Sergey Naryshkin was born on October 27, 1954 in St. Petersburg. He spent his childhood in Vsevolozhsk, Leningrad region. In 1972 he graduated from school No. 190 with an artistic and aesthetic focus with a gold medal. After which he entered the Leningrad Mechanical Institute, which he successfully graduated in 1978 with the specialty “radio mechanical engineer”.

In 1982, Sergei Evgenievich was appointed assistant to the vice-rector of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute. As an expert of the State Committee on Science and Technology, he worked in the office of the economic adviser at the USSR Embassy in Belgium.

Since 1992, Naryshkin headed one of the departments of the Committee on Economics and Finance of the St. Petersburg City Hall. Three years later, in 1995, he went to work at Promstroybank in St. Petersburg as head of the external investment department.

He received additional education with a degree in economics at the St. Petersburg International Institute of Management, which he successfully graduated in 1997.

Since January 1997, he worked in the government of the Leningrad region, as head of the investment department. In 1998, he headed the Committee on Foreign Economic and International Relations of the Government of the Leningrad Region.

In February 2004, Sergei Naryshkin was appointed deputy head of the economic department of the President of the Russian Federation, and since March of the same - deputy chief of staff of the government of the Russian Federation. Six months later, on September 13, 2004, he took up the position of Chief of Staff of the Government - Minister Russian Federation.

In 2007, on February 15, Naryshkin took the post of head of the government apparatus - deputy chairman of the government of the Russian Federation. Since May 2008, he has been appointed head of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation.

Sergey Evgenievich Naryshkin was elected to the State Duma of the sixth convocation on December 4, 2011. Member of the All-Russian political party"United Russia". Since December 21, 2011 he has been the chairman State Duma sixth convocation.

After the State Duma elections, on September 22, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree appointing Naryshkin as director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. The decree came into force on October 5, 2016.

Naryshkin is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the non-profit organization "Fund modern history"and Chairman of the Board of Trustees Russian Academy national economy and civil service under the President of the Russian Federation. Chairman of the Russian Historical Society.

Has a doctorate in economics. Speaks English and French languages. Sergey Naryshkin is the author of more than 30 scientific works on current issues of state policy of attracting foreign investment.

Awarded the Medal of the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, II degree (2003), the Order of Honor (2004), the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, IV (2008) and III degree (2010), and the Order of Alexander Nevsky (2014).

Sergey Naryshkin is married, his wife Tatyana Sergeevna is a specialist in the field of information technology. The family has two children - a son and a daughter.

On December 20, 2005, the day the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service turned 85, the director of the SVR, Army General Sergei Lebedev, “revealed the secrets of his profession.” He shared these secrets in an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in which he also spoke about the everyday life of intelligence officers, touched upon issues of cooperation with other intelligence services and answered a number of questions. As the publication notes, Lebedev “spoke out unusually frankly on the most closed topics.”

Sergei Nikolaevich, our editorial office also has its own intelligence service, and it reports something. For example, we know that this year you have a personal anniversary - 30 years in foreign intelligence. What stages do you divide these 30 years of your biography into?

To be honest, I didn’t think about it. We can probably start with the German period, when in 1975 I was assigned to the German department. This period lasted for 20 years. Then my functions and tasks expanded, I was assigned to oversee Central and Eastern Europe, I was the head of the department. The third stage, perhaps, is the American period of my work. Unexpectedly, I was suddenly offered to go to the USA. I worked there for two years. And the fourth stage - as director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the most responsible, but, on the other hand, the most interesting.

It is clear that intelligence officers are reluctant to talk about themselves. How long will the veil of secrecy remain, say, over illegal immigrants?

For life.

And the relatives may not know?

Sometimes they don’t know until the end of their lives. These are the features of our work. My father died without ever knowing that I was serving in intelligence, although by that time I was already a general. He was very proud that I was a diplomat; he told everyone that his son worked at the Foreign Ministry. And my mother found out that I was a scout when I celebrated my 50th birthday. Colleagues prepared a photo montage of me in military uniform. She saw the photo and said: “I actually guessed that you were somehow connected with intelligence.”

Four years and four months - this is the length of time that Primakov and Trubnikov served as directors of the Foreign Intelligence Service before you. With what mood did you overcome this time barrier of your predecessors?

