected. In addition, we were paid for the period when we were actually forced to sit without work. The funny thing is that Congress actually had to vote to give us that money back. Or they could easily and casually say: “No damn thing, we won’t pay you anything,” leaving us in the cold. After all, they are Congress and only care about their own bills and money. They don't care about you personally or what you do for your country. For me this was the last straw. I decided that enough was enough and turned this page of my life.

Long before my participation in Defcon, there was a widespread belief that hackers and security specialists should not work for others. It’s quite funny to see how everything has changed and now the founder of Defcon and Black Hat not only works as an Advisor to the US Department of Homeland Security, but also changed his opinion on this matter to the complete opposite. I almost beg you to do differently. It's within your power. At least don't mess with the US Intelligence Community.

On January 9, 2019, it became known that Kaspersky Lab, whose software was banned from use in the American government agencies, helped catch a thief of classified data from the National Security Agency (NSA). Read more.

2018

Searching for information about spy microchips from China

On October 11, 2018, it became known that the US National Security Agency (NSA) was searching for witnesses who could confirm information about the installation of Chinese spy microchips on the servers of American companies. Bloomberg reported this with reference to NSA expert Rob Joyce.

Rob Joyce urged those with information to contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), NSA or the US Department of the Interior.

In early October 2018, Bloomberg published an article claiming that Chinese hackers were trying to spy on American companies using microchips. According to agency sources, spy chips were embedded in motherboards intended for servers used by companies such as Apple and Amazon. Sources claimed that this happened at the stage of equipment assembly at factories in China, which are contractors of the world's largest manufacturer motherboards Supermicro.

Apple and Amazon subsequently denied these claims. Supermicro also denied Bloomberg's accusations. Later, security expert Joe Fitzpatrick, referred to by the agency, said that Bloomberg distorted his words in his article, taking them out of context.

Ex-programmer sentenced to 5.5 years in prison for leaking cyber weapons to Kaspersky Lab

In September 2018, ex-NSA programmer Nghia Hoan Pho, 68, was sentenced to five and a half years in prison for leaking classified cyber-military developments. Back in December, Pho pleaded guilty to intentionally unauthorized copying of classified information related to state security. Read more.

The US NSA created a cyber unit to fight Russia

"Russians are coming"

Paul Nakasone, who heads the National Security Agency (NSA) and at the same time holds the post of head of cyber forces, officially confirmed in July 2018 to the Bloomberg news agency the creation of a separate special forces “to repel Russian threats in cyberspace.”

“I formed a group for Russia – Russia Small Group,” Nakasone said. “This is something that the intelligence community really should have done after [the events of] 2016-2017.”

The Washington Post reported that the US NSA and its cyber forces intend to counter “Russian threats to US security” in the midterm elections in November, which will re-elect the US House of Representatives (lower house) of 35 senators and 39 state governors.

“Russia has significant capabilities, and we certainly must be prepared for this challenge,” Paul Nakasone said last weekend during a speech at the annual Aspen Security Forum in Aspen, Colorado. “And if such a challenge comes, I believe, without a doubt, we will be ready to resist.”

Strengthening the infrastructure of the NSA cyber forces

In June 2018, The New York Times wrote that the Pentagon over the past few months has significantly expanded the capabilities of the US NSA cyber forces, giving them, among other things, the right to hack enemy networks to protect American networks. Such powers do significantly expand the room for maneuver for the NSA's cyber troops, since previously they were allowed mainly only to protect US networks. Also, the increase in status, in all likelihood, also opened up additional opportunities “for protection from Russia,” Bloomberg notes.

The NSA has stepped up surveillance of Americans' phone calls.

The National Security Agency (NSA) tracked three times more phone calls and text messages from Americans in 2017 than in the previous year, Reuters reported in May 2018. This is stated in the report of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence of the United States.

As the agency notes, a sharp increase in phone call tracking was recorded in the second year after the adoption of a law in the United States that was designed to reduce the scope of surveillance. The data collected by the NSA includes numbers and times of calls or text messages. It is clarified that the NSA does not record the content of conversations.

