Pressure drop in the brake line of a freight train. Procedure in case of signs of violation of the integrity of the train brake line

2.1. The main reasons for the drop in pressure in the brake line of a train are:

Disconnection of brake hoses or other violation of the integrity of the brake line on a train;

Breakage (self-release) of the automatic coupler in the train;

Derailment of rolling stock with violation of the integrity of the brake line;

Stop valve failure on a passenger train.

2.2. Signs of a drop in pressure in the train brake line are:

Reduction in speed that does not correspond to the track profile;

Frequent activation of compressors;

Rapid decrease in pressure in the main tanks after turning off the compressors when sandboxes and hyphons are not working;

Triggering of the brake line rupture alarm with sensor No. 418.
The main control over the integrity of the train's brake line is carried out by the driver using control devices located in the control cabin.

2.3. Procedure for a train driver to act in the event of a drop in pressure in the brake line of a passenger train, MBPS.

If the pressure in the brake line of a passenger (mail and luggage, freight-passenger) train or MVPS drops, the driver must apply emergency braking by placing the driver's crane handle in the emergency braking position, and the auxiliary brake handle in the extreme braking position until a complete stop. When applying emergency braking in mandatory a sand supply system must be used under wheelsets. The supply of sand must be stopped at a speed of 10 km/h.

2.4. The procedure for a driver's actions in the event of a drop in pressure in the brake line of a freight train.

If, when a freight train is moving, its speed does not decrease without activating the brakes, but there are signs of a possible rupture of the brake line, the driver must immediately turn off the traction, move the handle of the driver's crane to position III for 5-7 seconds (overlap without power) and observe the pressure in the brake line, while:

If there is a rapid and continuous drop in pressure in the brake line or a sharp deceleration in the movement of the train that does not correspond to the track profile, perform service braking, after which the driver's crane handle is moved to the IG position and the train is stopped without using the locomotive's auxiliary brake;

If there is no rapid and continuous decrease in pressure in the brake line and a sharp deceleration of the train, perform service braking by the amount of the first stage, then release the brakes in the prescribed manner;

In the event of repeated braking of the train due to spontaneous activation of the automatic brakes in the train, perform braking and release the automatic brakes in the established order, informing the DNC or DSP about this and declare a control check of the automatic brakes, coordinating with the DNC station for its implementation.



2.5. The procedure for transmitting information about a train stopping due to a drop in pressure in the brake line.

When a train is forced to stop due to a drop in pressure in the brake line, the driver (driver's assistant) is obliged to announce in the established manner by radio the place and reason for stopping the train, indicating the lack of information about the presence of the rolling stock gauge.

2.6. The procedure for inspecting the train composition.

When the train stops due to a drop in pressure in the brake line, the driver must send an assistant driver to inspect the train, having previously instructed him on the procedure.

Before leaving to inspect the train, the assistant driver must:

Write down the number of the tail car from the brake certificate, form VU-45;

Take signaling accessories with you and a flashlight at night;
- when stopping a freight train on an unfavorable profile, take a brake shoe to secure the cars;

To determine the cause of the pressure drop in the brake line, inspect the entire train;

Having reached the last car, check it with the number indicated in the certificate of form VU-45, make sure that there are tail signals on the car, and also that the end valve is in the closed position, and the brake line hose is suspended on a bracket (in a passenger train, additionally check with the conductor of the tail car).

Inspection of a passenger train is carried out jointly with the train manager or train electrician.

2.7. Procedure in case of disconnection of brake hoses or other violation of the integrity of the brake line on a train.

If a disconnection of the brake hoses is detected, the locomotive crew is obliged to:

Inspect them, replace them if necessary (remove them from the tail car or locomotive) and connect them, making sure that the number of the tail car corresponds to the number indicated in the certificate of form VU-45;

Perform a short brake test.

If a violation of the integrity of the train brake line is detected due to a malfunction of the brake equipment of the cars and the impossibility of eliminating it, the locomotive crew is obliged to:

In agreement with the DSC, order an auxiliary locomotive from the tail of the train to remove the tail section from the stage, or request carriage workers to eliminate the malfunction;

If the end valve to the faulty car is closed, secure the tail part of the train from the faulty car in accordance with the fastening standard.

2.8. Procedure for detecting a train disconnection (break).

If during inspection of the train a self-release or broken automatic couplers are detected,

the assistant driver is obliged;

Take measures to secure the uncoupled part of the train by laying brake shoes on the side of the slope and activating the existing ones hand brakes freight cars, according to fastening standards;

On a passenger train, through the car conductors, activate the hand brakes of each car of the uncoupled part;

Make sure that the number of the last car of the uncoupled group corresponds to the number indicated in the certificate of form VU-45;

Report to the driver about the securing of uncoupled cars, the distance between them, the condition of their automatic couplers and brake hoses.

After receiving information from the assistant driver, the driver coordinates further actions with the DNC.

In case of self-uncoupling, the locomotive crew is obliged to:

If possible, connect the train with a settling speed of the head of the train of no more than 3 km/h;
- replace damaged brake hoses with spare ones, and if they are missing, remove them from the tail car or front beam of the locomotive;

After the train has been coupled, perform a short test of the brakes based on the action of the brakes of the two tail cars.

The procedure for further actions in the event of a train disconnection (break) is determined by paragraphs 7.9. - 7.13. IDP.

If it is impossible to connect the train, the driver is obliged to request an auxiliary locomotive at the rear of the train.

When withdrawing part of a train from a section, it is necessary to protect the tail car of the withdrawn part of the train with an unfurled yellow flag at the buffer beam on the right side, and at night with a yellow light from a lamp and write down the numbers of the tail cars of the remaining part of the train and the withdrawn part.

In the event of a break in the automatic coupling devices of wagons, the driver is obliged to order a control check of the brakes.

2.9. Procedure for detecting rolling stock derailment.

If a rolling stock derailment is detected, the assistant driver is obliged to immediately secure the tail section of the train in accordance with the securing standards, fencing the derailment site in accordance with the fencing standards and report to the train driver.

The train driver, having received information about the rolling stock derailment, is obliged to:

Turn on the red lights of the buffer lights;

Provide train fencing in accordance with the established procedure;

Report to the DNC (chipboards limiting the stretch);

after a personal inspection of the derailment site, transfer the following information to the DNC (chipboards limiting the stretch): are there any casualties, the presence of clearance on the adjacent track,

indicate exactly at which kilometer and picket the derailment occurred, the nature of the terrain, whether there are any approaches to the railway track,

how many units of rolling stock derailed (is there a locomotive derailment),

data on the state of the contact network and contact network supports;

In the future, follow the instructions of the DNC.