Honestly, I forgot about it suspended sentence, which expired on September 20, 2004. I was just getting ready to fly on a business trip, and suddenly in the morning they brought me a newspaper. On the first page there is my portrait and it is written: “Today is a fateful day for the director of the SVR.” I didn’t immediately understand what was going on, I thought: maybe it’s better not to fly? Then I read further and it turns out that today is four years and four months of my work as a director, and then the question is raised: will I be fired today or not. The article turned out to be good in terms of its mood and assessment of my activities. At the end there was a conclusion: apparently, they won’t remove it.

This is all the more pleasant, because personnel leapfrog is especially destructive for the special services. Moreover, the whole country experienced the destructive years of the 90s for the security forces. Although it was difficult at the beginning, when your Service was created in 1920. For a long time Soviet intelligence recognized as the best in the world. Now we are especially pleased to congratulate you on your professional holidays - the Day of the Russian Security Agency Worker and the 85th anniversary of the SVR. Do you have traditions for celebrating such dates?

We have a whole range of different celebrations planned. And it will end on December 20 with a gala evening in the Kremlin. We intend to carry out general meeting in the Service, where veterans, Heroes of the Soviet Union, Heroes of Russia, and order bearers will be invited.

We are currently holding meetings with veterans. There are Americanists, specialists in Europe, Arabists, Easterners, Westerners, etc. The atmosphere there is very warm. We nominated a number of our employees for state awards - in connection with the holiday, but for specific deeds. The decrees have already been signed. Among those awarded are those awarded the Order of Courage and medals "For Courage".

Are all your decrees closed?

What are awards for in intelligence?

For ingenuity, perseverance, courage.

Can you solve at least one case?

For example, one of our employees received the Order of Courage two years ago for his actions in ensuring the withdrawal of the Russian embassy convoy from Baghdad. You probably remember this incident, when our convoy was fired upon by the Americans. The embassy convoy was accompanied by several of our employees from the special embassy security group. The ambassador told me that these guys really showed courage. After the shelling began, our officer covered the ambassador’s car in his jeep. The ambassador was slightly wounded, but the officer was hit tangentially in the head. But he, wounded, managed to pull the ambassador out of the car. This employee was operated on in Syria, and several fragments were removed. Then there was a repeat operation in Moscow: an x-ray showed that fragments remained in the head.

Later, the ambassador told me: “The SVR officer saved my life.”

By the way, on the eve of the shooting of that embassy convoy in Iraq, a version appeared in the Russian press that diplomats would take away the archives of the Iraqi special services. Was this really the case?

I can definitely say that this is complete nonsense. But the appearance of such a version undoubtedly created a stir around the column. And I am personally convinced that that provocative publication could serve as the basis for an attack on the convoy.

Do you think it is possible to unite the Russian intelligence services? Now the border guards have returned under the wing of the FSB. Is it permissible to merge the SVR with the FSB or is it fundamentally impossible?

Discussions on this topic do not stop. There are both supporters of unification and opponents. I think that this is not the main thing. It's not a matter of form, but of content. Intelligence services can actively interact and cooperate quite effectively when located in different departments. The closest interaction between the SVR, FSB, GRU, FSO is the main principle. No competition - only constructive, friendly cooperation.

I think it is necessary to maintain the existing structure of separate existence of the intelligence services. The past 14 years have confirmed the effectiveness of the activities of the Russian special services in a separate version. The practice of the leading countries of the world also speaks of the advisability of maintaining such a scheme.

What is the relationship between the Foreign Intelligence Service and foreign intelligence services? Who do you consider the main competitor among the world's intelligence services? What could we learn and what could the relevant intelligence services learn from us?

We maintain partnerships with intelligence services of more than 70 countries. We have good contacts with both intelligence services and counterintelligence. First of all, these are, of course, the intelligence services of the leading countries of the world: the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, China, India, and Arab states. We have a common task - the fight against international terrorism. And in contacts with the heads of Western intelligence services, I constantly say: look what is happening in the world. Terrorists unite and create international terrorist groups. Organized crime is uniting. The drug business is united into international syndicates. Weapon smuggling is taking place again international groups. Therefore, God himself ordered the intelligence services to join forces to counter the listed threats. There are also new areas of cooperation. For example, the issue of environmental safety is now becoming increasingly important.

The recent man-made accident in China on the Songhua River is on everyone's lips. Did you have any operational information about this incident?

In this particular case, no. We simply could not have such information, because it was not sabotage, not a terrorist attack, but an unexpected accident.