Rumor about the possible appointment of a military expert as head of the NSA

2017

Data about the NSA's secret Red Disk project leaked online

In November 2017, information appeared that confidential data from a hard drive belonging to the US National Security Agency (NSA) had leaked onto the Internet.

As it turned out, a classified project of the NSA and the US Army, stored on an Amazon Web Services server, was not password protected. The leaked virtual disk image contained more than 100 GB of data.

Data from the disk was discovered by security researcher Chris Vickery and reported his discovery to the government in October 2017.

Once unpacked and downloaded, the disk image was a 2013 snapshot of a hard drive from a Linux server that was part of a cloud-based intelligence sharing system called Red Disk. The project was developed by INSCOM (US Army Intelligence and Security Command) Futures Directorate as a complement to the so-called Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) - the US Army's legacy intelligence processing and sharing platform.

The project was conceived as an easily customizable cloud system capable of providing access to the required data within complex military operations. In particular, it was assumed that the Red Disk system would be able to provide American soldiers in hot spots with data directly from the Pentagon, including satellite images and video broadcasts from unmanned aerial vehicles.

As a result, the system did not live up to expectations: it turned out to be too difficult to use and had low operating speed. However, $93 million was invested in the development of the project, but it was never fully implemented.

The NSA collapses after its hacking tools are stolen

The National Security Agency (NSA) is struggling to recover from the blow it received from the hacker group Shadow Brokers, which stole data in 2016. source codes department's hacking tools. In August 2016, hackers began publishing the codes, causing great damage to the NSA's intelligence and cyber capabilities, former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told The New York Times.

The NSA has been investigating the incident for 15 months, but still cannot say with certainty whether it was a foreign hacking operation, an internal leak, or both. The NSA's counterintelligence unit Q Group and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have been involved in the investigation. Since 2015, three NSA employees have been arrested for removing classified data from the office, but the agency fears there are still undisclosed spies on staff.

These fears were confirmed to The New York Times by former NSA cyber unit employee Jake Williams, who described how a Shadow Brokers representative contacted him on Twitter in April 2017. The unknown hacker not only knew who Williams was, but also mentioned technical details of the NSA's hacking operations that were known only to some of Williams' colleagues in the division.

Global damage

The damage caused by the Shadow Brokers far exceeded that of Edward Snowden, who stole four laptops containing classified material from the department in 2013, although his actions attracted more media attention. But if Snowden exposed only the names of hacking tools, Shadow Brokers made their codes public. Now these codes, created with the money of American taxpayers, are being bought up by hackers in North Korea and other countries in order to be used against the United States and allied powers, writes The New York Times.

The publication links the theft of codes with major ransomware attacks, in particular with the destruction of files of tens of thousands of employees of Mondelez International, the manufacturer of Oreo cookies. The incident, which occurred at the end of June, was caused by the spread of the Petya virus. The parcel delivery company FedEx suffered from the same ransomware, which cost the attack $300 million. These companies, like hospitals in the US and Indonesia, an engineering plant in France, an oil company in Brazil, a chocolate factory in Tasmania and many others deserve explanations. why codes created by the NSA were used against them, the newspaper believes.

The United States learned about the theft of NSA data through Kaspersky Anti-Virus from Israeli intelligence services

NSA spies on foreigners outside the US

In September 2017, it became known that the US National Security Agency (NSA) was monitoring more than 100 thousand foreign citizens outside the country. The intelligence service operates on the basis of paragraph 702, VII Amendment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), CNN reports, citing a number of senior officials.

Specifically, Section 702 allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to authorize surveillance of non-U.S. citizens or persons located outside the country if they have information of foreign intelligence interest.

The amendment to the Covert Surveillance Act expires in December 2017, but opinions are divided on the advisability of its extension.

Arguments against"

A number of American politicians have spoken out against further extension of this law, fearing that it could be used for surveillance, including on American citizens. Intelligence agencies can gain access to electronic communications of US citizens without a warrant just because of the mere mention of a foreign entity, said Senator Ron Wyden.