2.10. Procedure for detecting a failure of the stop valve on a passenger train.

If, during an inspection of a passenger train, it turns out that the pressure drop in the brake line was due to the failure of the stop valve, then no further inspection is carried out. The locomotive driver acts on the basis of the decision on further travel made by the train manager. The locomotive driver must receive a report in the established form, which is drawn up by the head of the train on the fact and reasons for the failure of the stop valve.

3. The procedure to take if a malfunction is detected is a “push” along the way.

3.1. If a lateral, vertical “push” is detected along the route, the train driver is obliged to:

Apply service braking and carefully monitor the condition of the rolling stock until the train stops;

If, while traveling with a train, a track malfunction is detected that directly poses a threat to traffic safety (rail bending, track erosion, landslide, snow drift, track overshoot, etc.), apply emergency braking, taking all possible measures to stop the train to a dangerous place;

Immediately notify via train radio communication to the drivers following an oncoming or oncoming train (when a threat is created to the safety of traffic on an adjacent track), the chipboard limiting the stretch, or the DNC in the form:

"Attention, attention! Listen, everyone! I, driver (last name) of train N.... on.....

km of picket detected a “shock” (lateral, vertical or knock, etc.) when

speed...... km/h. I have no information about the presence of clearance on the adjacent track

(or available)".

When traveling with a passenger train, convey information about the reason for the stop to the head of the train.

Receive confirmation that the information about the “push” was perceived by drivers following oncoming and oncoming trains, as well as by the chipboard limiting the stretch.

3.2. The DSP, having received a message from the driver about the presence of a “push” on the way, is obliged to stop sending passing trains to the stage along the specified track, and report the “push” on the way to the drivers of the trains sent from the station earlier and to the road foreman (track foreman).

3.3. After a passenger train stops, its inspection is carried out by the driver together with the train manager. Inspection of other trains is carried out by the train driver.

3.4. If during inspection of the train no faults are found in the locomotive, cars and track underneath the train, after the DSP report on the inspection results, movement is allowed at a speed of no more than 20 km/h. After passing the dangerous place, the entire train proceeds at the set speed.

3.5. If the cause of the shock was: a broken rail, track erosion, a collapse, track overshoot and other track faults that threaten the safety of train traffic, further movement of the train through a dangerous place is permitted only after inspection of this place by a track worker (not lower than the foreman position) and mandatory recording by him in the form DU-61 about the possibility of proceeding to a dangerous place, indicating the speed of movement.

If the train is stopped at a broken rail, on which, according to the conclusion of the track foreman (entry in the warning form for train DU-6]), it is possible for a train to pass, then only the first train is allowed to pass along it. Passage of trains on a broken rail within a bridge or tunnel is prohibited in all cases.
In the event of an obstacle (track erosion, landslide, snow drift, fallen load, etc.) on an adjacent track, the driver must give a general alarm signal (one long and three short) and organize its fencing in accordance with the requirements of clause 3.16 of the Signaling Instructions on railways Russian Federation dated May 26, 2000 No. TsRB-757.

3.6. The train driver who discovers a track fault, in the event of a radio communication fault, is obliged to take all possible measures to transmit the relevant information to the DSP or DNC. In exceptional cases, it is allowed to use cellular communications.

3.7. Drivers behind moving trains, having received information about the “push”, are obliged to:

Stop the train near the indicated location of the obstacle, make sure that further travel is possible, and proceed to this location with the entire train at a speed that ensures the safety of train movement, but not more than 20 km/h.

Report any malfunctions identified at the site of the obstacle via radio to the drivers behind the moving trains and the chipboard, and if a malfunction is detected that threatens traffic safety, stop the train and resume movement only after this malfunction is eliminated by the track workers.

3.8. The road foreman, or in his absence, the track foreman on the first train leaving the station, goes to the stage and takes the necessary measures to eliminate the malfunction.

2.1. The main causes of pressure drop in the brake line
trains are:

Disconnection of brake hoses or other damage to integrity
brake line in the train;

Breakage (self-release) of the automatic coupler in the train;

Derailment of rolling stock with violation of the integrity of the brake line;

Stop valve failure on a passenger train.

2.2. Signs of a drop in pressure in the brake line of a train
are:

Reduction in speed that does not correspond to the track profile;

Frequent activation of compressors;

Rapid decrease in pressure in the main reservoirs after turning off the compressors when sandboxes and typhons are not working;

Triggering of the brake line rupture alarm with sensor No. 418.


The main control over the integrity of the train's brake line is carried out by the driver using control devices located in the control cabin.

2.3. Procedure for a train driver's actions in the event of a drop in pressure in the brake line of a passenger train, MVPS.

If the pressure in the brake line of a passenger (mail and luggage, freight-passenger) train or MVPS drops, the driver must apply emergency braking by placing the driver's crane handle in the emergency braking position, and the auxiliary brake handle in the extreme braking position until a complete stop. When applying emergency braking, a system for supplying sand under the wheelsets must be used. The supply of sand must be stopped at a speed of 10 km/h.

2.4. The procedure for a driver's actions in the event of a drop in pressure in the brake line of a freight train.

If, when a freight train is moving, its speed does not decrease without activating the brakes, but there are signs of a possible rupture of the brake line, the driver must immediately turn off the traction, move the handle of the driver's crane to position III for 5-7 seconds (overlap without power) and observe the pressure in the brake line, while:

If there is a rapid and continuous drop in pressure in the brake line or a sharp slowdown in the movement of the train that does not correspond to the track profile, perform service braking, then move the driver’s valve handle to position III and stop the train without using the auxiliary brake of the locomotive;

If there is no rapid and continuous decrease in pressure in the brake line and a sharp deceleration of the train, perform service braking by the amount of the first stage, then release the brakes in the prescribed manner;

In the event of repeated braking of the train due to spontaneous activation of the automatic brakes in the train, perform braking and release the automatic brakes in the established order, informing the DNC or DSP about this and declare a control check of the automatic brakes, coordinating with the DNC station for its implementation.

2.5. The procedure for transmitting information about a train stopping due to a drop in pressure in the brake line.

When a train is forced to stop due to a drop in pressure in the brake line, the driver (driver's assistant) is obliged to announce in the established manner by radio the place and reason for stopping the train, indicating the lack of information about the presence of the rolling stock gauge.