But when we talk about environmental safety in a broad sense, is this kind of information from intelligence also meant?

Certainly. If chemical or other weapons are being tested somewhere or dangerous developments are underway that could lead to a serious environmental threat, of course, we are obliged to monitor these processes.

Do your foreign colleagues also report to their centers about how Russia plans to build, for example, an oil pipeline along Lake Baikal?

Many foreign intelligence services are closely monitoring our most important technical projects. This is the usual work of intelligence agencies.

These days, all of Europe is excited by sensational news that there were secret CIA prisons in Poland and Romania. What data does Russian intelligence have on this matter?

We have some information, but I wouldn’t say anything specific.

And yet, what do you personally think: is there any basis for such suspicions among the world community?

I believe there are reasons. It is not for nothing that leading European politicians are discussing this topic with alarm.

According to the 1992 Almaty agreement, the intelligence services of the CIS countries do not work against each other. But today, when Georgia and Ukraine are joining NATO, does this postulate remain relevant? This is not an idle question, because today all unbiased observers understand that in Ukraine there was not a struggle between political strategists, but a struggle between the special services. Under these conditions, is your agreement still valid?

Remains with all CIS countries. Both with Ukraine and with Georgia. Moreover, it was updated in 2000. And cooperation with the intelligence services of the CIS countries continues. We cooperate closely, first of all, of course, in the fight against terrorism and extremism.

So, political changes do not affect your relations with former colleagues of the former USSR?

Of course, we cannot be aloof from political events, which in a certain way influence our activities. For example, the active rapprochement of some CIS countries with NATO will, unfortunately, force us to reconsider certain aspects of our cooperation.

But you yourself said that your Service cooperates with the intelligence services of NATO countries...

Yes, but not as deeply and confidentially as with the intelligence services of the CIS countries.

And what does the experience of interaction or competition between the intelligence services of the youngest NATO members - the Baltic states - show? How dangerous competitors have the intelligence services of these states now become? Have they become a springboard for NATO intelligence services?

We do not consider them as opponents. The intelligence services of these countries, naturally, have intensified their interaction with the intelligence services of NATO countries and operate in close contact with them. At the same time, I don't think they pose any serious threat to Russia, although we know that they are working against us.

The conclusion of an important strategic, economic, and political agreement on the construction of the Russia-Germany gas pipeline is also facilitated by the emergence of serious problems. Since the First World War, the Baltic seabed has been the world's dumping ground. Dump of sunken ships and submarines. And the saddest thing is chemical weapons. To what extent does the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service help ensure the future environmental safety of the oil pipeline along the Baltic seabed, who are your partners?

The Foreign Intelligence Service is not directly involved in this problem, although we are monitoring this topic. According to our estimates, the statements that there is a landfill there and the entire bottom is strewn with chemical charges, bombs, and so on are an exaggeration. In addition, in anticipation of the construction of routes, the necessary surveys will be carried out. We believe that if all required construction standards are observed, there is no environmental hazard when laying the route. There is a certain risk, but this risk is completely surmountable, it is predictable, and it can be avoided.

The topic of environmental threat is sometimes artificially promoted by opponents of the construction of this gas pipeline. It is no secret that, first of all, Poland and the Baltic states feel offended and deliberately exaggerate this threat. By the way, recently a scientific institute in Rostock (Germany) conducted preliminary studies and published results that confirm our conclusions that if there is an environmental risk, it is minimal.

Recently the whole world watched almost live loud scandal in the United States, when a senior official in the presidential administration revealed to reporters the name of a career CIA employee. How are things going with us? Do we have any punishment for disclosing the names of intelligence officers?

We have a law that provides criminal penalty for disclosing information about an intelligence officer. And about the source. But, unfortunately, this law has not yet been applied and not a single case has been brought to court. Although some intelligence officers were exposed precisely as a result of chatter. And, to be honest, when I learned about this situation in the United States, as the head of intelligence, I thought: why don’t we also use our legislation properly?

Why do we need a law for a particular case?

Don't tell me. By naming an intelligence officer, people cause enormous damage to both intelligence and the state.