For their part, NSA representatives deny the existence of such incidents. They said the agency is required to comply with numerous measures to protect citizens' privacy under its 2008 statute.

Arguments for"

The NSA itself is in favor of extending the amendment, in particular, arguing that thanks to the Covert Surveillance Act, it has repeatedly been possible to promptly identify cyber espionage threats, prevent cyber attacks, and disrupt the preparation of terrorist acts by Daesh (banned in Russia).

In addition, US Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats proposed indefinitely extending the law allowing covert electronic surveillance of citizens. The US presidential administration also advocated extending the law without making any changes to its text.

Secret US base for intercepting communications discovered in Australia

The US government has built a secret base in Australia's Northern Territory to monitor wireless communications and support its drone program, according to a new batch of National Security Agency (NSA) documents provided by Edward Snowden. In documents published by The Intercept, the base is referred to under the code name Rainfall, but its official name is Joint Defense Facility Pine Gap.

“Just a short drive from Alice Springs, the second most populous city in the Northern Territory, lies a highly classified, secure facility codenamed Rainfall. This remote base, located in the desert wilderness in the heart of the country, is one of the premier covert surveillance sites in the Eastern Hemisphere,” writes The Intercept.

The base houses a strategic satellite communications ground station to secretly monitor telecommunications in multiple countries and obtain geolocation data of targets targeted for drone attacks. The base is active and employs hundreds of American and Australian personnel.

The satellites used at the base are geostationary, that is, they are located in orbit above 32 thousand km above the surface of the planet and are equipped with powerful equipment for monitoring wireless communications on Earth. In particular, satellites are capable of intercepting data transmitted using mobile phones, radio and satellite uplinks.

The Northern Territory is a federal subject within Australia, in the north of the mainland. Has a status slightly lower than that of the state. It borders Western Australia to the west, South Australia to the south and Queensland to the east. The main city is Darwin.

Satellite uplinks are the portion of a communications link used to transmit signals from a ground terminal to a satellite or airborne platform.

Facebook and Google announced total surveillance by the NSA

In May 2017, it became known that American IT companies were asking for amendments to the Internet surveillance law. They wrote such a letter to Congress. It was signed by the heads of more than 20 companies. The authors of the appeal propose to deprive the National Security Agency of its powers. In addition, they want to control the activities of the NSA.

The companies' request concerns mass surveillance software PRISM. They are demanding limits on the amount of data the NSA can collect through this program, as well as ensuring transparency in the process. Each case of obtaining personal data must be monitored by a court. The letter was signed, in particular, by Facebook, Google, Airbnb, Amazon, Dropbox, Microsoft, Uber, Yahoo and others.

Tools for hacking the SWIFT banking system

Among these tools, tools were discovered to carry out attacks on the international interbank system SWIFT and its service bureaus. Apparently, the NSA's goal was to gain the ability to monitor any transactions carried out through this system.

The published tools also include exploits for hacking systems based on different versions of Windows, as well as a number of presentations and accompanying documents for these and other Equation tools.

SWIFT representatives told Threatpost that neither SWIFT infrastructure nor data itself was compromised, but that “third parties” could gain unauthorized access to communication channels between service bureaus and their clients.

Service bureaus are third-party service providers that manage and support financial institutions' connections to the SWIFTNet network. The Shadow Brokers leak, in particular, includes detailed data on the architecture of EastNets, the largest SWIFT service bureau in the Middle East, and data for accessing it.

It is worth noting that after the attacks of September 11, 2001, American intelligence services secretly gained access to financial information on the SWIFT network - this was done in order to track possible financial transactions of terrorists.

In 2006, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times published stories about the NSA and CIA's ability to monitor transactions on SWIFT, and the service's administration was heavily criticized for not adequately protecting customer data.

Subsequently, the architecture of the entire system began to be updated - precisely in order to protect the secrecy of transactions.

US NSA GenCyber ​​program for training cyber warriors

GenCyber ​​program, which cyberwarriors learn from, is directly funded by a key intelligence unit - the US National Security Agency. As part of GenCyber, special courses are held in 36 states, where everyone interested is told about the basics of cybersecurity and cyber warfare, and in a number of universities they train “cyber warriors” directly.