2.6. The procedure for inspecting the train composition.

When the train stops due to a drop in pressure in the brake line, the driver must send an assistant driver to inspect the train, having previously instructed him on the procedure.

Before leaving to inspect the train, the assistant driver must:

Write down the number of the tail car from the brake certificate, form VU-45;

Take signaling accessories with you and a flashlight at night;


When stopping a freight train on an unfavorable profile, take a brake shoe to secure the cars;

To determine the cause of the pressure drop in the brake line, inspect the entire train;

Having reached the last car, check it with the number indicated in the certificate of form VU-45, make sure that there are tail signals on the car, and also that the end valve is in the closed position, and the brake line hose is suspended on a bracket (in a passenger train, additionally check with the conductor of the tail car).

Inspection of a passenger train is carried out jointly with the train manager or train electrician.

2.7. Procedure for disconnecting brake hoses or other
violation of the integrity of the brake line on the train.

If a disconnection of the brake hoses is detected, the locomotive crew is obliged to:

Inspect them, replace them if necessary (remove them from the tail car or locomotive) and connect them, making sure that the number of the tail car corresponds to the number indicated in the certificate of form VU-45;

Perform a short brake test.

If a violation of the integrity of the train brake line is detected due to a malfunction of the brake equipment of the cars and the impossibility of eliminating it, the locomotive crew is obliged to:

In agreement with DSC, order an auxiliary locomotive from the tail
trains to remove the tail section from the section, or request carriage workers to eliminate the malfunction;

If the end valve to the faulty car is closed, secure the tail part of the train from the faulty car, in accordance with the norm
fastening.

2.8. Procedure for detecting a train disconnection (break).
If during inspection of the train a self-release or broken automatic couplers are detected, the assistant driver is obliged;

Take measures to secure the uncoupled part of the train by laying brake shoes on the side of the slope and actuating the existing hand brakes of freight cars, in accordance with the securing standards;

On a passenger train, through the car conductors, activate the hand brakes of each car of the uncoupled part;

Make sure that the number of the last car of the uncoupled group corresponds to the number indicated in the certificate of form VU-45;

Report to the driver about securing the uncoupled cars, the distance
between them, the condition of their automatic couplers and brake hoses.

After receiving information from the assistant driver, the driver coordinates further actions with the DNC.

In case of self-uncoupling, the locomotive crew is obliged to:

If possible, connect the train with settling speed
the head of the train no more than 3 km/h;


Replace damaged brake hoses with spare ones, and if they are
absence, remove from the tail car or front beam of the locomotive;

After the compound has adhered, perform a short brake test.
by the action of the brakes of the two tail cars.

The procedure for further actions in the event of a train disconnection (break) is determined by paragraphs 7.9. - 7.13. IDP.

If it is impossible to connect the train, the driver is obliged to request an auxiliary locomotive at the rear of the train.

When withdrawing part of a train from a section, it is necessary to protect the tail car of the withdrawn part of the train with an unfurled yellow flag at the buffer beam on the right side, and at night with a yellow light from a lamp and write down the numbers of the tail cars of the remaining part of the train and the withdrawn part.

In the event of a break in the automatic coupling devices of wagons, the driver is obliged to order a control check of the brakes.

2.9. Procedure for detecting rolling stock derailment.

If a rolling stock derailment is detected, the assistant driver is obliged to immediately secure the tail section of the train in accordance with the securing standards, fencing the derailment site in accordance with the fencing standards and report to the train driver.

The train driver, having received information about the rolling stock derailment, is obliged to:

Turn on the red lights of the buffer lights;

Provide train fencing in accordance with the established procedure;

Report to the DNC (chipboards limiting the stretch);

After a personal inspection of the gathering place, transfer the following information to the DNC (chipboards limiting the route):

are there any human casualties,

presence of clearance on the adjacent track,

indicate exactly at which kilometer and picket the derailment occurred, the nature of the terrain, whether there are any approaches to the railway track,

how many units of rolling stock derailed (is there a locomotive derailment),

data on the state of the contact network and contact network supports;

In the future, follow the instructions of the DNC.

2.10. The procedure for detecting a failure of the stop valve in the passenger
train.

If, during an inspection of a passenger train, it turns out that the pressure drop in the brake line was due to the failure of the stop valve, then no further inspection is carried out. The locomotive driver acts on the basis of the decision on further travel made by the train manager. The locomotive driver must receive a report in the established form, which is drawn up by the head of the train on the fact and reasons for the failure of the stop valve.


1. Procedure V If a malfunction is detected, there will be a “push” along the way.

3.1. If a lateral, vertical “push” is detected along the route, the train driver is obliged to:

Apply service brakes and monitor conditions closely
rolling stock until the train stops;

If, while traveling with a train, a track malfunction is detected that directly poses a threat to traffic safety (rail bending, track erosion, landslide, snow drift, track overshoot, etc.), apply emergency braking, taking all possible measures to stop the train to a dangerous place;

Immediately notify via train radio communication to the drivers following an oncoming or oncoming train (when a threat is created to the safety of traffic on an adjacent track), the chipboard limiting the stretch, or the DNC in the form:

"Attention, attention! Listen, everyone! I, the driver (surname) of train No. .... at.... km picket, detected a “push” (lateral, vertical or knock, etc.) at a speed of.... km /h. I don’t have (or have) information about the presence of a clearance on the adjacent track.”

When traveling with a passenger train, convey information about the reason for the stop to the head of the train.

Receive confirmation that the “push” information has been received
drivers following oncoming and oncoming trains, as well as chipboards limiting the stretch.

3.2. The DSP, having received a message from the driver about the presence of a “push” on the way, is obliged to stop sending passing trains to the stage along the specified track, and report the “push” on the way to the drivers of the trains sent from the station earlier and to the road foreman (track foreman).

3.3. After a passenger train stops, its inspection is carried out by the driver together with the train manager. Inspection of other trains is carried out by the train driver.

3.4. If during inspection of the train no faults are found in the locomotive, cars and track underneath the train, after the DSP report on the inspection results, movement is allowed at a speed of no more than 20 km/h. After passing the dangerous place, the entire train proceeds at the set speed.

3.5. If the cause of the shock was: a broken rail, track erosion, a collapse, track overshoot and other track faults that threaten the safety of train traffic, further movement of the train through a dangerous place is permitted only after inspection of this place by a track worker (not lower than the foreman position) and mandatory recording by him in the form DU-61 about the possibility of proceeding to a dangerous place, indicating the speed of movement.