Firstly, this person will no longer be able to properly perform his functions; he often becomes restricted from traveling abroad and is incapacitated as an intelligence officer. Secondly, foreign intelligence services immediately begin checking all his connections: where he worked, with whom he met. Analysis of connections can lead to sources, and therefore many other people may suffer. Thirdly, when revealing an intelligence officer, officials and journalists do not think about the fate of this person. After all, he has a family, children. He made his life plans. He was, as is quite often the case, a good, capable diplomat, businessman, and journalist. And suddenly the talker deals a blow to his career. We have been preparing a scout for a very long time. Before hiring a person, we study him for three or four years, evaluate his intelligence, moral and volitional qualities, and communication skills. Then we seriously prepare for several years. And suddenly, because of some chatter, years of preparation, money spent on training and education, are down the drain.

Maybe sometimes people act with the best intentions or out of stupidity, and not at all out of a desire to annoy the intelligence services?

What's the difference? I am sometimes surprised by the presentation of material about our intelligence officers. Yes, there are failures and failures, as in any profession. And it becomes offensive when the phrases “a Russian spy has been exposed again” appear in Russian newspapers. Well, why "spy"? After all, these are our intelligence officers, they work in the interests of our country. This is a matter of patriotism.

Some say: how can it be, you are engaged in illegal activities, you are spies. By the way, in the West, when I worked in the USA, my American partners told me: “It’s time for you to stop intelligence activities in the USA. You are distracting a lot of FBI employees, and instead of fighting terrorists and criminals, we are forced to monitor you Stop it." I always answered: “Gentlemen, I agree, but on a mutual basis. I know that there are much more American intelligence officers in Russia than ours here.”

That's it, after that the conversation immediately ended. What happens, they can conduct intelligence activities against us, but we have no right?

Do you think it is possible today to effectively fight terrorism only within the legal framework?

When there is a life-or-death struggle, unfortunately, all sorts of situations arise. If they act against us using illegal methods, then as an exception, in self-defense, we are sometimes forced to respond to terrorists with their own weapons. I can assume that when the special forces released the hostages at Dubrovka or Beslan, they had no time to think about how legal their actions were in relation to terrorists.

From time to time, campaigns of spy mania are launched abroad with accusations against the Russian special services. Is there a reason for this?

Quite often, such campaigns are “custom-made”, initiated by opponents of the development of relations with Russia, and aim to undermine bilateral cooperation. Unfortunately, it has become a rule to frighten the average person abroad with “Russian spies” who allegedly infiltrated all departments. There are cases when local counterintelligence agencies deliberately exaggerate the “Russian spy threat” in order to show their need, expand staff or improve funding. Here is one example. In 1992, I was working in Germany, and suddenly the German intelligence services gave us a list of Russian intelligence officers allegedly operating on German territory. By the way, I was in it too. But I got on the list for good reason. And a good third of those accused had nothing to do with intelligence. For example, ambassadors were enrolled there. But this is absurd! German intelligence officers, of course, knew that these people were not intelligence officers. A number of journalists, businessmen, and diplomats were also included in the list - 162 people in total. And the explanation for this was simple then. Soviet Union collapsed, the Warsaw Pact collapsed, the GDR disappeared, and German counterintelligence officers did not want staff reductions due to the disappearance of the external enemy. It was necessary to justify the necessity of its existence.

How about Iran? Does it have a military nuclear program? How likely is it that US force will be used against him?

We are closely watching what is happening around Iran. And we report this to management. We are not indifferent to how events will develop. But we do not yet have information that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Accordingly, there is no justification for the use of force against Iran.

Is this why we serve as Iran's lawyer in the international arena?

We are not lawyers. We are simply reporting the real situation. We were not lawyers for, for example, Saddam Hussein. We simply said that, unlike the Americans and the British, we have no information about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in this country. We had no information that Saddam Hussein supported international terrorists. And we turned out to be right then. We are simply giving an objective picture of the state of affairs.

Since we are talking about threats, I would like to summarize the topic of threats to Russia’s national security. Name the main external threats to our country.

Today the biggest threat to us is the threat of stocks international terrorism against Russia both on our territory and against Russian citizens Abroad. It also seems to me that we must seriously think about ensuring the economic security of Russia. Otherwise, we will not be masters in our own state. Fortunately, I can confirm that the President and the current leadership of the country are taking active steps to prevent key areas of our economy from falling under foreign control.

How has the foreign intelligence mentality changed in market conditions? How do you cooperate with commercial structures and advise them when concluding contracts?