One of the creations of the GenCyber ​​program is " National Cyber ​​Warrior Academy", which works at the University of North Georgia and does just that. For training, it recruits students in order to prepare for service in federal and military government agencies. Moreover, priority is given to Americans who study the Russian language.

Future cyber warriors' specializations include training in drone programming, car hacking, and even 3D design. Upon completion of training, each graduate is issued a document - " hacker certificate"And there are 76 such educational institutions in , which, under the leadership of the NSA, train future cyber warriors with every possible range of skills, and this is just the beginning. In 2017, it is planned to conduct 120–150 such courses, and by 2020, the head of the program, Stephen Lafontaine, wants to increase the number There are up to 200 such courses per year.

National Science Foundation also finances the program " Cyber ​​Corps", which is intended for the recruitment of cybersecurity specialists, and, of course, all this is paid for by American taxpayers - grants from $22 thousand to $34 thousand per person. For such a generous reward, each graduate must "repay the debt" - get a job only to government agencies, the list of which is still the same - the NSA and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where they will have to engage in cyber operations.

"Snowden No. 2" stole 50 TB of classified data "due to mental illness"

In February 2017, the US National Security Agency accused Harold Martin, a former freelancer, of stealing classified information. The volume of data he stole amounts to a total of 50 TB, which is approximately 500 million pages. The US government has already called the incident the largest theft of classified data in the history of the country.

Among other things, Martin allegedly stole lists of NSA secret agents working undercover abroad. Also, according to The New York Times, he stole computer codes designed to attack government networks of other countries, including China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. In total, he had 75% of the hacking tools used by the Tailored Access Operations (TAO) unit, which carries out cyberattacks at the NSA.

In addition, the discovered archive contains NSA documents from 2014, which contain detailed intelligence information about foreign cyber systems and cyber attack techniques. Also found in Martin's possession was an NSA user manual for intelligence collection and a file describing the agency's daily operations dating back to 2007.

In addition, Martin is accused of stealing data from other agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the US National Space Agency and the US Cyber ​​Command.

However, it has not yet been specified what Martin did with the stolen data, if anything at all. However, he will have to answer to 20 criminal articles at once, for each of which he can receive up to 10 years in prison. The investigation into Snowden No. 2, which began in August 2016, continues. In mid-February, Martin will appear in court in Baltimore, USA.

2016

Hackers stole tools from NSA-linked Equation Group

Search for hackers of US Democratic Party servers before the presidential election

According to a journalistic investigation published by the British publication The Intercept, the secret Menwith Hill base in British North Yorkshire, which during the Cold War was called Field Station 8613 and spied on Soviet communications, employs more than 2,200 analysts, mainly from the American NSA, in 2016.

The top-secret nature of the Menwith Hill base is emphasized by 24-hour patrols by the British Army and surveillance cameras placed on almost every three-meter section of the base's fence, which covers an area of ​​about 2 square meters. km.

According to secret documents obtained by The Intercept from former NSA employee Edward Snowden, Menwith Hill is home to two major global espionage functions. One of them is called Fornsat and uses powerful antenna fields to intercept signals from foreign satellites.

The second feature, called Overhead, uses US government satellites in geostationary orbit over countries of interest to monitor mobile phone traffic and Wi-Fi networks.

According to American journalist James Bamford, who worked with Snowden, in 2016, the NSA is developing two global initiatives at once. The first is called TreasureMap, its task is to create a real-time interactive map of all devices in the world that are connected to the Internet. The second operation was called Turbine, its goal was to place malware on computer systems around the world for espionage or cyberattacks.

James Bamford claims that the NSA and CIA cyber espionage subsidiary is called the Special Collection Service. Its branches, equipped with the necessary equipment, are located in US embassies around the world. The service's regional center, responsible for operations in the Caribbean and Central and South America, is located in San Antonio, Texas.