If the train is stopped at a broken rail, on which, according to the conclusion of the track foreman (entry in the warning form for train DU-61), it is possible for a train to pass, then only the first train is allowed to pass along it. Passage of trains on a broken rail within a bridge or tunnel is prohibited in all cases.


In the event of an obstacle (track erosion, landslide, snow drift, fallen load, etc.) on an adjacent track, the driver must give a general alarm signal (one long and three short) and organize its fencing in accordance with the requirements of clause 3.16 of the Signaling Instructions on the railways of the Russian Federation dated May 26, 2000 No. TsRB-757.

3.6. The train driver who discovers a track fault, in the event of a radio communication fault, is obliged to take all possible measures to transmit the relevant information to the DSP or DNC. In exceptional cases, it is allowed to use cellular communications.

3.7. Drivers following oncoming trains, having received information about the “push”
are obliged:

Stop the train near the indicated location of the obstacle, make sure that further travel is possible, and proceed to this location with the entire train at a speed that ensures the safety of train movement, but not more than 20 km/h.

Report any malfunctions identified at the site of the obstacle via radio to the drivers behind the moving trains and the chipboard, and if a malfunction is detected that threatens traffic safety, stop the train and resume movement only after this malfunction is eliminated by the track workers.

3.8. Road foreman, and in his absence - foreman of the track on the first
train leaving the station, goes to the stage and takes the necessary measures to eliminate the malfunction.

4. Procedure locomotive crew in case of insufficient braking effect (failure of auto brakes).

4.1. In case of unsatisfactory operation of automatic brakes along the route, insufficient braking effect (if after the first stage of braking the initial effect is not obtained in a passenger train or multi-unit train within 10 s, in an empty freight train with a length of up to 400 axles and a passenger-and-freight train within 20 s, in other freight trains within 30 s), the driver is obliged to apply emergency braking and take all possible measures to stop the train.

Emergency braking is also applied when, when checking the operation of the automatic brakes, it is revealed that the required braking effect is not obtained at the distance established by local regulations to reduce the speed by 10 km/h in a freight, freight-passenger, passenger train, multi-unit train and single locomotive.

If there is no braking effect after applying emergency braking, the driver is obliged to take all measures to stop the train:

Move the double pull valve to the emergency braking position;

Activate the stop valve, emergency release valve buttons, emergency braking valves (on the series of locomotives where they are installed);

Call auto-stop braking, for which:


turn off the EPC if there is no pressure in the brake cylinders or the impulse line of the locomotive equipped with the KOH device;

turn off the EPC and turn it on without pressing the RB button;

turn off the EPC if there is no pressure in the brake cylinders or the impulse line on a locomotive equipped with a KOH device;

press and hold the RB button on a locomotive equipped with ALSN or KPD;

turn off the CLUB-U power switch when the EPK is turned on;

turn off the ALSN circuit breakers or the “locomotive alarm” button when the EPC is turned on;

Apply electric braking on those series of locomotives where this is provided. In this case, the locomotive brake must be released. It is not allowed to simultaneously use pneumatic and electric braking on electric and diesel locomotives in cases not provided for by the locomotive diagram;

On a passenger train, transmit by radio a requirement to the train manager about the need to activate the stop valves and hand brakes of the train, and if it is impossible to communicate via radio, give a “Three short” signal (request to the train crew employees to activate the hand brakes of the train);

If an attempt to stop the train fails, sound a general alarm and, via train radio communication, additionally inform the traffic control center in front of the station or the DNC about what happened so that they can take measures to freely accept the train into the station or allow the train to pass through the station.

4.2. After stopping the train, the driver must:

Fix the auxiliary brake valve in the extreme braking position and place it on the lock;

In accordance with the established procedure, report to the DNC or DSP of the nearest station, as well as to the drivers of following trains about the reason for the stop;

To find out the reason for the unsatisfactory operation of the auto brakes, check their operation for each car;

If, based on the results of this check, the reason for the unsatisfactory operation of the brakes has not been identified, notify the DNC directly or through the DSP about the need to carry out a control check of the brakes.

Taking into account the profile of the track and ensuring traffic safety, the driver and the DNC jointly determine the station at which the control check will be carried out, and the order of the train to this station based on a registered order transmitted to the driver via train radio communication.

The control check of the brakes is carried out jointly by workers of the locomotive, carriage (or passenger facilities on a passenger train).

4.3. When a train travels to a station, the driver is obliged to:

When the traffic light is green, proceed at a speed of no more than 40 km/h:

Traffic lights with a yellow indication proceed at a speed of no more than 20 km/h;


When approaching a traffic light with a prohibitory indication, stop the train at a distance of 400-500 m before the traffic light and then pull up at a speed of no more than 5 km/h.

4.4. In the event that the identified cause of brake failure cannot be eliminated, the locomotive crew is obliged to:

Secure the train from running away with brake shoes;

Apply hand brakes (if necessary);

The further procedure for removing the train from the stretch will be determined jointly with the DNC.

The train, in order to provide a brake pressure sufficient for safe exit from the stage, can be pulled out using several locomotives with their attachment to the train, or in parts, with each part of the train being pulled out from the stage provided with a brake pressure that ensures traffic safety.

locomotive crew on the procedure for action in emergency and non-standard situations due to violation normal operation auto brakes 2011

1. Procedure in case of signs of violation of the integrity of the train brake line

1.1. The main reasons for the drop in pressure in the brake line of a train are:

Disconnection of brake hoses or other violation of the integrity of the brake line on a train;

Breakage (self-release) of the automatic coupler in the train;

The assistant driver with 2 brake shoes moves forward to place them on the rails, observing personal safety measures. The driver leaves the locomotive in compliance with personal precautions.

security.

3.3. Message: “The carriages on the adjacent track have left”:

Apply emergency braking, simultaneously confirm the received message and specify the time of departure;

Direct the assistant driver forward to install the brake shoes on the rails along the adjacent track. Installation of brake shoes is carried out on both rail threads and by adding soil to the contact area of ​​the wheel with the nose of the brake shoe in order to reduce the likelihood of the brake shoe being knocked out when the wheel hits;

Report by radio about the forced stop and report to the DSC (DSP) about the measures taken.