I want to say that there is a mutual change in mentality here. Many structures began to behave more respectably: like a state. And intelligence changed its attitude towards them. In 2000-2001, the President of the Russian Federation repeatedly said at various meetings that we must change our attitude towards private business. Do not continue to view businessmen as thieves, exploiters and robbers. If government agencies abroad protect national business, then we should do the same. By the way, there should be a counter-movement of business. I remember the 90s. I worked abroad. Many business representatives did not want to have any contact with the embassies of their homeland. Moreover, they even hid their trips, mainly because the business was not entirely clean. And businessmen were afraid that suddenly some of their meetings and transactions would become the property of the intelligence services. At the same time, domestic technologies that cost millions were sold for pennies. Now the situation has changed, the business has become mature and respectable, and no longer shuns either the special services or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, we protect and support our business, which demonstrates a state approach and acts in the interests of Russia.

Three years ago, you told our newspaper that $4 billion was raised from the sale of Russian weapons. An even larger amount is expected this year. What is the Service's role in arms deals?

I can confirm that the Foreign Intelligence Service helps Rosoboronexport and the military-industrial complex. We give recommendations on where there is a need for certain types of weapons, where it is possible to sell what types of weapons more profitably and at what prices.

So you are entitled to your legal interest. What is the budget of the Foreign Intelligence Service?

Sufficient.

So now the intelligence officer does not choose between the Motherland and the dollar, as before? Have funding problems been resolved?

We are now sufficiently funded. The salary is normal.

We just received a letter from a reader who is interested in the salary of an intelligence officer. Satisfy your curiosity?

In 2000, we experienced certain difficulties with financial support, and young employees especially suffered. But now, in my opinion, we get enough for a scout to be able to support his family at the proper level, dress and eat normally. But if a candidate comes to us and immediately starts talking about money, then we tell him that he has come to the wrong address.

What if this is just a cynical professional who does a great job, but wants to be paid decently for it?

A cynical professional will work for us today. But tomorrow, just as cynically, he will be able to switch to another “employer” who will offer him more.

Are you uncomfortable among journalists or should a real intelligence officer feel good everywhere?

I won’t hide the fact that I internally feel some tension from the presence of cameras here. Of course, this is due to the specifics of intelligence work. In addition, you have to carefully think through the answers to questions that are sometimes too direct and inconvenient for the intelligence officer. Although in general you are right: a scout should feel confident in any situation and in any environment.

We can hardly imagine an ignorant intelligence officer. What else should a scout be like?

I always draw the attention of our young employees to the fact that they need to constantly work on themselves. We cannot stand still. You need to read a lot every day, keep abreast of affairs and events. You must be able to present in conversations the broad information that the intelligence officer has in an accessible form so that it is interesting to talk with him. When our academy trains intelligence officers to work abroad, they are told: the main thing is to find an interesting foreigner who would have and share information. And I always add that an equally important task is to become an interesting interlocutor for a foreigner. Because no person will date you if they are not interested in you.

A scout must be sociable, have self-control and quick reaction, and be capable of analysis. And, of course, he must be devoted to his homeland and his intelligence service.

Every profession has age limits. For example, you cannot become a good musician after 30 years if you have not studied music before. Is there an age limit for a scout? After what age can you become a scout?

There are no qualifications when hiring us. Although you are right that a person really masters knowledge better at a young age. That's why we try to hire young people.

Is it true that intelligence officers are not sent on business trips abroad if they do not have their own apartment in their homeland?

Yes, there is such a rule. I believe that it should be implemented. I myself worked abroad and I know that it is very important for a person to feel that he has his own corner, somewhere to return. This is an important psychological factor.

And yet, how to become a scout? Where can a person come, what door can he knock on?

We have addresses. Has its own website.

We found out that people don’t come to you mainly for a salary? And then for what?

First of all, this is a craving for interesting work, a sense of romance, a desire to serve the Motherland.

Are romantics really coming to you?

Although this sounds somewhat pretentious, it is true. There are people who come to us after reading books about intelligence officers. I urge department heads not to kill their sense of romance with the prose of everyday work that is present in every profession.

Accordingly, as a romantic, any intelligence officer, including you, should feel nostalgia for places of military glory? Do you often think about Germany?

There is nostalgia for the places where I started working. This is typical for all intelligence officers, and not just for Germanists. The famous intelligence officer Vadim Alekseevich Kirpichenko, whom we saw off on his last journey the other day, told me about his first trip abroad to Yemen. Desert, heat. But he had very fond memories of Yemen. This is the first touch to foreign countries, to the intelligence profession. Yes, for me Germany was such a country. But I know colleagues who remember Ethiopia, Mongolia, and other countries with the same warmth... Americanists love the USA very much. The country is very interesting, I can confirm.