According to Bamford, the cyber service is led from Fort Meade, the NSA headquarters in Maryland. A separate headquarters of the Special Collection Service is under construction, costing $3.2 billion. The headquarters will be equipped with a supercomputer, which will occupy an area of ​​55 thousand square meters. m and will consume about 60 MW of electricity. After its launch, cyber espionage in the United States should reach a new level.

Journalist David Sanger wrote a book about the massive cyber war the United States is waging against Iran. In particular, it talks about the initiative “ Olympic Games", authorized by the Barack Obama Administration, which, with the help of cyber attacks, threw back Iran's nuclear program two years ago. During the operation, about a thousand turbines were destroyed remotely, and the Iranian nuclear plant in Netenz was also disabled.

2015

The NSA is preparing the US for a large-scale cyber war

Mass surveillance carried out by the US National Security Agency (NSA) is just the beginning of more global events, Spiegel magazine wrote in 2015. New documents released by Edward Snowden and obtained by the publication suggest that the agency is arming America for future wars in cyberspace, in which the Internet will play a key role.

The goal of the preparation is to gain the ability to paralyze computer networks, and thereby disrupt the operation of enterprises, including power plants, water supply systems, factories and airports, as well as financial institutions.

In the twentieth century, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons were created. Only decades later were measures developed to regulate such types of weapons. Today, new digital weapons are being created for war on the Internet. But no international agreement or organization regulates digital weapons. Only one law applies here - the strongest wins, writes Spiegel.

Remarkably, Canadian theorist Marshall McLuhan foresaw this decades ago. In 1970 he stated:

"World War III will be a guerrilla information war with no separation between military and civilian participation."

This, according to the German publication, is exactly what the NSA is preparing for now.

By 2015, the US Army, Navy and Air Force have cyber units. But the NSA, which, by the way, is also a military organization, according to Spiegel, is a leader in this area. It is no coincidence that NSA Director Michael Rogers also serves as head of the US Cyber ​​Command. It controls about 40 thousand military personnel who engage in espionage and conduct cyber attacks.

From a military point of view, Internet surveillance is just the first phase of cyber warfare. Based on NSA documents obtained by Spiegel, surveillance is needed to find vulnerabilities in enemy systems. information system. After vulnerabilities are found, the second phase begins - installing bugs and gaining the ability to constantly monitor.

The third phase in the NSA documents cited by the publication appears with the word “control.” In the third phase, the agency gains the ability to “control and destroy critical systems.” Critical systems include everything that ensures the normal life of people - electrical networks, communications, transport. The documents include the concept of “stage-by-stage seizure of control in real time.”

One NSA presentation states that the next major global conflict will begin in cyberspace. Therefore, one of the agency’s most important tasks is to prepare for such a conflict. According to documents, in 2013 the NSA expected to receive about $1 billion from the state budget just to strengthen its computer networks.

Kaspersky uncovered a unique NSA spy program

The US National Security Agency came up with the idea of ​​hiding spyware in hard drives produced by Western Digital, Seagate, Toshiba and other leading manufacturers, thus gaining access to information on most computers in the world. This was reported in 2015 by Reuters, citing a Kaspersky Lab study and testimony from former NSA employees.

Based on the results of many years of observations, Kaspersky Lab was able to uncover the most complex and sophisticated cyber espionage system known to date. Company specialists discovered personal computers in 30 countries infected with one or more of these spyware programs. The largest number of infected computers, according to her data, were in Iran, as well as Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Mali, Syria, Yemen and Algeria. Computers most often attacked were in government and military institutions, telecommunications companies, banks, energy companies, nuclear research companies, media companies and Islamic activists.

Kaspersky Lab does not name the specific country behind the spying campaign. However, he clarifies that it is closely related to Stuxnet, which was developed by order of the NSA for attacks on Iranian nuclear program facilities. A former NSA employee told Reuters that Kaspersky's findings were correct. According to him, current agency employees rate these spy programs as highly as Stuxnet.

Another former intelligence official confirmed that the NSA had developed a valuable method for hiding spyware in hard drives, but said he did not know what spying tasks they were assigned to.