4. Procedure in case of excessive pressure in the brake line of a passenger train

4.1. In the event of an unauthorized increase in pressure in the brake line of a passenger train, the overcharge of the TM is eliminated after it is stopped by the braking stage with the discharge of the equalization tank by 0.3-0.5 kg/cm2. In this case, the driver must:

In case of recharging the TM to 6 kgf/cm2, perform service braking with a discharge of up to 4 kgf/cm2 and release the brakes with an increase in pressure in the UR to 5.3-5.4 kgf/cm2 (this pressure value is 0.2-0.3 kgf/cm2 is higher than the pressure remaining in the reserve tank of the car with the smallest rod exit);

If the line is overcharged to 7 kgf/cm2, apply braking by reducing the pressure to

5 kgf/cm2, after 15-20s, release the brakes by increasing the pressure to 6.2-6.3 kgf/cm2, and after 1-1.5 minutes, perform braking again by reducing the pressure in the UR to 4 kgf/cm2 and release the brakes by increasing the pressure to 5.3-5.4 kgf/cm2;

In case of recharging to 8 kgf/cm2, perform three brakes, each time reducing the pressure by

2 kgf/cm2 and increasing it during tempering by 1.2 kgf/cm2 after 1-1.5 minutes.

In the case of recharging the brake line above the compressor switch-on pressure, take into account that if the pressure in the GR drops below the recharging pressure of the TM, the brakes on the train will operate. After the charging pressure has been restored, the driver must send an assistant driver to the rear of the train to check the release of the brakes. If during inspection the brakes of individual cars do not release, the assistant driver must release the brakes by releasing air from the spare tanks through Exhaust valve. After charging the train brakes, the train driver must brake with a discharge of TM by 0.5-0.6 kg/cm2 and release the brakes. The driver's assistant, when moving from the tail car to the locomotive, is obliged to check the release of all cars in the train.

5. The procedure for the locomotive crew when recharging the brake line as part of a freight train.

5.1. When controlling the brakes of a freight train (the air distributors are set to flat mode) and increasing the pressure in the brake line, the driver must check that the driver's valve handle is clearly set to the 2nd position. Provided that the driver's crane stabilizer is correctly adjusted at a rate of 0.2 kg/cm2 in 80-120 seconds and the density of the equalizing piston is satisfactory, the pressure will decrease to the charging piston automatically.

5.2. If, during the transition to normal charging pressure, it becomes necessary to apply control braking or spontaneous operation of the train’s automatic brakes occurs, the driver is obliged to:

Stop the train by discharging the brake line to the first stage value of 0.6-0.7 kg/cm2;

After stopping the train, reduce the pressure in the brake line to 3.5 kg/cm2 and after

1 minute, with the brake compressor operating and the maximum pressure in the supply line, release the brakes by increasing the pressure in the surge tank to 5.8 - 6.5 kg/cm2

5.3. The assistant driver is obliged to:

Inspect the train, making sure that the brakes of each car are released;

If cars with brakes that have not been released are identified, release them manually by discharging working chamber air distributor;

Upon arrival at the tail of the train, bleed the brake line;

Upon completion of purge of the brake line, together with the driver, perform a short test of the brakes by actuating 2 tail cars by discharging the brake line along

pressure gauge of the surge tank at 0.6 - 0.7 kg/sq. cm;

Write down the number of the tail car and make sure there is a tail signal;

When returning to the locomotive, check the release of the brakes on each car.

5.4. When recharging the brakes of a freight train with air distributors set to mountain mode, their release after stopping is done manually by discharging the working chamber.

5.5. If an increase in pressure is detected along the route when the valve handle is in the 2nd position, the driver must move the driver's valve handle to the 4th position, while:

If the increase in pressure has stopped, then, according to the operating conditions and at your own discretion, monitoring the condition of the train, continue moving to the first station alternating the 2nd and 4th positions, provided that you can maintain a constant pressure in the TM within 5.0 -5.2 kg/sq. cm;

If, while the train is moving, a slowdown in speed occurs that does not correspond to the track profile, immediately stop the train using the service brake to inspect it;

If the increase in pressure in the UR and TM has not stopped, to be able to proceed to the nearest station, with the driver’s valve handle in the 2nd position, increase the rate of elimination of overcharge pressure by tightening the stabilizer spring clockwise and, if this is not enough, smoothly loosen the valve plug at the top of the stabilizer.

6. The procedure for the train dispatcher and the station duty officer in the event that a train heading to the station has lost control of the brakes or when cars are leaving the station for the haul

6.1. The DSP, having received a message about the passage of a train that has lost control of the brakes, is obliged, depending on the train situation and if there is a free track at the station, to immediately prepare a route for receiving the train on the free track and, in agreement with the DSC, accept one of

the following solutions:

Organize by everyone by possible means stopping a train (installation of brake shoes, use of a locomotive, etc.);

If it is impossible to stop the train, ensure its passage to the next free section;

Direct the train to a catching, safety dead-end or to other tracks on which there is a possibility of stopping the train or reducing the degree of subsequent severe consequences;

in the absence of free tracks, catching, safety dead ends and access roads, as well as the impossibility of stopping the train using brake shoes or a locomotive,

direct the train onto one of the tracks occupied by rolling stock, in which there are no cars with people loaded with VMs and others dangerous goods, while using all types of communication, inform workers located on the territory of the station and, especially, in the zone of impending danger,

associated with the reception of an uncontrollable train. Regardless of the possibility of stopping the train on the stretch, the actions of station workers where an out-of-control train is heading are similar

listed.

If there is a train in the opposite direction on a stretch (or the track of a multi-track section), then the DNC and DSP are obliged to bring the current situation to the driver of this train by any possible means.

6.2. In the event of wagons leaving the station for the haul, the EAF, having received information about the wagons leaving, is obliged to:

Immediately inform all workers on the tracks about this, and the latter should take measures to detain the cars;

If it was not possible to detain the departing cars, immediately notify the DSC, DSP of the neighboring station about this and inform the drivers of the trains on the stretch. The duty officer at the station in the direction of which the carriages went, having received the message, is obliged to:

Prepare a route for receiving cars on the safest path (to a safety dead-end, an exhaust path, in the direction of the dumping device);

Prepare brake shoes to hold the cars;

Warn station workers and crossing guards;

Prevent cars from entering the track occupied by a passenger train, using all means for this purpose, including sending a locomotive or a locomotive with cars to meet the moving cars.