Is it true that the film “Seventeen Moments of Spring” was shown at your academy as a teaching aid?

As a teaching aid - no. Although the scouts love this movie.

And also to the question of romance. Previously, there were patriotic films “Dead Season”, “Shield and Sword”, “Seventeen Moments of Spring”. Are there plans now, when our cinema is emerging from stagnation, of similar films with the participation of intelligence consultants?

Films are being made. And I would like those people who are going to make these films to invite consultants from the SVR. Because, frankly, sometimes they show such nonsense about intelligence.

Allow me a few more questions in blitz mode. Do you have a bust of Dzerzhinsky at your site?

Yes, I won’t hide it.

What intelligence service do you consider to be the best in the world?

I can’t single out just one as a standard. The more powerful the state, the more effective its intelligence. The leading countries of the world have strong intelligence services, each of them has its own achievements.

Whether there is a nuclear bomb from North Korea?

We don't have such data.

Did you try to poison Berezovsky?

That's bullshit.

Stirlitz is a collective image. And if he existed in reality, who would he be - an employee of the GRU or the SVR?

I think he could be both a GRU employee and ours. In the history of both intelligence services there are many talented intelligence officers who performed similar functions. The same Sorge was a GRU intelligence officer. And Abel is our intelligence officer.

The well-known Kalugin has now gone so far as to conduct excursions in America costing $55 to the places of his “military glory.” What do you think of it?

In intelligence, such people are treated not only with condemnation, but also with contempt. It’s immediately obvious that the person has sold out. How can you treat a corrupt person?

A number of intelligence agencies, for example, your colleagues from the CIA and the BND, have opened a store where they sell underwear with their emblem. Is there anywhere I can buy a souvenir with the SVR emblem?

We have souvenirs with the SVR emblem. But they are not for sale. We give them.

It is considered the date of foundation of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR of Russia), which is integral part security forces and is designed to protect the security of individuals, society and the state from external threats.

The SVR carries out intelligence activities in order to provide the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly and the government with the intelligence information they need to make decisions in the political, economic, military-strategic, scientific, technical and environmental fields; ensuring conditions conducive to the successful implementation of the Russian Federation's security policy; assistance economic development, scientific and technological progress of the country and military-technical security of the Russian Federation.

Intelligence information is provided to the President of the Russian Federation, the chambers of the Federal Assembly, the Government of the Russian Federation and federal executive and judicial authorities, enterprises, institutions and organizations determined by the President.

General management of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation (including the SVR) is exercised by the President of the Russian Federation. He appoints the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

The activities of the SVR are based on the federal law “On Foreign Intelligence” of January 10, 1996 (with subsequent amendments).

It is impossible to establish the exact time when intelligence operations began in Russia to obtain political and military information. Reconnaissance was carried out almost always. The date of birth of the foreign intelligence service of the Russian Federation is considered to be December 20, 1920, when the chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) Felix Dzerzhinsky signed an order to create the Foreign Department of the VChK (INO VChK) under the NKVD of the RSFSR.

With this order, the Foreign Department, created in the spring of 1920 in the Special Department of the Cheka in order to strengthen intelligence work abroad, was removed from its composition and became an independent unit.

To discuss emerging problems and develop intelligence policy in relation to the current situation, the SVR Board regularly meets, including deputy directors of foreign intelligence, heads of operational, analytical and functional units.

The efforts of the Foreign Intelligence Service are concentrated on the timely identification of real external threats to the interests and security of Russia, participation in their neutralization, and ensuring the strengthening of the country’s international positions, its economic, scientific, technical and defense potential.

Over the years of the existence of Soviet and Russian foreign intelligence, many bright, successful operations were carried out. A prominent place in its chronicle is occupied by the many years of effective work of the “Cambridge Five”, the exploits of Soviet intelligence officers during the Great Patriotic War, and the selfless activities of the “Red Chapel” in Hitler's Germany, operations to facilitate the creation of the USSR nuclear shield, as well as many others, carried out both in the post-war years and at a later time. A large number of foreign intelligence officers were awarded high state awards.