National Security Agency United States (eng. National Security Agency, NSA) is a division of electronic and electronic intelligence of the US Department of Defense, part of the Intelligence Community as an independent intelligence agency. Formed as part of the US Department of Defense on November 4, 1952. In terms of the number of military personnel and civilian employees and the size of its budget, it is the largest intelligence agency in the United States.

The US NSA is responsible for the collection and analysis of information by means of ER (RTR and RR), monitoring electronic communication networks, recording electronic traffic, solving highly specialized tasks of electronic intelligence (RTR) and radio intelligence (RR) to obtain information from communication networks of foreign countries through electronic and radio interception and its decryption using computer equipment. The NSA is also responsible for closing the electronic communications networks of US government agencies from unauthorized access by DER services of other countries.

Solve problems of obtaining information by technical means, is responsible for all types of electronic information systems, data protection and cryptography tasks.

General information

The NSA is a key DER structure within the United States Intelligence Community, headed by the Director of National Intelligence. The Central Security Service is a department of the US Department of Defense, an organization created to develop security measures for electronic communication networks and cooperation between the US NSA and the cryptographic services of the US Department of Defense. The director of the NSA and the head of the Central Security Service is also the head of the operational headquarters for psychological warfare and electronic warfare of the US Armed Forces. Since 2009, these positions have been combined by General Keith Alexander (NSA director since 2005). The NSA's field of activity is limited to electronic warfare; the agency does not conduct human intelligence outside the United States.

The job category of the head of the NSA is filled by a senior member of the US Department of Defense - a military personnel with the rank of lieutenant general or vice admiral. The positions of deputy heads of the NSA can be filled by civilian specialists from the US Department of Defense.

The number of employees and the annual budget of the agency are a US state secret. There are different estimates of these figures: the number of employees at headquarters is estimated at 20-38 thousand people; In addition, about 100 thousand specialists in electronic warfare, psychological warfare and cryptography work at US military bases around the world. According to various widely varying estimates, the NSA's budget could range from $3.5 billion to $13 billion, making it the world's best-funded intelligence agency.

The training of specialists for the NSA is carried out at the National Cryptography Institute. This educational institution trains personnel not only for the NSA, but also for several other divisions of the US Department of Defense. In addition, the NSA pays for the education of its employees at leading US colleges and universities, as well as at military colleges of the Department of Defense.

The NSA, like many other intelligence agencies, has its own museum - the National Museum of Cryptography, located in a former motel near the agency's headquarters.

Mission

The mission of information security is to prevent foreign adversaries from gaining access to confidential or classified national information. The mission of electronic intelligence is to collect intelligence signals, process and disseminate intelligence information from foreign signals for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes in support of military operations. The agency also enables Warfare network operations to defeat terrorists and their organizations at home and abroad, consistent with American laws and the protection of privacy and civil liberties.

Goals and objectives

GOAL 1: Success in modern operations - incorporating wise policy decisions, effective national security actions, US freedom of action in cyberspace, exploiting the use of foreign electronic signals and systems, and information security systems used by the US and its allies to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties.

GOAL 2: Prepare for the Future - providing opportunities and solutions to the next generation that meet the challenges of tomorrow and move solutions from invention to performance in support of national security and US Government missions.

GOAL 3: Strengthening workforce competency - attracting, developing and preparing an exceptional, diverse workforce prepared to meet US cryptological challenges.

GOAL 4: Implementation of best business practices - making optimal, strategic and tactical investment decisions, ensuring organizational accountability for the implementation of these decisions and implementation associated with improved performance.

GOAL 5: Demonstrate principled performance - achieving U.S. missions with commitment through a principled and decisive approach to accomplishing assigned missions while respecting the rule of law, citizens' rights, and public trust, which must be paramount.

The NSA consists of two main directorates: the main directorate of DER, responsible for obtaining information from foreign communication channels, and the main directorate of information security, which is responsible for protecting electronic systems US communications and information system.

The department's tasks include: radio intelligence and electronic intelligence (see: en: SIGINT), protection of government information, cryptography.

Obligations to fellow citizens

“We will act with dignity to advance the rights, goals and values ​​of the nation.

We will adhere to the spirit and letter of the Constitution, laws and regulations of the United States.