1. Procedure in case of signs of violation of the integrity of the train brake line

1.1. The main reasons for the drop in pressure in the brake line of a train are:
- separation of brake hoses or other violation of the integrity of the brake line in the train;
- breakage (self-release) of the automatic coupler in the train;
- derailment of rolling stock with violation of the integrity of the brake line;
- breakdown of the stop valve on a passenger train.
1.2. Signs of a possible train brake line rupture include:
- reduction in speed that does not correspond to the track profile;
- frequent switching on of compressors;
- rapid decline pressure in the main reservoirs after turning off the compressors when sandboxes and typhons are not working;
- activation of the brake line rupture alarm with sensor N 418;
- longitudinal-dynamic reactions in the composition, unusual for this track profile.
The integrity of the train's brake line is monitored by the driver using measuring and signaling devices located in the control cabin.
1.3. If the pressure in the brake line of a passenger (mail and luggage, freight and passenger) train drops, the driver must apply emergency braking by setting the handle of the driver's crane to the emergency braking position, turning on the sand supply and setting the auxiliary brake handle to the extreme braking position until a complete stop.
1.4. When a freight train is moving, if its speed does not decrease without activating the brakes, but there are signs of a possible rupture of the brake line, the driver must turn off the traction, move the handle of the driver's crane to position III for 5-7 seconds (overlap without power) and observe the pressure in the brake line, while:
- if there is a rapid and continuous drop in pressure in the brake line or a sharp slowdown in the movement of the train that does not correspond to the track profile, perform service braking, then move the driver’s valve handle to position III and stop the train without using the locomotive’s auxiliary brake;
- if there is no rapid and continuous decrease in pressure in the brake line and a sharp deceleration of the train, perform service braking by the amount of the first stage, then release the brakes in the prescribed manner;
- in the event of repeated braking of the train due to spontaneous activation of the automatic brakes in the train, in the absence of a continuous drop in pressure in the brake line when the driver's crane handle is set to position III - brake and release the automatic brakes in the established manner, informing the DNC or DSP about this and submitting a control check auto brakes, having agreed with the DNC station for its implementation.
1.5. When a train is forced to stop due to a drop in pressure in the brake line, the driver (driver's assistant) is obliged to announce in the established manner by radio the place and reason for stopping the train, indicating the lack of information about the presence of the rolling stock gauge.
1.6. When the train stops due to a drop in pressure in the brake line, the driver must send an assistant driver to inspect the train, having previously instructed him on the procedure.
Before leaving to inspect the train, the assistant driver must:
- write out the number of the tail car from the brake certificate, form VU-45;
- take signaling accessories with you, a flashlight at night;
- when stopping a freight train on an unfavorable profile, take a brake shoe to secure the cars;
- adjustable wrench;
- portable radio station;
- technical first aid kit.
To determine the cause of the pressure drop in the brake line, the assistant driver inspects the entire train. Having reached the last car, he checks it with the number indicated in the certificate form VU-45, makes sure that there are tail signals on the car, and also that the end valve is in the closed position, and the brake line hose is suspended on a bracket (in a passenger train additionally check with the conductor of the tail car).
Inspection of a passenger train is carried out jointly with the train manager or train electrician.
1.7. When disconnecting the brake hoses, check for signs of self-release on the train:
- traces of damage on the front stop of the impact sockets, the throat of the automatic coupler head;
- inspect the external condition of the brake hoses, traces of interaction with foreign parts of the track on the heads and rubber tubes of the hoses;
- write off the numbers of the cars between which a disconnection of the hoses was detected, upon arrival at the locomotive, make a reconciliation against the full-scale sheet
- nearby carriages. If the numbers do not correspond to the full-scale sheet, inform the dispatcher and agree on further actions.
If the brake hose is damaged, replace it with a spare one from the first aid kit or removed from the locomotive or tail car.
- make sure that the number of the tail car corresponds to the number specified in the certificate form VU-45, check the air permeability of the brake line by opening the valve of the tail car and briefly test the brakes.
If a violation of the integrity of the train brake line is detected due to a malfunction of the brake equipment of the cars and the impossibility of eliminating it, the locomotive crew is obliged to:
- in agreement with the DSC, order an auxiliary locomotive from the tail of the train to remove the tail section from the stage, or request carriage workers to eliminate the malfunction;
- if the end valve to the faulty car is closed, secure the tail part of the train from the faulty car, in accordance with the fastening standard in accordance with Appendix 1.
1.8. Procedure for detecting a train disconnection (break).
If during inspection of the train a self-release or broken automatic couplers are detected, the assistant driver is obliged to:
- take measures to secure the uncoupled part of the train by laying brake shoes on the side of the slope and activating the existing hand brakes of freight cars, in accordance with the securing standards;
- in a passenger train, through the car conductors, activate the hand brakes of each car of the uncoupled part;
- make sure that the number of the last car of the uncoupled group corresponds to the number indicated in the certificate of form VU-45;
- report to the driver about the securing of uncoupled cars, the distance between them, the condition of their automatic couplers and brake hoses.
After receiving information from the assistant driver, the driver coordinates further actions with the DNC.
In the passenger train, report the self-release to the train manager. Together with him and the train electrician, after disconnecting the high-voltage heating cable of the train, inspect the automatic coupling devices. If the locks of both automatic couplers remain mobile and there are no visible faults in them, the assistant driver, in the presence of the train manager, must couple the cars with a settling speed of the head of the train of no more than 3 km/h. During the connection, the train manager is in the vestibule of the car at a working stop valve, monitoring the access and coupling of parts of the train.
In the event of a malfunction of the mechanism of one of the automatic couplers of disconnected cars, after connecting the train, replace it internal mechanism automatic coupler removed from the automatic coupler of the last car or locomotive. If it is impossible to replace the mechanism or the automatic coupler is faulty, request an auxiliary locomotive.
- on a freight train, check the serviceability of the automatic coupler mechanism and connecting hoses of disconnected cars. After receiving information from the assistant driver about exiting the inter-car space, connect the train, while settling the head of the train should be done with extreme caution so that when coupling cars the speed does not exceed 3 km/h
- replace damaged brake hoses with spare ones, and if they are missing, remove them from the tail car or front beam of the locomotive;
After connecting the parts of the train on the stretch, charge the brakes, briefly test the brakes on the two tail cars, remove the brake shoes from under the cars, release the hand brakes and remove the rest of the train from the stage.
It is prohibited to connect parts of a train during a stretch:
a) during fog, snowstorm and other unfavorable conditions, when signals are difficult to distinguish;
b) if the uncoupled part is on a slope steeper than 2.5 o/oo and can move away from the push when connected in the direction opposite to the direction of movement of the train.
If it is impossible to connect the train, the driver must request an auxiliary locomotive at the rear of the train, additionally indicating in the application the exact distance between the separated parts of the train.
When withdrawing part of a train from a section, it is necessary to protect the tail car of the withdrawn part of the train with an unfurled yellow flag at the buffer beam on the right side, and at night with a yellow lamp light and write down the numbers of the tail cars of the remaining part of the train and the withdrawn part.
It is prohibited to leave trains containing cars with people and dangerous goods of class 1 (explosive materials) on the stretch without security.
In the event of a break in the automatic coupling devices of wagons, the driver is obliged to order a control check of the brakes.
1.9. Procedure for detecting rolling stock derailment.
If a rolling stock derailment is detected, the assistant driver is obliged to immediately secure the tail section of the train in accordance with the securing standards.
The train driver, having received information about the rolling stock derailment, is obliged to:
- turn on the red lights of the buffer lamps;
- provide train fencing in accordance with the established procedure;
- report to the DNC (chipboards limiting the stretch);
- after a personal inspection of the gathering place, transfer the following information to the DNC (chipboards limiting the route):
whether there are human casualties;
presence of clearance on the adjacent track;
indicate exactly at which kilometer and picket the derailment occurred, the nature of the terrain, whether there are any approaches to the railway track;
how many units of rolling stock derailed and characteristics of the cargo;
is there a derailment of the locomotive;
data on the state of the contact network and contact network supports;
In the future, follow the instructions of the DNC.
If a passenger train stops, fencing is done from the head side by the driver's assistant, and from the tail by the conductor of the last passenger car by laying firecrackers at a distance of 1000 m from the head and tail of the train.
When stopping other trains, fencing is carried out by the driver's assistant by placing firecrackers on the adjacent track from the side of the train expected along this track at a distance of 1000 m from the obstacle. If the head of the train is located more than 1000 m from the obstacle, firecrackers on the adjacent track are placed opposite the locomotive. If the train driver receives a message that a train has been sent along an adjacent track in the wrong direction, he must radio the assistant driver to lay firecrackers at the same distance from the obstacle on the opposite side.
In areas where passenger trains operate at speeds over 120 km/h, the distances at which firecrackers must be placed are set by the owner of the infrastructure.
After laying the firecrackers, the driver's assistant and the carriage conductor must move 20 m away from the place where the firecrackers were laid back to the train and show a red signal in the direction of a possible approaching train.
When servicing locomotives of passenger trains by one driver, fencing of the train during a forced stop on a stretch is carried out by the head (mechanic-foreman) of the passenger train and the carriage conductors at the driver’s direction, transmitted via radio communication.
1.10. Procedure for detecting a failure of the stop valve on a passenger train.
If, during an inspection of a passenger train, it turns out that the pressure drop in the brake line was due to the failure of the stop valve, then no further inspection is carried out. The locomotive driver acts on the basis of the decision on further travel made by the train manager. The locomotive driver must receive a report in the established form, which is drawn up by the head of the train on the fact and reasons for the failure of the stop valve.