The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources

Every full-fledged state must have special services that engage in intelligence activities outside their countries. There is such a service in Russia. It is called the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR RF). For obvious reasons, this service is strictly classified, and therefore it is possible to learn about its specific activities and achieved results only in general terms.

Stages of formation of the Russian foreign intelligence service

It is generally accepted that the history of Russian foreign intelligence begins in the 20s of the last century. It was then that a special division was created within the structure of the Cheka, called the Foreign Department (INO). His main task was to create residencies and intelligence networks outside Soviet Russia. At that time, domestic foreign intelligence officers considered the White Guards who had taken refuge in various foreign countries as their main enemy.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet foreign intelligence, for obvious reasons, began to act differently. At that time, her activities could be divided into two areas. The first direction was that employees operated in the rear and headquarters of Nazi Germany and its allies, obtaining important military information, and thereby contributing to the overall victory. The second direction of Russian foreign intelligence in those years was organizing sabotage behind enemy lines and conducting combat operations.

When did the Great End Patriotic War and the Cold War broke out, Soviet foreign intelligence officers were actively operating in Western countries, obtaining valuable secret and operational information for the country. It was during this period that the country and the whole world were able to learn the names of some of the most outstanding Soviet intelligence officers, such as Rudolf Abel.

In 1991, when the Soviet Union was reaching its end last days, and in its place new sovereign states were formed (including Russia), the Central Intelligence Service was formed, soon called the Foreign Intelligence Service. Simultaneously with the renaming, the tasks of Russian foreign intelligence partially changed. It was announced that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service will no longer seek to penetrate all countries, but will work only where the interests of the Russian Federation may be present. In addition, at the same time it was stated that the new Russian foreign intelligence service should no longer enter into confrontation with similar services of Western countries, but, on the contrary, cooperate with them in every possible way.

To what extent and in what direction the guidelines, tasks and goals of Russian foreign intelligence have changed at this time is difficult to say due to the secrecy of this service. However, former SVR Colonel Stanislav Lunev recently openly stated that the SVR is currently working against the United States much more actively than it was during the Cold War. These words of a retired colonel can be found in the public domain. These same words were indirectly confirmed in 1996 by an employee of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service who fled to England and gave Western intelligence agencies the coordinates of more than a thousand secret Russian intelligence officers.

Who runs the Foreign Intelligence Service

Over the entire existence of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (since the 20s of the last century), a total of 33 people were at the head of this organization. History has preserved some names of leaders, while others are known only to a very narrow circle. Some of the leaders lasted long enough in their leadership positions for a long time, others - literally several months, or even weeks. Some of the leaders later went to other services or retired, others were arrested and shot.

Currently, the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service is Sergei Evgenievich Naryshkin. Officially, his position is called Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. This position corresponds to the rank of army general. The right to appoint the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service is exclusively vested in the President of Russia. The Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service is accountable to him for his service, and he can remove the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service from his position. Army General Naryshkin is the thirty-fourth head of Russian foreign intelligence. The headquarters of this federal service is located in the Moscow region, its press center is located in Moscow.

General information about the structure of the SVR

In its activities, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service is guided by the federal law “On Foreign Intelligence”. In accordance with the law, the structure of the SVR consists of:

• Mining apparatus. The employees of this unit are entrusted with the task of collecting information of interest;
• Analytical apparatus. Here employees analyze the information obtained;
• Operational and technical services;
• Support services;
• In addition, the structure includes a system for training personnel.

According to the assurances of the leading officials of the Foreign Intelligence Service, such a structure is not frozen. On the contrary, it is quite flexible and can change in connection with new tasks and changes in the environment.

More information about the activities of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service