We will support and protect our troops in the field.

We will fight terrorism around the world - risking our lives if necessary to preserve the nation.

We will provide our politicians, negotiators, ambassadors, law enforcement agencies, intelligence community, vital intelligence information, incl. of a military nature, so that they can protect and defend the people.

We will protect the national security networks vital to our people.

We will trust the managers of our public resources and rely on their decisions to be prudent and reasonable.

We will continually strive to ensure transparency in all of our reviews, controls and decision-making processes.

We will be responsible for our actions and take responsibility for our decisions.

We honor open government and transparent mandates by providing timely and accurate information available to the public, subject to the need to protect privacy, confidentiality, security, or other restrictions under existing laws and policies.

In order to achieve the stated goals and programs, we are collaborating with the Maryland STEM program."

Headquarters

Headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland ( 39°06′31″ n. w. 76°46′18″ W d. HGIOL), between Baltimore and Washington. Territory - 263 hectares. Fort Meade is fully capable of providing all its vital functions. It has its own power plant, television network, police, libraries, cafes, bars, various social facilities, including schools and a kindergarten. The complex's two glass buildings were built in 1984 and 1986 and are equipped with systems for protecting against enemy electronic reconnaissance. The height of the main building is 9 floors.

Story

Armed Forces Security Agency

Creation of the NSA

As a result of the investigation into the failures of the ABVS, it was decided to establish a new body with broader powers and transfer to it all electronic intelligence functions. Thus, President Truman's secret directive of October 24, 1952 established the National Security Agency. The official date of its creation is November 4, 1952. Unlike its predecessor, it reported not to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but directly to the Secretary of Defense. The creation of the NSA was kept secret and until 1957 the agency was not mentioned in any official document. It was not until 1957 that it was mentioned in the annual Directory of US Government Agencies. United States Government Manual ) as "a separately organized agency within the Department of Defense, under the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense...performing highly specialized technical functions in support of the intelligence activities of the United States."

Defectors

In 2013, American citizen Edward Snowden announced another public confirmation of the NSA's global activities, citing personal involvement in electronic espionage. In early June, Snowden gave The Guardian and The Washington Post classified NSA information regarding the total surveillance of American intelligence services over information communications between citizens of many countries around the world, using existing information and communication networks, including information about the PRISM project.

First publications

Throughout the Cold War, the NSA was hostile to attempts by writers and journalists to lift the veil of secrecy over the organization. Works on cryptography rarely appeared in the open press, since most developments were classified. When D. Kahn’s book “Code Breakers” was being prepared for publication in 1967, which contained, among other things, some information on the methods used by the NSA, the agency tried to prevent its publication. In 1982, James Bamford's book Puzzle Palace was published, the first book entirely dedicated to the NSA. For writing, the author used documents to which access was provided in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act ( Freedom of Information Act). In an attempt to prevent the book from being published, the government changed the classification of some documents. To this day, the book remains practically the only full-scale work dedicated to the NSA.

Digital Fortress is a novel by American writer Dan Brown. The book tells about the confrontation between the National Security Agency, represented by the best US cryptographer Susan Fletcher, and a mysterious attacker.

NSA Influence on Cryptography Standards

Competition AES

Perhaps due to previous discussions, the NSA's involvement in choosing a successor to DES was immediately limited to performance testing. The agency subsequently certified the algorithm to protect state secret information. The widely used hash functions SHA-1 and SHA-2 were developed by the NSA.

Dual EC DRBG

The NSA promoted the standardization of the Dual EC DRBG random number generator (RNG) in . The low performance of the algorithm and the presence of vulnerabilities in it have led some experts to believe that a “backdoor” is built into the generator, allowing the agency to gain access to information encrypted by systems using this RNG. In December 2013, Reuters reported that the NSA secretly paid RSA $10 million to make Dual EC DRBG the default in its products.

Echelon

The NSA is the primary operator of the Echelon global interception system. Echelon has an extensive infrastructure, including ground tracking stations located throughout the world. According to a report by the European Parliament, the system is capable of intercepting microwave radio transmissions, satellite communications, and mobile communications.

In the early 1990s, monitoring the territory of the “collapsed” Soviet Union, and primarily Russia, continued to be the main task of the US National Security Agency, since it was in this part of the globe that a significant nuclear potential was located. In 1990, in order to maintain its budget in changed conditions, the agency had to change the field of its activities, prioritizing the acquisition of economic rather than military data. The object of surveillance was many countries that are allies of the United States, whose banks, trading and industrial companies successfully compete in the world market with their American partners.

Other tracking programs

In April 2009, U.S. Department of Justice officials admitted that the NSA engaged in large-scale collection of information from the internal communications of U.S. citizens in excess of its authority, but argued that the actions were unintentional and have since been corrected.

Research

Research in Information and Computer Sciences

The NSA has a team of computer scientists, engineers, and mathematicians who conduct research on a wide range of problems. The agency collaborates with commercial and academic partners, as well as other government organizations, to explore new analytical methods and computing platforms.
Their research in the area includes:

• Database
• Ontology
• Artificial intelligence
• Language analytics
• Voice analytics

Simulation/Cognitive Science

Foreign analogues

• Russia: Spetsvyaz FSO Russia;
• Russia: FSB of the Russian Federation
• UK: Government Communications Centre;
• Canada: Communications Security Center;
• France: Frenchelon.

Staff

Directors

• November 1952 - November 1956 - Lieutenant General Ralph Kanin
• November 1956 - November 23, 1960 - Air Force Lieutenant General John Samford
• November 1960 - June 1962 - Vice Admiral Lawrence Frost
• July 1, 1962 - June 1, 1965 - Air Force Lieutenant General Gordon Blake
• June 1965 - March 28, 1969 - Lieutenant General Marshall Carter
• August 1969 - July 1972 - Vice Admiral Noel Gayler
• August 1972 - August 1973 - Air Force Lieutenant General Samuel Phillips
• August 1973 - July 1977 - Air Force Lieutenant General Lew Allen
• July 1977 - March 1981 - Vice Admiral Bobby Inman
• April 1981 - April 1, 1985 - Lieutenant General Lincoln Faurer of the Air Force
• April 1985 - August 1988 - Lieutenant General William Odom
• August 1988 - April 1992 - Vice Admiral William Steadman
• May 1992 - February 1996 - Vice Admiral John McConnell
• February 1996 - March 1999 - Air Force Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan
• March 1999 - April 2005 - Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Hayden
• April 2005 - April 2014 - Lieutenant General Keith Alexander
• April 2014 - present - Admiral Michael Rogers.

Notable employees

• Robert Morris
• Louis Tordella

see also

Notes

1. DAYS.RU INTERNET NEWSPAPER VERSION 5.0/USA fired the head of military intelligence
2. Schneier B. 25.1 National Security Agency// Applied cryptography. Protocols, algorithms, source texts in C language = Applied Cryptography. Protocols, Algorithms and Source Code in C. - M.: Triumph, 2002. - P. 661-663. - 816 p. - 3000 copies. - ISBN 5-89392-055-4.
3. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security / Ed. by K. Lee Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth Lerner. - 1 edition. - Gale, 2003. - Vol. 2. - P. 351-353. - ISBN 978-0-7876-7546-2.
4. Pykhalov I. V. NSA // US Intelligence Services. - St. Petersburg. : OLMA-PRESS, 2002. - ISBN 5-7654-1504-0.
5. The NSA/CSS Mission - NSA/CSS (undefined) . www.nsa.gov. Retrieved December 3, 2015.
6. US National Security Agency (undefined) Archived from the original on February 21, 2012.
7. Commitment - NSA/CSS (undefined) . www.nsa.gov. Retrieved December 6, 2015.
8. NSA Headquarters (undefined) . Agentura.ru. Retrieved November 23, 2012. Archived February 21, 2012.
9. Cold War: A Student Encyclopedia / Ed. by Spencer C. Tucker, Priscilla Mary Roberts. - ABC-clio, 2007. - Vol. 3. - P. 1447-1449. - ISBN 978-1-85109-847-7.