If, while a freight train is moving, its speed decreases without activating the brakes, signs of a possible brake line rupture have appeared: frequent switching on of compressors, a rapid decrease in pressure in the main reservoirs after turning off the compressors when the sandboxes and typhons are not working, the activation of a brake line rupture alarm with sensor No. 418, the driver must immediately turn off the traction for 3-5 With move the handle of the driver's tap to position III (roof without power) and observe the pressure in the brake line.

If there is a rapid and continuous drop in pressure in the brake line or a sharp deceleration in the movement of a train that does not correspond to the track profile, it is necessary to perform service braking at a step of 0.5-1.0 kgf/cm 2, then move the driver’s crane handle to position III and stop the train without using the auxiliary brake of the locomotive. After the train stops, identify and eliminate the fault.

Without waiting for the train to stop, turn on two red buffer lights on the locomotive. When an oncoming train appears, give signals by briefly flashing the spotlight, call the driver of the oncoming train via train radio and inform him that there is no information about the condition of the train and the presence of clearance on the adjacent track.


At the same time, via radio communication, inform the train dispatcher, the attendants at the stations limiting the stretch, and the drivers of oncoming and passing trains on the stretch, and in the passenger train, the head of the train about what happened, including in the message information about the condition of the train and the gauge on the adjacent no information path available.

At the same time, the driver of the oncoming train, having received a message from the driver of the stopped train, information about the train stopping due to the brakes being activated and his lack of information about the presence of clearance on the adjacent track, as well as if there are red lights at the buffer beam, take measures to reduce the speed from in such a way as to follow a stationary train at a speed of no more than 20 km/h, and proceed further with special vigilance and readiness to stop immediately if an obstacle to further movement is encountered. If the driver of an oncoming train has received information that there has been a derailment of rolling stock on an adjacent track that has gone beyond the gauge of the rolling stock, he must stop the train with his head near the locomotive of the oncoming train, and if it is not possible to smoothly reduce the speed in time, apply emergency braking.

If, when the driver's crane handle is set to position III, there is no rapid and continuous decrease in pressure in the brake line and a sharp deceleration of the train, perform service braking by the amount of the first stage, then release the brakes in the established order. In the event of repeated braking of the train due to spontaneous activation of the automatic brakes in the train, brake and release the automatic brakes in the established order, reporting the brake malfunction to the train dispatcher or the station duty officer, and at the same time request a control check of the automatic brakes. Proceed to the nearest station where there is a service station for cars or to the station indicated by the train dispatcher.



If the “TM” warning lamp of the brake line rupture indicator lights up while parked, it is necessary to check the serviceability of the indicator by the braking stage, at which the “TM” lamp should go out. Having ensured that the indicator is in good working order, after restoring the charging pressure, check the density of the brake network in position II of the driver's crane handle, which should not differ from the density specified in the certificate of form VU-45, by more than 20% in the direction of decreasing or increasing. If the HM density does not meet these conditions, perform a short brake test. Report the incident to the train dispatcher or station duty officer.


8.5.4 Spontaneous braking of a passenger train and open circuit of electro-pneumatic brakes

The most likely reason for spontaneous braking of a passenger train (in the absence of a decrease in pressure in the brake line) is the supply of power to the EPT circuit from an external source, regardless of whether the EPT power source on the locomotive is turned on or not.



Most often this occurs due to the inter-car connection touching the lighting circuit, which has broken insulation of the head of the connecting sleeve of the conventional unit. No. 369A.

Since in the lighting network of the train the “minus” is the car body, and the “plus” gets into the head of the hose (control wire No. 2), then through the contact in the head of the connecting hose of the tail car, all electric air distributors receive power from the working wire No. 1. No. 305. As a result, the train is completely braked without turning on the warning light on the locomotive. If at the same time the EPT power source on the locomotive was turned on, and the driver’s crane handle was set to the overlapping position, then due to the opposite switching on of the locomotive power converter and the car power supply, a short circuit would occur, leading to the activation of the current protection in the static converter and the disconnection of the EPT power source from the chain.

Foreign voltage entering the EPT circuit can also occur on locomotives, mainly electric locomotives that have a single-wire control circuit.

To identify and eliminate the cause of self-braking of the EPT, the auxiliary brake of the locomotive is activated, the power source of the EPT is turned off (if it was turned on), and, by closing the end valves, the hoses between the locomotive and the first car are disconnected. If the brakes of the first car are released, you need to look for a malfunction on the locomotive, paying attention to the position of the relay for turning on the EPT circuit when the autostop is activated. If the brakes of the first car do not release, then it is necessary to inspect the inter-car connections of the lighting circuits and, where they touch the heads of the connecting sleeves, hang the wires, eliminating the contact, notify the conductor, who, if necessary, can turn off the car lighting circuit. If the reason for braking has not been identified and the brakes do not release, it is necessary to disconnect both EPT wires in the last terminal box of the last car and insulate them, thus creating an open circuit between wires No. 1 and 2. For the same purpose, you can jam the ball contact of the connecting head


tail car sleeves in a recessed position (insert insulated objects between the ball and its socket).

The reason for the braking of an individual car when traveling to the EPT may be damage (breakdown) of the selenium diode of the electric air distributor of the conventional unit. No. 305, which is determined by strong reactions in the train when braking. The serviceability of the diode is determined by full testing of the EPT at the train formation or turnover stations. If the diode is damaged along the route (strong reactions on the train), they switch to automatic brakes.

An open circuit of the EPT or failure of its devices leads to the extinguishing of the EPT signal lamp.

In this case, the driver must turn off the EPT power source and switch to controlling the auto brakes. But if the EPT circuit is broken during braking, the power source is not immediately turned off, but a deep reduction in pressure in the brake line is first performed.

The need for such an action is explained as follows. If the EPT circuit breaks during braking, the braking efficiency of the train depends on the time of transition to pneumatic braking. So, at pause 3 With the pressure in the brake cylinders decreases from 4.0 to 1.8-2.0 kgf/cm 2 as a result of air escaping through the electric air distributor. Then, if emergency braking was applied, the pressure in the cylinders for 2-4 With increases to maximum due to the action of air distributor No. 292. Thus, the time to restore pressure in the brake cylinder will be 6-7 s. If following the EPT was short-term, the spare reservoir does not have time to charge to normal pressure and the newly established maximum pressure in the brake cylinder will be lower than the initial one (3.8 kgf/cm 2 instead of 4.0 kgf/cm 2).

When braking the EPT with a discharge of the brake line, air distributor No. 292 does not operate, since in this case the pressure in its spool chamber, as well as in the spare reservoir, decreases due to the supply of air to the brake cylinder. Therefore, after the EPT circuit breaks, the brakes are released. To activate the air distributor. No. 292, it is necessary to reduce the pressure in the line to a value corresponding to full service or emergency braking. However, when braking the EPT with a discharge of the brake line, braking occurs in those cars where the EPT has not worked or is missing.


8.5.5 Changing the length of a train brake line


■ First method: when the pressure in the line decreases by 0.5 kgf/cm 2 the release of air into the atmosphere through the valve (the handle is in position IV) with four or fewer cars should stop immediately, with eight - after 2-3 With, at 16 - after 7-9 s, at 20 - after 11-13 s.

■ Second method: when moving the operator’s valve handle (RCC) from position I to position II after increasing the pressure in the surge tank by 0.5 kgf/cm 2 above the charging point in a train of 12 or more cars, air is not discharged from the brake line (TM) into the atmosphere. The release of pressure indicates a shortening of the brake line, since in position I of the RCM, charging of the brake occurs faster than the equalization reservoir. The longer the reset time, the shorter the line. The locomotive crew must notify the carriage workers about the suspicion of TM blockage in order to determine the reasons and location of the TM air duct blockage and, after eliminating the malfunction, perform a short brake test.

If the brake line is clogged (the end valves are closed) and the vehicle is following the EPT, the first few braking sessions will be effective due to the residual air pressure in the reserve reservoirs. Continued use of the EPT may result in the passage of a prohibiting signal. Therefore, it is important in all cases mentioned in the Brake Operating Instructions to test the brakes and check their operation along the route.

On a freight train, closure of end valves or blockage of the brake line can be detected by comparing the time of pressure drop in the main reservoirs when the train departs from the starting station and along the route.

Such a comparison must be carried out after a long stay or after repair work has been carried out on the train. A sharp increase (more than 20%) in the time of pressure drop in the main tanks may be a consequence of a decrease in leaks due to a reduction in the length of the train main. Having discovered it along the route, it is necessary to check the operation of the brakes, and at a stop - the condition of the train's brake line by performing a short brake test.

If the locomotive is equipped with a brake line break indicator, cond. No. 418, then the end valves are closed or the line is broken


easily determined by the lighting of the “TM” signal lamp. When the alarm goes off in a parking lot, check its serviceability by performing the first stage of braking, at which the “TM” lamp should go out. If the indicator is in working order, inspect the composition and perform a short test of the car brakes.

To determine the location of the blockage in the brake line, it is necessary to perform braking, and if the brakes on part of the train do not work or are not released during vacation, then the location of the blockage must be looked for in the first car of this part or in the one standing in front of it.

In a freight train, as in a passenger train, it is possible to detect the overlap of the end valves in the first 10-15 cars by moving the driver's valve handle from the train position to position I and returning it back to the train position. If the brake line is short, air is released into the atmosphere through the driver's valve. Therefore, when departing trains, this method of checking TM for shortening is practiced.

In all cases of detection of shortening of the vehicle along the route, apply emergency braking and find out the reasons.

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