1. The political direction of Russian intelligence. The responsibility of employees in this area is to obtain all kinds of information relating to one or another aspect of the policies pursued by the governments of other countries. Foreign policy guidelines, intentions and draft laws of foreign governments are of primary interest to employees in this area. In addition, Russian intelligence officers collect information about the plans and specific activities of foreign and international social and political structures (parties, social movements etc.), and, in addition, plans, intentions and specific actions of leading foreign politicians and public figures. Of course, all this is done in order to ensure Russia’s interests;
2. Analytical and research direction. Here the information received is processed, analyzed and summarized, analytical documents are prepared on one or another important issue, relating, first of all, to all sorts of global international processes and phenomena. After processing, analytical findings are presented to senior officials of the Russian state;
3. Economic direction. Based on the name, the main interest of this service is everything related to the economies of other countries, foreign economic structures and financial institutions. Employees in this area are interested in what is happening in the commodity markets, in the foreign exchange and metal markets, etc. The task of economic intelligence officers also includes creating favorable conditions for Russia, under which Russia could achieve success in foreign economic activity;
4. Scientific and technical direction. Here employees are called upon to find proactive information about all sorts of technical and scientific innovations. Of primary interest are various innovations associated with the invention of new weapons;
5. Foreign Intelligence Service. The first responsibility of this service is to ensure the safe stay of Russian officials and citizens abroad. The Foreign Intelligence Service counters the intelligence services of other countries, as well as criminal structures that could harm the country. Recently, this service has also been confronting organized international criminal communities (drug trafficking, terrorism, illegal distribution of all types of weapons, human trafficking, etc.).

Powers of the Foreign Intelligence Service

The SVR has many specific powers that are vested in it by federal legislation:

• The right to recruit agents, involving in cooperation persons who voluntarily agreed to this;
• Encrypt your employees without disclosing where and who they actually work with;
• Issue special documents to encrypted employees stating that they work in institutions and companies that are not related to the SVR;
• Carrying out intelligence activities, the service interacts with federal executive authorities at all levels, if the need arises;
• Ensures the safety of state secrets and prevents their leakage;
• Ensures the safe stay of Russian officials and other citizens of the Russian Federation during their stay outside Russia;
• Maintains the safety of persons admitted to state secrets during their foreign business trips;
• The service has the right to interact with similar services of other states. The procedure for such interaction is specified in Russian federal laws;
• Has the right to create special educational institutions, institutions where the qualifications of its employees are improved, to establish research institutes, archives, and to publish special printed publications;
• Ensures own safety in accordance with current legislation;
• The service can create all kinds of organizational structures if it believes that they will help it more effectively fulfill the responsibilities assigned to the service.

All of the above powers are legally enshrined in federal law"On foreign intelligence."

Protection of Foreign Intelligence Service employees by law

The state provides protection for all categories of SVR employees. No one other than their immediate superiors has the right to interfere with the official activities of SVR employees or interfere with the performance of their official duties. This is stated in the aforementioned law “On Foreign Intelligence”.

The same applies to persons who confidentially cooperate with the Foreign Intelligence Service. Any information about such persons, as well as all the nuances associated with cooperation, are state secrets and can never be declassified. If necessary, such persons, as well as members of their families, may be placed under special protection.

How can you become an SVR employee?

To become an intelligence officer, you must graduate from a special educational institution - the Foreign Intelligence Academy. The requirements for future intelligence officers are as follows:

• Age from 22 to 30 years;
• Higher humanitarian or technical education;
• Excellent physical health;
• Absence of C grades and “failures” during final year studies educational institution, where the candidate for intelligence officer received his higher education;
• Extraordinary ability to foreign languages;
• Excellent knowledge of the Russian language;
• High general educational, scientific, technical, political and general cultural preparation;
• Sincere patriotism;
• A sincere and justified desire to work in intelligence;
• The ability to think logically both orally and in writing, as well as the ability to clearly express thoughts on paper;
• Lack of psychological changes (extremism, adventurism, religious extremism).

After passing a medical and psychological examination, candidates for admission to the Academy appear before a special commission, which, as a result of an interview, determines how well the candidate speaks Russian, as well as what his abilities in foreign languages ​​are. Based on the results of the interview, the commission issues a conclusion, which indicates the positive as well as negative aspects of the candidate. The candidate then receives advice on how best to eliminate it negative properties, after which the commission’s decision on admitting the candidate to study at the academy is announced, or the candidate is reasonably denied enrollment.

The current state of the Foreign Intelligence Service

As domestic experts testify, currently the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service is at its best. To prove their words, they give the following arguments.

Firstly, the SVR managed to avoid the reorganizations that other Russian security forces underwent. Secondly, the professionalism of Russian intelligence officers for last years rose extremely high level. Currently, the Foreign Intelligence Service is a highly professional, law-abiding structure not influenced by any particular ideology, capable of performing tasks of the highest level.

Chiefs of Soviet foreign intelligence Antonov Vladimir Sergeevich

Chapter 13. LEADERS OF THE SVR OF RUSSIA (BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION)

Chapter 13. LEADERS OF THE SVR OF RUSSIA (BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION)